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This study examines the problem of low level tax compliance in 
Tanzania. It proceeds from the premise that high level taxpayer 
compliance is essential to the success of the tax system. Unless 
taxpayer compliance is achieved at sufficient levels, the performance 
of the tax system will be significantly impaired. 
The study notes that the complimentality which must exist between 
enforcement and voluntary compliance is not given sufficient 
recognition. Tax enforcement alone (namely, detection and 
punishment of tax non-compliance), will not, of itself, lead to high 
level tax compliance. Voluntary taxpayer compliance must be 
promoted to the highest degree, and the multifaceted nature of non-
compliance must be fully appreciated. 
The study attempts to demonstrate that there is an inter-play 
between good governance and taxpayer compliance which is not 
sufficiently recognised. It argues that tax compliance levels reflect 
the effectiveness of tax administration, taxpayer attitudes towards 
taxation, and their attitudes towards government in general. These 
attitudes are formed in a social context by such factors as the 
perceived fairness of the tax structure, the ability of government to 
deliver services to its people, and the legitimacy of government. Quite 
apart from the legitimacy that arises from the democratic mandate, 
good governance in itself gives the government legitimacy. In turn, 
the legitimacy of government creates public confidence in the tax 
system and provides the basis for taxpayer willingness to pay tax. 
Tax reforms which aim only at reforming the tax administration so as 
to make it more modern, efficient, and responsive, cannot achieve 
optimum tax compliance if such tax administration reform does not 
go hand in hand with the creation of a caring attitude in the tax 
institution backed up by a government committed to serving its 
people. 
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Dear Sirs, 
A Note on the Revisions 
I have undertaken the following revisions to the thesis: 
I have substantially re-written chapters one, two and eight, and have 
reorganised the sections in each of those chapters to achieve a better 
flow of content and better linkages between chapters and section. 
I have clarified the research problem to focus on low level tax 
compliance in Tanzania. 
I have clarified the objective of the research underscoring the 
complimentality that needs to exist between enforcement and 
persuasive strategies showing how pursuit of enforcement alone (or 
over reliance on it) will not yield high level tax compliance. 
I have re-stated the hypotheses so as to align them better with the 
analysis and discussion undertaken in the thesis. 
I have clarified both in the objectives of study and in the hypotheses 
that the jurisdiction studied is Tanzania. 
I have removed both the suggestion that the study is empirical and 
comparative making it clear from both the title of the thesis and the 
statement of the problem that the study is analytical and focused only 
on Tanzania. 
I have re-worked the transitions between chapters so that each 
succeeding chapter draws from the preceding one and feeds into the 
next, all flowing from the hypotheses and the objectives of study 
outlined in chapter one. 
I have made better attempt throughout the thesis to support 
assertions with research material and to better reflect how the 
statements or opinions I make are backed up by written authority. 
I have removed from the footnotes lengthy comments or notes on 
authors incorporating these in the text to reflect readership better. 
I have included in the text more specific references to the books and 
read material to provide better support for the propositions and 
assertions I make in the thesis. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
I have added significantly to the volume of literature and the 
discussion of that literature in relation to key concepts underpinning 
the thesis such as governance, compliance, tax policy, tax 
administration and others. 
I have revised chapter three slightly to include more recent literature 
published since 2008 when I first submitted. 
I have aligned chapters four to seven with the changes made to 
chapters one and two. 
I have updated to 2010 much of the data in the thesis to incorporate 
tax information that has become available since July 2008 (when I 
first submitted). 
I have revised chapter 8 to reflect better the findings and conclusions 
of the study. 
I have shortened the Abstract at the beginning of thesis. 
While I have expunged some sections of previous text, the additional 
readership has grown the thesis slightly from the 82,000 words it was 
to 86,000 (it was difficult to remain within the 80,000 word limit 
recommended) . 
Sincerely, 
Kibuta Ongwamuhana 
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This study focuses primarily on tax compliance in Tanzania, but it 
also examines relevant data from neighbouring countries such as 
Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, and Zambia, which have undergone tax 
administration reforms similar to Tanzania, and are equally 
concerned with tax compliance. 
The major finding of the study is that existing tax laws in Tanzania do 
not encourage taxpayers to comply with taxes voluntarily. The tax 
laws are tilted more towards enforcement and do not sufficiently 
address the involvement and protection of taxpayer. There are also 
governance issues, both in relation to the state and in relation to the 
tax administration which alienate taxpayers and causes them not to 
take ownership of the tax system. 
The study makes the recommendation that tax laws need to be 
reviewed, negative governance issues which impact adversely on 
taxpayer compliance attitudes in Tanzania must be addressed, and 
over-reliance on enforcement must be avoided, if high level tax 
compliance is to be achieved. 
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Chapter One: Tax Compliance 
1.1 Introduction and Background 
In defining tax, Professor Tiley 1 quotes from the Oxford English 
Dictionary describing tax as 'a compulsory contribution to the 
support of government levied on persons, property, mcome, 
commodities, transactions etc, now at a fixed rate mostly 
proportionate to the amount on which the contribution is levied'. 
However, Professor Tiley says that, this definition of tax when 
stripped of its limited view as to the purpose of taxation, its irrelevant 
description of the tax base and its undue stress on proportionate as 
opposed to progressive taxation, tells very little beyond the fact that 
taxes are compulsory. 
The compulsory nature of taxation is underscored by many who 
attempt to define taxation. Cooley's definition2 describes taxes as 'the 
enforced contributions from persons and property levied by the state 
by virtue of its sovereign power for the support of government and for 
all public needs'. Whitehouse and Vaines3 strip the tax definition to 
three elements, 'a compulsory levy, imposed by government, to raise 
money for public purposes'. The 2009 edition of the Oxford Dictionary 
of Law4 also·underlines the compulsory nature of taxation saying that 
'tax is a compulsory contribution to the state's funds'. Unlike the 
Oxford English Dictionary, the Oxford Dictionary of Law does not 
refer to the purpose tax or manner of imposition, as these are indeed 
irrelevant to the essential character. 
Given the compulsory character of taxes, it may seem odd that this 
study sets out to make a case for voluntary tax payment, and speak 
1 J Tiley Revenue Law 6th ed (2008) 3. 
2 Quoted in Blacks Law Dictionary 9 th ed (2009) 1594 [from TM Cooley The Law of 
Taxation 4th ed (1924) 61-63]. 
3 C Whitehouse and P Vaines Revenue Law - Principles and Practice 20th ed (2002) 
5. 
4 Oxford Dictionary of Law 7th ed (2009) 541. 
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against the predominant use of coerCIOn In securing taxpayer 
compliance with taxes. 
Even though taxes are compulsory, they are readily justified by 
many. There are those who justify taxation on account of the role 
government plays in sustaining the protection of life, liberty and the 
pursuit of happiness. 5 There others who justify taxation on account 
of the public services provided by government such as education, 
health and security.6 All these functions are funded largely by 
revenues from taxation. Therefore there is some inherent good in the 
existence of government and taxation is seen as a necessary 
consequence. 
The imperative of government and the resulting need for taxation 
gives rise to a duty for the public to comply with tax payment. The 
obligation to pay tax is not only self evident, but should also be 
readily acceptable. Professor Bird says that: 
"In an ideal law abiding society, people would pay taxes they 
owe. Tax administration in such a setting would amount to 
little more than the provision of facilities for citizens to 
discharge this responsibility. No such country exists, or is 
likely to exit. Compliance with tax laws must be crated, 
cultivated, monitored, and enforced in all countries. "7 
However, voluntary payment of tax remains largely illusory. 
Broomberg and Kruger, say that 'most people, at best of times, dislike 
paying tax'.8 This is a widely held view. For Tanzania, Maliyamkono, 
writing with the colonial history in mind, notes that "the history of 
taxation in the country (Tanzania) has led to a situation where many 
people and companies see no shame in avoiding paying tax and 
5 T Maliyamkonono et al Why Pay Tax (2009) 2. 
6 C Whitehouse and P Vaines Revenue Law - Principles and Practice 20th ed (2002) 
6. 
7 R M Bird 'Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Transitional Countries' in 
International Studies in Taxation: Law and Economics eds G Lindecrona, S Lodin 
and B Wiman (1999) 7l. 
8 E B Broomberg and Des Kruger Tax Strategy 3rd ed (1998) 1. 
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where small enterprises will find it beneficial to remain outside the 
formal taxed economy."9 Attributing the dislike for taxes on the 
colonial history of Tanzania is a bit lame because even in countries 
which have not known colonialism taxation is not readily accepted. 
Nonetheless, tax compliance remains an important component In 
designing tax systems and in administering tax legislation. The need 
to secure compliance is an avoidable imperative. Bird sums it up: 
"Given the universality of the free rider instinct, an element of 
coercion seems inherent in the fmancing of public goods. Tax 
compliance to a considerable extent thus depends ultimately 
upon the perceived ability of the tax administration to detect 
and bring tax offenders to book."lO 
All taxation is based on law. Most Constitutions prohibit taxation 
except in accordance with laws duly enacted by the legislative 
authority. In Tanzania, Article 138(1) of the Constitution provides 
that "No tax of any kind shall be imposed save in accordance with a 
law enacted by Parliament or pursuant to a procedure lawfully 
prescribed and having the force of law or by virtue of a law enacted by 
Parliament" .11 
Tax laws are enact d In the belief that taxpayers will comply with 
them. Looking at the laws, the policy statements, and the conduct of 
tax administrators, the underlying assumptions behind tax laws 
appear to be that: 
(i) there is a sufficiently high legal literacy amongst the population 
to understand the taxation laws and the obligations which tax 
laws impose; 
9 T Maliyamkonono et al Why Pay Tax (2009) 7. 
10 R M Bird 'Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Transitional Countries' in 
International Studies in Taxation: Law and Economics eds G Lindecrona, S Lodin 
and B Wiman (1999) 72. 
11 The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977, 2005 Edition issued 
by the Office of the Attorney General, at 123. 
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(ii) there is a high enough sense of civic duty among taxpayers to 
easily and rapidly appreciate the need for tax laws; 
(iii)the high sense of civic duty will drive taxpayers to accept tax 
laws and willingly bear tax obligations; and 
(iv)the few errant taxpayers will find the enforcement measures in 
the tax laws a sufficient deterrent to mould them back into the 
fold. 
I t would seem from prevailing tax practice that tax policy framers and 
tax administrators believe that in the absence of the above 
assumptions, it would be pointless to enact laws which are unlikely 
to be respected. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
The problem to be examined in this study is why the tax compliance 
level in Tanzania is poor. The proposition put forward is that there is 
not enough recognition of the complimentality which must exist 
between enforcement and voluntary tax payment. The near singular 
emphasis placed on tax enforcement undermines voluntary tax 
payment and alienates taxpayers from the tax system. 
The factors which show that the tax administration in Tanzania has 
not succeeded in the important task of securing high level taxpayer 
compliance are the narrow tax base, the prevalence of dissatisfaction 
with taxation, and a perception that the tax administration is high-
handed and severely tainted with corruption. 
The Tanzania Revenue Authority (the TRA), established by law as a 
semi-autonomous government agency IS responsible for the 
administration and collection of central government taxes in 
Tanzania. The TRA is acutely aware of the problem of tax non-
compliance and has been addressing aspects of non-compliance in 
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implementing the First, Second and Third Corporate Plan. 12 In the 
meantime however, faced with a general dissatisfaction with taxation, 
and low levels of voluntary taxpayer compliance, the TRA has tended 
to rely heavily on detection and punishment of non-compliant 
taxpayers. With detection and punishment underpinning tax 
administration strategies in Tanzania, audits and inspections have 
become a regular rather than random feature of tax law 
administration. There is a culture of criminal prosecutions and fiscal 
penalties which characterises the response of tax administrators to 
non-compliance. 
However, it is argued In this study that enforcement measures are 
costly in both monetary and psychological terms. A tax system which 
is heavily reliant on tax enforcement needs a large team of tax 
auditors and tax investigators who all must be well equipped to do 
their job. It also needs to involve court bailiffs and property 
auctioneers. It needs to involve as well the police for protection, or to 
give police powers to tax administrators. All this increases the cost of 
tax collection and eats into tax revenues. Tax enforcement is also 
limited by the capacity of the country to allocate tax enforcement 
resources. As a result, enforcement can have only limited success in 
boosting compliance with taxes. 
It is also noted in the study that undue reliance on tax enforcement 
can be counter-productive and may reduce taxpayer compliance. 
Enforcement procedures are by their very nature intrusive. Fear and 
punishment can work only up to a point beyond which they generate 
resentment and resistance from taxpayers. The greater the extent of 
tax enforcement powers, and the more often they are used, the more 
taxpayer-hostility they tend to generate. 
The study puts forward the proposition that if the factors which 
account for the low level of voluntary taxpayer compliance are 
12 see Chapter Two, section 2.6 discussing the 'Public Perception of the Tax System 
in Tanzania'. 
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addressed and remedied, a much higher tax compliance level can be 
achieved. Stated differently, the level of tax compliance will 
significantly improve if there is a high level of voluntary tax payment. 
The study attempts to dispel the suggestion that voluntary taxpayer 
compliance is merely an ideal, possibly a myth. It demonstrates how 
voluntary tax payment can be made a reality. It also discusses wider 
governance issues which have been shown to impact significantly on 
taxpayer compliance patterns. The study attempts to formulate 
compliance principles which may be used to realize voluntary 
taxpayer compliance and improve the administration of taxes. 
1.3 The Relevance of the Thesis 
The relevance of this study is to make a case that it is not only the 
threat of prosecution, fines and jail terms which make taxpayers 
comply with their tax obligations. In fact there are many taxpayers 
who will evade taxes notwithstanding that there are severe penalties 
for tax evasion. 
There are several factors which make people comply with tax laws. 
Some taxpayers pay their taxes voluntarily because deep in their 
hearts they believe that paying taxes is their civic responsibility in 
respect of which they need no one to push them or threaten them. 
Others believe that it is in their best interests to comply with tax 
obligations because they receive benefits from the government worthy 
of their tax contributions. There are also those who believe in paying 
their taxes because of the culture they have inherited and they are 
proud of such culture. They were born in that culture and will do 
everything to continue it because it is their obligation to do so. Others 
comply with tax because of their religious belief which equates non-
payment of tax with theft which is sin. Yet others do so because of 
their desire to belong and interact socially. The stigma associated 
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with tax evasion is so powerful in the psychology of this group that 
an individual would feel ostracised if they become associated with tax 
cheats. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there are those groups who resent 
taxation and believe that there is no justification for it. They perceive 
taxation and the whole matter of government as an intrusion into 
one's privacy. Some use the government's failure to deliver public 
services to an acceptable level as justification for not paying their 
taxes. Even when government efficiently delivers public services, 
they are quick to say that the government has that duty, and there 
should be no quid pro quo to justify taxation. They will use the 
failings of government (corruption, authoritaria ism, wastefulness 
and unfairness in the tax system) to claim legitimacy for non-
payment of tax and for their resistance. This study makes a case 
that even this class of people can be made to comply voluntarily with 
their tax obligations through a mix of tax compliance strategies which 
have persuasion (rather than threat and sanctions) at the center of 
the mix. 
The study puts forward the proposition that a tax administration can 
win the hearts and minds of taxpayers by treating them with respect. 
The government through responsible administration can influence 
positive taxpayer attitudes by ensuring that the benefits flowing from 
taxes are visible to the public and the taxation system is balanced 
and fair. 
Much of the funding which is now overbearingly in favour of tax 
enforcement could be redirected towards promoting voluntary tax 
compliance and both the savings emerging and the enhanced tax 
revenues to be realized, can be channeled to improve services in 
education, health and in government investment in the productive 
sectors. 
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The conclusions from this study are relevant because they proceed 
from an understanding (rarely appreciated by tax administrators) that 
governments are generally limited in their ability to fund tax 
enforcement. The governments of developing countries such as 
Tanzania are more severely limited in this regard because of the 
shortage of money and the skills necessary to make tax enforcement 
work. Given these circumstances, a mix of enforcement and 
persuasive strategies is an imperative and resource allocation is best 
maximized by investing as well in voluntary taxpayment schemes. 
1.4 Objectives of the Research 
The primary objective of this study is to examine why the level of tax 
compliance in Tanzania is poor. Proceeding on the basis that there is 
not enough recognition in Tanzania of the complimentality which 
needs to exist between enforcement and voluntary tax payment, and 
that the undue emphasis placed on tax enforcement undermines 
voluntary tax payment and alienates taxpayers from the tax system, 
the secondary objectives of the study are: 
(i) To show the complimentality that needs to exist between 
enforcement and persuasion and show that inordinate 
reliance on enforcement is counter-productive and may 
undermine tax compliance; 
(ii) To explore and reveal the factors which influence taxpayer 
behaviour and which account for taxpayer compliance; 
(iii) To underscore the interface between good governance and 
voluntary taxpayer compliance and show how governance 
impacts on compliance; and 
(iv) To show how immensely complex and multifaceted taxpayer 
compliance is, and therefore the need for multidimensional 
strategies in such compliance. 
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1.5 Research Methodology 
The research conducted used a variety of methods. The first IS 
documentary research. This entailed the collection and reVIew of 
policy documents, legislation, research reports and recorded 
information from public debates which are relevant to the subject. 
Documentary research also involved the identification and critical 
examination of literature which is available on the subject so as to 
establish the state of knowledge on voluntary taxpayer compliance. 
The sources of literature and documents included institutional 
libraries, the internet for electronic information, government offices 
(especially the Tanzania Revenue Authority - TRA, the Ministry of 
Finance, the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, the 
Bank of Tanzania, the office of the Attorney General, the National 
Bureau of Statistics, the Eastern and Southern African Universities 
Research Program - ESAURP, the Economic and Social Research 
Foundation - ESRF, the Research on Poverty Alleviation - REPOA, the 
Institute of Resource Assessment, and University libraries. Other 
sources included country offices of organisations such as the World 
Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the African Development 
Bank. 
A second method used was selective interviews. Although it was 
initially intended to conduct wider surveys to gauge perceptions and 
attitudes towards the tax system, the review of the literature at the 
outset showed that sufficient data already existed from very recent 
surveys carried out by the National Bureau of Statistics and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. These two surveys were done in 2003 and 
2007 and contain adequate data to satisfy the purposes of this 
thesis. 13 There was not much point in undertaking a largely similar 
13The two surveys were carried out meticulously and covered a sufficiently wide 
field of respondents generating reliable results. The data from the two surveys is 
examined and used in this thesis. 
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survey which would very likely only replicate results already 
documented. 
A third research method relied on was the examination and analysis 
of the existing laws in Tanzania, and where possible, the other 
countries in Eastern Africa. This also included examination and 
analysis of the current Practice Notes and Rulings issued by the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority; an examination and analysis of decided 
cases (both tax and non-tax), and the examination and analysis of the 
existing tax policy documents. 
1.6 Hypotheses 
This work proceeds on the following hypotheses: 
(i) There is not enough transparency and public involvement in 
the making of tax laws in Tanzania which impacts on 
taxpayer compliance with tax laws. 
(ii) The content of existing tax laws to a large measure does not 
encourage taxpayers to comply voluntarily with taxes; 
(iii) The manner of tax administration alienates taxpayers from 
the tax system and fails to inspire them to take ownership of 
the tax system; 
(iv) Serious governance Issues exist in Tanzania which impact 
negatively on taxpayer compliance attitudes; 
(v) Public perception of the government in Tanzania and of the 
tax system affects taxpayer compliance attitudes; 
(vi) Taxpayers can voluntarily pay their taxes if they perceive the 
tax laws to be just, the tax administration to be fair, and the 
government to be responsible; and 
(vii) The manner in which tax money IS spent/used has an 
impact on tax compliance 
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1.7 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework guiding this thesis is that taxpayer 
compliance is central to the success of any tax system. Unless 
taxpayer compliance is secured at sufficient levels, the performance 
of the tax system will be significantly impaired. 
Tax laws are enacted on the assumption that people will comply with 
them and pay their taxes to the levels expected by government. Every 
time the government introduces new taxes, or reviews existing ones, 
the underlying assumption is that the taxes associated with those 
laws will be paid to the projected levels so that projected revenues are 
realized to fund government activities. With this assumption as the 
guiding premise, compliance with taxes has become the most 
important aspect of tax administration. It is no surprise, therefore, 
that a large part of the literature on tax administration is dedicated to 
tax compliance issues. 
Much effort has gone into researching how best to secure taxpayer 
compliance, change taxpayer attitude, and get taxpayers to accept 
taxes and the tax system. 14 A host of variables said to affect 
compliance have been investigated, such as legal sanctions,15 social 
stigma,16 likelihood of being audited,17 morality,18 self interest,19 
opportunity,2o perception of fairness,21 and demographic features. 22 
14J A Roth et al (eds) Taxpayer Compliance University of Pennsylvania Press, 
Philadelphia, 1989. 
15 H Grasmick and W Scott Tax Evasion and Mechanisms of Social Control: A 
Comparison with Grand and Petty Theft' (1982) 2 Journal of Economic Psychology 
213. 
16 T Pocarno and C Price The Effects of Social Stigmatization on Tax Evasion' 
(1993) 5 Advances in Taxation 197. 
17 P Webly 'Audit Probabilities and Tax Evasion in a Business Simulation' (1987) 25 
Economic Letters 267. 
18 R Schwartz and S Orleans 'On Legal Sanctions' (1967) 25 University of Chicago 
Law Review 274. 
19 K M McGraw and J T Scholz 'Appeals to Civic Virtue Versus Attention to self 
Interest: Effects on Tax Compliance (1991) 25 Law and Society Review 471. 
20 S Klepper and D Nagin The Anatomy of Tax Evasion' (1989) 5 Journal of Law, 
Economics and Organisation 1. 
21 M L Roberts and P A Hite 'Progressive Taxation, Fairness and Compliance' (1994) 
16 Law and Policy 27. 
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However, Taylor23 argues that while each of these factors appear to 
have a causal effect or correlational connection with compliance, 
there is difficulty in determining the links between individual 
elements. What seems to be agreed according to Taylor is that 
strategies for improving tax compliance which are based solely on 
audits and sanctions are inadequate24 or counterproductive25 and do 
not explain voluntary compliance that occurs in the absence of 
audits. 
Nonetheless, the need for high level compliance is underscored in 
much of the tax literature examined in this study, as time and again, 
it is emphasized that unless people pay their taxes budget targets 
critical to funding government spending cannot be achieved. 
For Tanzania the importance of taxation as a revenue source for the 
government cannot be over-emphasised. Tax revenue accounts for 
around 60% of government spending supplemented only by non-
deficit foreign financing. Non-tax revenue is negligible. This 
composition of revenue makes it imperative to increase tax revenues 
through higher compliance with taxes. 
22 J C BaldI}' 'Income Tax Evasion and the Tax Schedule: Some Experimental 
Results' (1987) 42 Public Finance 357. 
23 N Taylor 'Understanding Taxpayer Attitudes Through Understanding Taxpayer 
Identities' in V Braithwaite Taxing Democracy (2003) Ashgate Publishing Limited 
7l. 
24 E Kirchler 'Differential Representations of Taxes: Analysis of Free Associations 
and Judgments of Five Employment Groups' (1998) 27 Journal of Social Economics 
117; S James and C Nobes The Economics of Taxation: Principles, Policy and Practice 
(1998) Prentice Hall, New York, USA; T R Tyler Trust and democratic Governance in 
V Braithwaite and M Levi (eds) Trsut and Governanance (1998) Russell Sage 
Foundation, New York 269. 
25 R Schwartz and S Orleans 'On Legal Sanctions' (1967) 25 University of Chicago 
Law Review 274; M Blumenthal, C Christian and J Slemrod 'The Determinants of 
Income Tax Compliance: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota' 
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No 6575 Cambridge, United 
Kingdom; 
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Globally, the importance of taxation is recognized in much of the 
literature. Gretz, Reinganum, and Wilde26 provide the reasons which 
make tax compliance a priority, namely that;-
(i) The revenue losses which arise from non-compliance are 
significant, 
(ii) Non-compliance with tax law could extend to disrespect for 
other laws creating a nation where there is no respect for 
the law, and 
(iii) The fairness of the tax system requires that equals should 
pay equal tax. 
Taylor adds that as tax systems begin to rely more heavily on 
voluntary self reporting and self assessment, the need to understand 
the processes underlying tax compliance is increasingly urgent.27 
1.8 Defining "voluntary taxpayer compliance" 
"Voluntary taxpayer compliance" is now a common-place phrase 
which has come to dominate tax compliance literature. Eliminating 
the middle word "taxpayer" which largely refers to the person paying 
the various levies collected by government, the two key words which 
remam In that phrase are "voluntary" and "compliance". In 
explaining these concepts, it is best to start with the word 
"compliance", a noun derived from the verb "comply", meaning to "act 
In accordance with a wish or command, to meet specified 
standards" .28 In relation to law(s), "to comply" means to obey and act 
in terms of the law. "Compliance" in relation to law is the act of 
submitting oneself to law. 
26M Graetz, J Reinganum and L Wilde, 'The tax compliance game: Toward an 
interactive theory of law enforcement' (1986) 2 (1) Journal of Law, Economics and 
Organisation, 1. 
27 N Taylor 'Understanding Taxpayer Attitudes Through Understanding Taxpayer 
Identities' in V Braithwaite Taxing Democracy (2003) Ashgate Publishing Limited 
72. 
28J Pearsall (ed) The Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press 
(2002) 10th Revised Edition, 292. 
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The word "voluntary" means "done, given, or acting of one's own free 
will", 29 the underlying factor being the lack of compulsion, or 
coercion, behind the act done. 
Braithwaite30 who has written extensively on tax compliance suggests 
that a definition of tax compliance should be one that captures issues 
of theoretical importance as well as giving practical direction for 
measunng compliance. He believes that James and Alley have 
offered a definition which meets this criterion. They define 
compliance as "the willingness of individuals and other entities to act 
within the spirit as well as the letter of tax law and administration 
without application of enforcement activity" .31 In these terms though, 
this definition is more of 'voluntary tax compliance' rather than 
general tax compliance. 
Braithwaite has also questioned the accuracy of speaking about a 
willingness to comply without enforcement when the compliance itself 
is required by law as is always the case with taxation. By law, non-
compliance invites sanctions. 
Putting aside this polemical Issue, In this study, the phrase 
'voluntary tax compliance' is used in the sense proposed by James 
and Alley above. In that sense, 'voluntary taxpayer compliance' can 
be described as a civic state of mind which accepts that the payment 
of tax is a necessary and important public duty, and from this 
acceptance arises a desire to comply with the taxes levied without the 
need for a sanction or other form of state coercion. Voluntary 
taxpayer compliance may also refer to a taxpayer's desistance from 
subterfuge or unfair attempts to reduce the tax burden on him/her. 
Commonplace tax burden reduction methods include; deliberate 
29Ibid., at 1606. 
30 V Braithwaite 'Dancing with Tax Authorities' in V Braithwaite (ed) Taxing 
Democracy (Chapter 2) Ashgate Publishing Company (2003) 24 
31 S James and C Alley 'Tax Compliance, self Assessment and Administration in 
New Zealand - Is the Carrot or the Stick More Appropriate to Encourage 
Compliance?' (1999) 5(1) New Zealand Journal of Taxation Law and Policy 3. 
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understatement of taxable income, overstating allowable deductions, 
falsifying tax information, committing tax fraud, and resisting or 
delaying tax payment. 
1.9 Scope of Study 
The geographical focal point of the inquiry is Tanzania. An attempt is 
made to use data from, and include some discussion of other 
countries in the Eastern Africa region (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda, 
Burundi and Zambia). However, such discussion is limited. South 
Africa is also excluded from the discussion. This is done for two 
reasons. Although this study is being submitted for examination at a 
South African University, the researcher's access to field data in 
South Africa would have been too limited because he is not a South 
African and has not worked or lived in South Africa to enable him to 
forge the sort of contacts and access to officers he has in Tanzania, 
and to a limited extent in the rest of Eastern Africa. In any case, the 
researcher believes that South Africa is in a more developed position, 
and has the degree of resources and know-how unavailable to 
Tanzania or the other countries of Eastern Africa that he examines. 
These factors put South Africa at a different level of play in relation to 
the issues examined in this study, so as to make it, for Tanzania and 
the other East African countries, a difficult example to follow. 
The study undertaken demonstrates that the taxpayer compliance 
level in Tanzania is poor. Existing tax laws do not facilitate, or 
encourage, voluntary taxpayer compliance. They are more tilted 
towards enforcement, with audits and sanctions standing out as pre-
eminent elements. This, coupled with negative perception of 
government and the tax system, create the tax resistance which feeds 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. 
The assumptions posted above at 1. 1 regarding tax laws and 
compliance with those laws, are not borne out in Tanzania. 
Investigation shows that, as is the case in many countries, tax 
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legislation in Tanzania is generally not understood by taxpayers 
because it is too complex. 
In this regard Tanzania is no different from other jurisdictions where 
complexity of tax legislation is a problem. In their attempt to develop 
tax compliance principles, Kidder and McEwen32 have identified two 
key issues affecting tax compliance; the first is lack of clear language, 
and the second is complexity. They argue that tax laws must be 
made less complex and must be drafted using clear language if they 
are to be understood, and complied with, by those who pay taxes. The 
comments of Kidder and McEwen on complexity and lack of clear 
language in taxation laws echo concerns which have long been 
expressed by the courts in the United Kingdom. Referring to some 
tax provisions in England, Lord Simonds in St Aubyn v Attorney 
Genera133 said that they "are, I think of unrivalled complexity and 
difficulty and couched in language so tortuous and obscure that I am 
tempted to reject them as meaningless". In Associated Newspapers 
Group v Fleming34 Lord Reid came very close to dismissing a tax 
provision for being "obscure to the point of unintelligibility". 
The failure to understand tax legislation is one of the many factors 
which lead to poor taxpayer compliance. Complexity of tax legislation 
leads those with means to engage tax advisers and leave it to them to 
make sense of the tax laws and, to either find ways for the taxpayers 
to live with the tax obligations, or to avoid them. To a large extent 
too, the complexity and the perception of unfairness in tax burden 
distribution and/or procedural inequity in administering tax, 
accounts for the tolerance society has for tax avoidance in stark 
distinction to the intolerance there is for tax evasion. 
32 R Kidder and C McEwen 'Taxpaying Behaviour in a Social Context: A Tentative 
Typology of Tax Compliance and Non-compliance' (1989) 2 Taxpayer Compliance 47 
at 64). 
33 (1952) AC 15 at 30. 
34 (1973) AC 628 at 639. 
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Although tax avoidance has the same cost to the nation as does tax 
evasion, tax avoidance is generally tolerated, even encouraged at 
times. Judicial vindication of the legality of tax avoidance has 
ensured that there is no stigma for indulging in the tax avoidance 
vice as there is for tax evasion. In CIR v Newman35, a judge felt it 
quite appropriate to say that "... there is nothing sinister in so 
arranging one's affairs as to keep taxes as low as possible, for no one 
owes any public duty to pay more than the law demands ... " This 
restatement in the United States of America of the virtue of tax 
avoidance echoes what has been the position for many years in the 
United Kingdom. Lord Tomlin's statement in IRC v Duke of 
Westminster36 is still good law to this day. He said: "Every man is 
entitled if he can to order his affairs so that the tax attaching under 
the appropriate Acts is less than it otherwise would be. If he 
succeeds in ordering them so as to secure this result, then however 
unappreciative the commissioners of Inland Revenue or his fellow 
taxpayers may be of his ingenuity he cannot be called to pay 
increased tax." 
Tax avoidance, however, is an equally complex and expenSIve 
exercise. Those without means to engage tax planners either suffer 
in silence, or complain against tax burdens they cannot appreciate, 
or resort to crude ways of beating the tax system, including, as is the 
case in Tanzania, bribing tax officers. 
Widespread ignorance of tax laws in Tanzania also results from the 
legislative process not being inclusive enough. It is quite uncommon 
to have broad purposeful consultation with stakeholders on proposed 
legislation. It is also rare to have a well thought out strategy for 
disseminating enacted laws to the public. The passing of a tax law is 
bureaucratic and secretive. Invariably it is triggered by a need for the 
Ministry of Finance to collect additional tax revenue, or a need by the 
35 159 F 2d 848 (1947) 
36 [1936] AC 1 
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tax authority to improve the administration of a particular tax or an 
aspect of taxation. Whatever the cause for law, the write-up leading 
to legislation proceeds with much secrecy. 
The TRA is the architect of all draft tax laws and amendments to 
existing laws. TRA legislative proposals are sent to the Ministry of 
Finance to be sanctioned. The Ministry of Finance in turn prepares a 
cabinet paper and seeks the approval of the Cabinet. However, 
discussions and views of ministers are never made pUblic. When 
Cabinet approval is obtained, instructions are sent to the Attorney 
General's office to prepare a Bill. 
There is much secrecy surrounding tax Bills. No one must know the 
content of proposed tax measures, as it is feared that such knowledge 
will compromise their effectiveness. When new tax proposals are 
tabled in Parliament, discussion is limited and is managed by 
government to ensure quick passage. There is rarely an attempt by 
government to encourage a real understanding by parliamentarians 
of the tax measures they are asked to legislate, nor is there an 
attempt to educate the public on what is proposed before it becomes 
law. As a result, widespread ignorance persists, and optimum 
compliance with tax law remains difficult and elusive. 
For Tanzania, there is also a real risk that this reliance on the tax 
administration to drive the tax legislation process will promote 
legislation which suits tax administrators and alienates the tax-
paying pUblic. Overtime, this can only lead to significant tax 
resistance. 
It is fair though to say that all tax systems experience some form of 
resistance to taxation, not only because taxation is intrusive, but also 
because of the financial and other incentives arising from non-
compliance with tax laws. It has been said that it is impossible to 
reduce the tax gap to zero, whether taxpayers are persuaded to pay 
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taxes voluntarily or are compelled to do so forcibly. Rosenberg37 
argues that neither persuasion nor force offers a guarantee for 
compliance with taxes by every person. He concludes that the most 
that can be done is to use a mix of strategies to try to achieve 
optimum tax compliance and bridge the tax gap. 
Various factors account for taxpayer compliance as well as taxpayer 
resistance. Ignorance of law and complexity of taxation as alluded 
above, are just two of the many factors that affect tax compliance. 
For most people as well, taxes are a considerable burden in terms of 
money, time and aggravation.38 In a study undertaken in his 
country, Carro1l39 reveals that 57% of the taxpayers studied over a 
period of three years evaded taxes by either understating their income 
or overstating their allowable deductions on income. 
Research undertaken in Tanzania by the Eastern and Southern 
African Universities Research Programme (ESAURP), whose results 
were published in 2009,40 shows that the untaxed informal sector in 
Tanzania accounted for 28.1% of Tanzania's GDP in 1986; 36.1% in 
1996; and 48.1% in 2006. The ESAURP research also revealed that 
the estimated tax gap for Tanzania in 2005/2006 was around 20% of 
potential revenue. When broken down in tax type, it shows the tax 
gap for income tax was 6.6%; for excise duty 18.4%; for VAT 15.2%, 
and for import duty 37.7%.41 Statistical projections by TRA of the tax 
gap behavior also show an upward increase. Data from the TRA 
Third Corporate Plan42 shows the tax gap rising from 17.8% in 
2010/11 to 20.1% in 2011/12 and to 22.7% in 2012/13. This steady 
increase in the size of the untaxed public is quite worrisome. This 
37J D Rosenberg, 'The Psychology of Taxes, Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We 
Can Make Them Sane', (1996) 16 Virginia Tax Law Review 155, at 181-182. 
38J S Carroll 'How Taxpayers Think About Their Taxes: Frames and Values', in J 
Slemrod (ed) Why People Pay Taxes (1992) 43. 
39 Ibid 
40 T Maliyamkonono et al Why Pay Tax (2009) 25. 
41 Ibid at 26. 
42 TRA Third Corporate Plan 2008/09 - 2012/13, Revised version March 2010. 
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data also supports the view that tax payment is a burden that many 
wish to escape. 
Attempts to justify taxes on account of servIces provided by the 
government fail to win the hearts and minds of taxpayers. Some 
argue that services provided by the government are generally so 
removed from the payment of taxes that it is difficult for the 
taxpayers to see the direct benefits they have received from the taxes 
they have paid.43 Moreover, as most taxes have a redistributive 
effect, many taxpayers will receive less in benefits than they pay in 
taxes.44 Even those who receive net benefits from the payment of 
taxes might prefer reduced or less costly benefits in exchange for 
lower taxes.45 Others reasonably perceive that their benefits would 
not decrease if they were not to meet their tax obligation.46 
Whatever, the motive for non-compliance, the end result impacts 
negatively on the nation's economy. Non-compliance of some is also 
unfair and unjust on the compliant taxpayers because it narrows the 
tax base, and results in compliant taxpayers being heavily taxed as 
there are less taxpayers supporting the tax base. Non-compliance is 
also damaging to the nations' economy because it prevents the 
government from meeting its revenue collection targets, and impairs 
the ability of the government to deliver essential public services. 
A narrow tax base leads to higher rates of tax. As the tax rates rise, 
the compliant taxpayers become disgruntled with the increasingly 
unbearable burden of supporting the free riders. In turn, this unfair 
tax burden encourages more people to cheat the tax system. 
Therefore it is critical that each and every taxpayer be made to meet 
their tax obligations as fully as possible. 
43R W McGee, 'Is Tax Evasion Unethical?' (1994) 42 Kansas Law Review 411 at 
432-33. 
44J 0 Rosenberg, supra Note 6, at 183. 
45Ibid. 
46 Ibid. (The typical case of a free rider is one who would like to enjoy the benefits 
without wanting to share the cost which brings the joy). 
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One program used by many countries to monitor and expand the tax 
base is registration of taxpayers. Each taxpayer is assigned a TIN 
(Tax Identification Number), in some jurisdictions this is called a PIN 
(Personal Identification Number). The TIN or PIN is a unique 
computer generated number which is non-repeating and is used to 
identify a taxpayer in connection with various tax related activities for 
which possession of a TIN is required. For many countries the TIN 
program enables the tax administration to identify and keep track of 
taxpayers and the taxable activities in which they engage. The more 
people assigned TIN numbers, the wider the scope for enforcement of 
taxes on those registered. 
Bird has cautioned that in emerging economies the effectiveness of a 
TIN program depends upon how widely the requirement for TIN is 
enforced on various transactions.47 If the requirement for a TIN on 
various documents is not wide ranging, the TIN program will not force 
new taxpayers to come into the tax net. In relation to Tanzania, 
Maliyamkono argues that: 
"If taxes are to be collected from the small and medium 
enterprises sector, tax regimes need to be developed which 
recognize the distinctive characteristics of small and medium 
enterprises. Most self employed people do not keep adequate 
records which would allow them to be accurately taxed. This 
is partly a result of illiteracy and inadequate skills but also 
due to the family nature of the business which leads to a 
confusion between family and business [mances. Moreover 
since many businesses are conducted in the home they can be 
invisible for tax purposes. Most transactions are conducted in 
cash and most traders do not operate bank accounts, and, in 
a situation where there is no culture of tax compliance, the 
scale of the operations cannot directly be estimated. 
Furthermore the turnover is high and since the barriers to 
47 R M Bird 'Tax Policy and Tax Administration in Transitional Countries' in 
International Studies in Taxation: Law and Economics eds G Lindecrona, S Lodin 
and B Wiman (1999) 69. 
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entry are low traders may frequently change their 
operations. "48 
The easy entry into the informal sector and easy mobility within the 
informal sector enabling traders to frequently change income 
activities without any reporting or compliance requirement partly 
explains why the informal sector in Tanzania has grown at 10% every 
10 years to stand at 48.1 % of the official GDP by 2006.49 
Tanzania had a population of 33.6 million by 2002 (the last census 
figures issued by the government), at least 54% of whom are above 
the age of 15 years. 50 The TIN registration program was launched in 
1996. However, until June 2010 there were only 686,980 TIN 
registrations (up from 334,724 in June 2008). This number includes 
both individuals and corporate entities engaged in trades. Those 
deriving income solely from employment covered by the PAVE scheme 
are excluded from TIN. The number of taxpayers registered for VAT 
stood at 14,292 in December 2010. The number of VAT registrations 
had risen to 15,320 by June 2004 but dropped significantly to 8,010 
in July 2005 because the VAT registration threshold was increased 
from Tanzania shillings 20 million to Tanzania shillings 40 million. 
Those who were no longer eligible were weeded out. These numbers 
show that there is still far too many potential taxpayers remaining 
outside the electronic tracking system afforded by the TIN program. 
For Tanzania, the low level of taxpayer compliance is additionally 
attributed to the high tax rates, which are levied because of the 
narrow tax base. The tax base is narrow because the size of the 
untaxed public is big. The tax base is also drained by widespread 
non-payment of tax. Non-payment of tax is compounded by wide-
ranging tax exemptions granted under existing tax laws. The Income 
48 T Maliyamkonono et al Why Pay Tax (2009) 9-10. 
49 T Maliyamkonono et al Why Pay Tax (2009) 25 
50Internet source http://www.tanzania.go.tz/census See also The Economic Survey 
2006, issued by the Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, Dar es 
Salaam, June 2007 which estimates the current population in 2007 to be 37.5 
million (Table A at xv). 
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Tax Act 200451 gives the Minister for Finance wide powers to exempt 
persons, entities, and institutions from payment of income tax. The 
Minister can also exempt any class of income from taxation. Section 
10 of the Income Tax Act 2004 reads as follows: 
10 (1) The Minister may by Order in the Gazette, provide 
(a) that any income or classes of incomes accrued in or derived 
from the United Republic shall be exempt from tax to the 
extent specified in such Orders; or 
(b) that any exemption under the Second Schedule shall cease 
to have effect either generally or to such extent as may be 
specified in such Order. 
(2) The Minister may by Order in the Gazette, amend, vary or 
replace the Second Schedule. 
(3) Notwithstanding any law to the contrary, no exemption shall be 
provided from tax imposed by this Act and no agreement shall be 
concluded that affects or purports to affect the application of this 
Act, except as provided for by this Act or by way of amendment to 
this Act. (This proviso is meaningless because the Minister has the 
powers to vary or amend the whole schedule which provides for 
exemptions.) 
Similar provisions exist 1n the VAT Act 1997,52 and also in the 
Customs Management Act of 2005.53 None of the three statutes 
provide clear guidelines or principles for the Minister to use when 
granting tax exemptions. The unwritten assumption appears to be 
that tax exemptions will be given in line with government policy and 
that such discretion will be exercised prudently. However, as 
documented practice has shown, this is not always the case. This 
51Act No 11 of 2004 which came into operation on 1 st July 2004 replacing the 
Income Tax Act of 1973 (Act No 33 operative from 1st January 1974). 
52Act No 24 of 1997, sections 9, 10, 11 and 12. Section 9 provides that certain 
supplies may be zero-rated, while section 10 deals with exempt supplies, and 
section 11 provides for exempt persons and exempt organizations. These 
substantive provisions cross refer to the First, Second, and Third Schedules to the 
VAT Act. 
53Act No 1 of 2005 (East African Community Laws). Section 114 of the East Africa 
Customs Management Act 2005 read together with the Fifth Schedule Parts A and 
B (this customs law applies to Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda). 
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ministerial discretion and the tax exemptions account for a large part 
of taxpayer-dissatisfaction with the tax system and in turn, the 
resistance to taxation. 
It is a principle of the rule of law that every power must have limits 
whether implied or explicit. 54 A power granted without limits can be 
abused. This is the reason why in many countries the power to tax 
derives from the constitution. The role of the constitution is to 
specify who should wield what amount of powers, how those powers 
are to be applied, and what limits are placed on the exercise of such 
powers. 55 The act of the legislature to grant unbridled powers to the 
Finance Minister, and to the Counci156 in the case of the customs 
exemptions, is inconsistent with responsible governance. The 
imprudent use of tax exemption powers has demoralized those who 
would otherwise be compliant taxpayers and has generated 
widespread distrust for the tax system. 
It is also a fact that the tax administration itself (the TRA) has been 
given, and is allowed to wield, immense powers. It may, without a 
court order, attach a person's bank account and direct the bank to 
pay to the TRA money out of the attached bank account. This extra-
judicial power can be exercised whether or not the TRA tax claim is 
lawfully disputed. The TRA has also the power to attach and sell 
property to recover disputed taxes even where there are on -gomg 
proceedings in respect of the dispute. The TRA also has power to 
collect taxes from third parties, or transfer a tax claim to a third party 
as if the third party owed the taxes directly. 
54A Michael and B Thompson (eds) Cases and Material on Constitutional and 
Administrative Law, Oxford University Press, 2000, at 24. 
55Ibid. 
56The Council is the policy organ of the East Mrican Community and is made up of 
Ministers responsible for Regional Cooperation drawn from Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda. The Council is established under Article 13 of the Treaty for the 
Establishment of the East African Community signed on 30th November 1999 which 
was ratified and brought into force on 7th July 2000. The functions of the Council 
are set out in Article 14. 
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Although a Bill of Rights57 exists in Tanzania which proclaims lofty 
inalienable rights for all persons living in Tanzania, these 
constitutional protections have not been used to curb the powers of 
the TRA, and/ or protect taxpayers from the wielding of taxation 
powers. 
From a perception perspective, rather than facilitating compliance 
with tax laws, the laws in place undermine taxpayer compliance. 
There seems to be an underlying mistrust of the taxpayer in the 
content of the tax laws, projecting the taxpayer as a cheat who must 
be reigned in, in order to secure compliance. 
1.10 Literature Review 
In reviewing the existing literature, this study attempts to explore the 
extent of existing knowledge on taxpayer compliance. The first point 
noted is that while there is ample written material on tax compliance 
generally, there is not much literature specific to voluntary tax 
compliance. The second point is that the written material on 
voluntary taxpayer compliance does not sufficiently project the 
complimentality of tax enforcement and voluntary tax compliance and 
the existing linkage between voluntary taxpayer compliance and good 
governance. This gap is addressed by this study. It is argued here 
that to achieve high level tax compliance, a combination of 
enforcement and voluntary tax compliance strategies is necessary. In 
addition, since legitimacy of government and good governance impact 
on compliance attitudes, the source of legitimacy and the elements of 
good governance are examined. 
57 Part Three of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania 1977, Articles 
21 and 24 provide for the right to participate in the governance of the country, the 
right to own property, and the right to protection of personal property (references 
used here are taken from the current 2005 edition of the Constitution). 
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In the study it is argued that generally people will not comply with 
what they do not respect. For a tax system to command the respect 
of the people, it needs to be just and beneficial to them. Government 
must deliver on its duty to its people in order for the tax claims it 
makes to be accepted with ease. In addition the tax system must be 
just. A just tax system is reflected through its sound administrative 
principles, the fairness of its rules and the safeguards it puts in place 
for the protection of taxpayers. 
To demonstrate these linkages, this study explores the strategies for 
tax compliance currently in use in Tanzania. It notes that there is a 
predominance of enforcement strategies as against persuasive 
strategies, concluding that not enough is being done to promote 
voluntary taxpayer compliance. The study also explores issues of 
governance starting with the governance concept itself, its underlying 
principles, the influence good governance has on compliance 
generally, and how good governance impacts on voluntary taxpayer 
compliance. 
The study notes as well that there is little taxpayer compliance 
material on Africa and none on Tanzania. Professor Maliyamkono58 
who is the Executive Director of ESAURP has spearheaded research 
on the taxation of the informal sector in Tanzania but much of that 
research and the literature flowing from it is dedicated to 
formalization of the informal sector with a view to expanding the tax 
base. Voluntary compliance of the informal sector traders has not 
been a focal issue in the ESAURP writings. Another writer is Odd-
Belge Fjeldstad, who works with the Chr. Michelsen Institute59 and 
does a lot of work for the Research Council of Norway and the Danish 
58 Two works have been published, T L Maliyamkono and M S D Bagachwa The 
Second Economy in Tanzania (1990) James Curry, London, United Kingdom; T L 
Maliyamkono, H Mason, A Ndunguru, N E Osoro and A Ryder (eds) Why Pay Tax 
(2009) Tema Publishers, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. 
59The Chr. Michelsen Institute is the largest independent non-profit research 
institution in Scandinavian countries. It is based in Norway and was founded in 
1930 as an international centre for policy oriented and applied development 
research. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
38 
International Development Agency (DANIDA). He has published 
several works on taxation in Africa, 60 though not directly on 
voluntary taxpayer compliance, his general discourse on African tax 
administration offers some insights on compliance. 
Wallschutzsky61 has provided additional literature on taxation in 
developing countries. He has attempted a comparative examination of 
taxpayer compliance in developing countries and developed countries 
showing the disparity that exists. The study by Morgan and 
Murphy62 on rural taxpayers in Australia is also instructive of the 
differences that exist in attitudes between rural and urban taxpayers 
more so for developing countries where the rural popUlation is a 
dominant proportion (true for Africa). These, however, do not address 
compliance within a tax administration framework and in the context 
of governance. 
McGee's63 numerous writings are focused more on tax evaSIOn 
generally and on tax non-compliance in the transition economies of 
the former Eastern Block countries. His earlier book on the 
philosophy of taxation offers good insights into the concept of Just 
taxation'.64 In a more recent book (2008)65, he has a solitary article 
600 H Fjeldstad, 'Why People Pay Tax: A Study of Tax Compliance in Tanzania' Den 
Ny Verden, Vol. 33 No.4 45-66; 0 H Fjeldstad, 'Taxation, Coercion and Donors: 
Local Government Tax Enforcement in Tanzania' (2001) 39(2) The Journal of Modem 
African Studies 289-306; 0 H Fjeldstad and J J Semboja 'Why People Pay Taxes: 
The Case of the Development Levy in Tanzania' (2001) 29 World Development 2059-
2074; 0 H Fjeldstad and J J Semboja 'Dilemmas of Fiscal Decentralisation: A Study 
of Local Government Taxation in Tanzania' (2001) 27(1) Forum for Development 
Studies 7-41. 
61 Wallschutzsky 'Achieving Compliance in Developing Countries' (May 1989) 
Bulletin De La Societe Geologique De France, 234-244. 
62S Morgan and K Murphy 'The Other Nation: Understanding Rural Taxpayers' 
Attitudes Towards the Australian System' Working Paper No 26 Australian National 
University, Canberra, (December 2001) 
63 R W McGee (ed) The Ethics of Tax Evasion (1998) Dumont, New Jersey, USA; R W 
McGee 'Tax Advice for Latvia and Other Similarly Situated Emerging Economies 
(1996) 13 International Tax & Business Lawyer 223; R W McGee 'Principles of 
Taxation for Emerging Economies:Some Lessons from the U.S. experience (1993) 12 
Journal of International Law29; R W McGee (ed) Taxation and Publlic Finance in 
Transition and Developing Economies (2008) Springer Science + Business Media, 
Miami USA. 
64 R W McGee The Philosophy of Taxation and Public Finance (2004) Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston, USA. 
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on tax evaSIOn m the West African country of Mali. Ayoki's66 
monograph on tax reform in Uganda, addresses more the issue of 
revenue mobilization looking at the structure of taxation and the tax 
administration processes. He does not discuss compliance issues. 
There are several other authors who have written on the subject of 
tax compliance but many look at the subject from the perspective of 
taxpayer behaviour (attitude). The causal link which exists between 
taxpayer behaviour and general governance is not sufficiently 
projected. These include Bird and Jantscher,67 Silvani and Baer,68 
Barbone,69 Tanzi and Pellechio,7o and Frampton71 . 
In Tanzania, a short study was made by Osoro72 and a short paper 
written by Luoga73 touching on the governance concept. Neither 
undertakes a sustained discourse on tax compliance. There are a few 
more studies on voluntary taxpayer compliance but these have not 
65 R W McGee and G G and B M'Zali 'Attitudes Towards Tax Evasion in Mali' 
(chapter 27) in R W McGee (ed) Taxation and Publlic Finance in Transition and 
Developing Economies (2008) Springer Science + Business Media, Miami USA. 
6666 M Ayoki, M Obwona and M Ogwapus Tax Reforms and Domestic Revenue 
Mobilisation in Uganda (2008) Fountain Publishers, Kampala, Uganda. 
67R M Bird and C D Jantscher (eds.) Improving Tax Administration in Developing 
Countries International Monetary Fund (1992), Washington DC; and M C 
Jantscher, 'Necessary Attributes for a Sound and Effective Tax Administration' ill 
Centro Interamericano de Administracoes Tributarias (ed) 1997, 3. 
68C Silvani and K Baer Designing a Tax Reform Strategy:Experiences and Guidelines, 
International Monetary Fund (1977) 1; and Striking the Balance: Tax 
Administration, Enforcement and Compliance in the 1990s, edited by the Institute for 
Fiscal Studies, 1993. 
69L Barbone, A Das-Gupta, L De Wulf and A Hansson 'Reforming the Tax Systems: 
The World Bank Record in the 1990s' World Bank Paper prepared by the Tax Policy 
and Administration Thematic Group, World Bank, 1999. 
70 V Tanzi and A. Pellechio 'IMF Working Paper 95/22' prepared for the 
International Monetary Fund, 1995. 
71 D Frampton Practical Tax Administration, Fiscal Publications, Bath, 1993. 
72N E Osoro et al 'Enhancing Transparency in Tax Administration in Tanzania' 
1999 EAGER/PSG Research Report, Department of Economics, University of Dares 
Salaam. 
73F DAM Luoga 'Tax Reform, Constitutionality and the Human Rights Dimension: 
An Analysis of the Pitfalls in the Tanzanian Tax Reform Approaches' in University of 
Warwick (ed) School of Law (2002) 355; FDA M Luoga 'Formulation of Tax Policy in 
a Developing Country: Some Suggestions for Tanzania' in C K Mtaki and L X 
Mbunda (eds) Taxation policy in Tanzania: Problems and Prospects (1995) Dar es 
Salaam University Press; FDA M Luoga 'Divergent Tax Administration Practices 
and the Collapse of Accountability in Taxation: the Emerging Realities in Tanzania' 
(Unpublished paper) (2004). 
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sought to exanune the special problems confronted by developing 
countries m aligning tax administration with democratic good 
governance.74 
At the global level, voluntary taxpayer compliance has assumed much 
prominence in tax compliance literature over the last decade. 
Voluntary taxpayer compliance is hailed for two parallel reasons. On 
the one side is the sound economics of voluntary taxpayer 
compliance. It reduces the cost of tax administration and is good for 
the economy. On the other side, is the sociological and psychological 
aspect of compliance, centred on taxpayer motivation and responsible 
citizenship. Some of this literature lauds the fear factor arguing that 
the fear of detection and punishment makes many comply with taxes. 
Taxpayer compliance literature at the global level appears unanimous 
in treating voluntary taxpayer compliance as a priority. The 
justification for this priority status is premised on the cost of non-
compliance. Graetz, Reinganum and Wilde75 (referred to previously) 
point to three reasons why non-compliance is costly. The first is the 
significant revenue losses that occur from non-compliance. The 
second is the real risk that the disrespect for tax laws which breeds 
non-compliance can quickly extend to widespread disrespect for other 
laws. The third is that tax non-compliance undermines the fairness 
of the tax system that requires that equals should pay equal taxes. 
Given the priority which the promotion of voluntary taxpayer 
compliance has come to occupy in developing efficient tax systems, 
Smith has identified a number of incentives which drive voluntary 
74J A Roth et al (eds) Taxpayer Compliance (1989); P Sawicki 'Income Tax 
Compliance: A Report of the ABA Section of Taxation' in A Blumstein (ed) Models for 
Structuring Taxpayer Compliance, American Bar Association (1983); J Slemrod 
'Complexity, Compliance Costs and Tax Evasion' in J A Roth et al (eds) Taxpayer 
Compliance (1989) 156-174. 
75M Graetz et al 'The tax compliance game: Toward an interactive theory of law 
enforcement' (1986) 2(1) Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation 1. 
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compliance. 76 He points to responsIve service and procedural 
fairness as key incentives for voluntary taxpayer compliance. He also 
points to the need for an appropriate balance between enforcement 
and cooperative strategies to reinforce voluntary taxpayer compliance. 
Further, he underlines the need for effective detection and 
punishment of non-compliance as both a deterrent and an incentive 
for compliance. Finally, he argues that legitimacy and/ or allegiance 
to authority, reinforces voluntary taxpayer compliance. However, his 
examination of voluntary taxpayer compliance as an issue in 
governance is peripheral. 
In the United States of America, Milliron and Toy are among the 
authors who have written on the subject mostly from a bahavioural 
perspective. 77 This is the case too with Boyd7B , Erard79 and 
MansfieldBo. However, in a recent book edited by McGee,BI a linkage 
is established between bureaucracy, corruption and tax compliance. 
The findings of a research by Riahi-BelkaouiB2 in 30 developed and 
developing countries indicate that tax compliance is highest in 
countries with least corruption and smaller bureaucracy. The tax 
morale is higher when citizens are protected from official corruption 
and bloated bureaucracy. This finding confirms the link between 
good governance and tax compliance attitude. 
76K W Smith 'Reciprocity and fairness: Positive incentives for tax compliance' Paper 
presented at the Conference on Tax Compliance and Tax Enforcement, Office of Tax 
Policy Research, School of Business Administration, The University of Michigan 
(December 1990). 
TTV Milliron and D Toy 'Tax compliance: An investigation of key features' (1988) 9(2) 
Journal of the American Tax Association 84-104. 
78C W Boyd 'The enforcement of taxpayer compliance: Some theoretical issues' 
(1986) 34(3) Canadian Tax Journal 588-599. 
79B Erard 'The influence of tax audits on reporting behaviour' 95-114 in Why people 
pay taxes: Taxpayer compliance and enforcement J Slemrod (ed) Ann Abor, 
Michigan, University of Michigan Press, 1992. 
80H K Mansfield, 'The role of sanctions in taxpayer compliance' A Report of the ABA 
section of tax invitational conference on income taxpayer compliance in P Sawicki 
(ed) 217 American Bar Association, Washington DC 1983 
81 R W McGee (ed) Taxation and Publlic Finance in Transition and Developing 
Economies (2008) Springer Science + Business Media, Miami USA. 
82 A Riahi-Belkaoui 'Bureaucracy, Corruption and Tax Compliance' in R W McGee 
(ed) Taxation and Publlic Finance in Transition and Developing Economies (2008) 
Springer Science + Business Media, Miami USA 8. 
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Overall, the literature on taxpayer compliance is heavily weighted 
towards measures and mechanisms for compelling compliance, but it 
is shifting. Many of the studies available were produced before the 
debates on taxpayer rights, the human rights dimension in taxation, 
democratic taxation and good governance, assumed prominence. 
These debates are now influencing a new breed of writings which 
acknowledge the multidimensional aspects of taxpayer compliance 
and have informed this study. They include the works of 
Braithwaite83 , Bentley84, Brenan and Buchanan,85 McGee86, Howarth 
and Maas87, and Croome.88 
The lack of literature on the subject of voluntary taxpayer compliance 
in Africa and on Tanzania and the predominance of writings 
examining the subject from a developed country perspective is a 
challenge for this study. This challenge will need to be surmounted. 
Notwithstanding, a critical examination of the subject is still possible 
and is undertaken here to assist in the developing tax administration 
principles which will foster voluntary taxpayer compliance In 
Tanzania and hopefully in the other Eastern African countries to 
which this study is relevant. 
83 V Braithwaite (ed) Taxing Democracy Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(2003) Ashgate Publishing Co, Aldershot, England. 
84 D Bentley (ed) Taxpayers' Rights: An International Perspective (1998) Revenue 
Law Journal, Gold Coast, Australia; D Bentley Taxpayers'Rights Theory, Origin and 
Implementation (2007) Kluwer Law International, AH Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Netherlands. 
85 G Brennan and J Buchanan The Power to Tax-Analytical Foundations of a Fiscal 
Constitution (1980) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK 
86 R W McGee The Philosophy of Taxation and Public Finance (2004) Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Boston, USA. 
87 P Howarth and R Maas Taxpayer Rights and Revenue Powers (2004) Lexis Nexis 
UK, London, UK. 
88 B Croome Taxpayers'Rights in South Africa (2010) Junta & Co Ltd, Clairemont, 
South Africa 
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1.11 Thesis Outline 
Chapter one has set out the research problem which is the subject of 
the thesis. It has put forward the objectives of the study and the 
hypotheses on which the study proceeds, together with the research 
methodology used. It also delimits the scope of the work to make it 
manageable. It finally reviews some of the literature that has 
informed the inquiry to follow. Having stated that the level of tax 
compliance is low in Tanzania, the general proposition put forward is 
that there is undue reliance on tax enforcement measures and not 
enough emphasis on promoting of voluntary tax payment. It is 
suggested that the level of tax compliance will improve if there is a 
good mix between enforcement and voluntary tax payment strategies. 
This chapter has also alluded to the impact of governance on tax 
compliance, a subject discussed in detail in chapter two. 
Chapter two examines the governance issue. It pursues the 
proposition that voluntary tax compliance is a function of confidence 
and trust in the government resulting from good governance and the 
perception people have of the government. The chapter seeks to 
demonstrate the extent to which good governance can inspire 
voluntary taxpayer compliance. A case is made that optimum 
taxpayer compliance can be achieved where there is a responsible 
government and the process of tax legislation is inclusive enough to 
enable taxpayers to take ownership of the tax system. 
Chapter three uses both literature and available data to demonstrate 
that tax resistance is largely attributable to the failure to have respect 
for the constitution, observance of the rule of law and good 
governance at a sufficient level. The chapter contains a 
thoroughgoing discussion on the protection of taxpayers and taxpayer 
rights. 
Chapter four focuses on tax administration in Tanzania. It examines 
the tax regime through the working of the TRA, and the interplay 
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between the TRA and the Ministry of Finance. The chapter discusses 
m detail the powers of the Commissioner General, the 
Commissioners, and the institutional relationship which exists 
between the taxpayers and the tax authority and how all this impacts 
on taxpayer compliance. 
Chapter five analyses the tax framework in Tanzania, paying 
particular attention to the tax laws which govern the taxation of 
income, the imposition of customs duties and the administration of 
value added tax. These three are the most important taxes for 
Tanzania because of their significant revenue yield and the 
complexity of their design. The aim of the analysis is to ascertain 
whether the tax laws governing income tax, value added tax and 
customs in Tanzania facilitate voluntary tax compliance or hinder 
such compliance. 
Chapter six discusses tax policy with a view to establishing whether 
the tax policy in Tanzania is driven by the needs of institutions and 
government, or the needs of the people whom the institutions and 
government aim to serve. It also discusses the interaction between 
taxpayers and tax officials in order to determine whether there is 
recognition of a common endeavour and whether there are policies in 
place aimed at maximizing taxpayer acceptance of the tax system. 
The questions posed are: whether taxpayers are treated respectfully; 
whether they are made to understand the tax system and the tax 
obligations placed on them; and whether there is recognition of their 
ownership of the tax system. 
Chapter seven discusses the tax enforcement strategy of the TRA. It 
examines the effectiveness of the enforcement initiatives (such as 
investigation and prosecution) undertaken by the Tax Investigations 
Department (TID), the problems preventing effective punishment of 
tax delinquency and looks at the overall limitations of tax 
enforcement. 
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Chapter eight draws conclusions from the study. In line with the 
overall inquiry undertaken in this work, this concluding chapter 
underlines the complimentality of voluntary taxpayer compliance and 
tax enforcement essential to the performance of a successful tax 
system and essential to desired increases in tax revenue yield. The 
Chapter suggests possible steps to be taken to improve the tax 
system and to improve voluntary taxpayer compliance which has 
lagged behind so that tax administration is improved. 
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Chapter Two: Good Governance and Tax 
Compliance 
2.1 Trust in Government 
46 
It is imperative that there is trust between the public and the 
government for tax compliance to work. Professor Bird89 underlines 
the linkage which exists between governance and compliance. His 
general proposition is that tax compliance levels not only reflect the 
effectiveness of the tax administration but also taxpayer attitudes 
towards taxation and towards government in general. He argues that 
that -
" ... attitudes affect intentions and intentions affect behaviour. 
Attitudes are formed in a social context by such factors as the 
perceived level of evasion, the perceived fairness of the tax 
structure, its complexity and stability, how it is administered, 
the value attached to government activities and the legitimacy 
of government."90 
Chapter one already alluded to the general dislike people have for 
taxation, so Professor Bentley suggests that -
"if you are going to do something that people do not like and 
you want them to tolerate or even enjoy it, make sure that you 
do it with as much fairness, transparency, consultation and 
engagement as possible. If you are going to tax people, make 
sure they know that they are doing something for the greater 
good, that the process is as painless as possible and that they 
don't feel that they are paying more than their fair share."91 
89RM Bird 'Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform' (2004) March, Asia Pacific Tax 
Bulletin, 134. 
90Ibid .. at 136. 
91D Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 2. 
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Later in this chapter the study will refer to a tax perception survey 
undertaken III Tanzania which demonstrates that perceived 
legitimacy of government and the state of governance affect public 
reaction to taxation.92 
Trust engenders compliance. De Juan, M A Lasheras, and R Mayo93 
have published findings which show that tax compliance decreases 
significantly where the level of trust in the government is low. 
Taxpayers are reluctant to give money to a government which does 
not command their confidence.94 Likewise, taxpayers' willingness to 
pay taxes voluntarily decreases when they disagree with how 
taxpayer money is spent, or where they feel alienated from what the 
government is doing.95 
The question, however, IS how does a government establish and 
maintain trust with its taxpayers? Good governance is a key factor in 
creating and maintaining trust between tax ayers and government. 
2.2 Good Governance 
Santiso96 traces the genesis of the concept of 'good governance' to a 
1989 World Bank Report97 on Sub-Saharan Africa which described 
the crisis in the region as "a crisis of governance". This view of the 
World Bank was prompted by concern over the continuing lack of 
92 National Bureau of Statistics 'Assessment of the Effectiveness of Taxpayer 
Awareness Program and Attitude of Taxpayers Towards Tanzania Revenue 
Authority - Report' National Bureau of Statistics Report September 2003. 
93A De Juan, M A Lasheras and R Mayo 'Voluntary Tax Compliant Behaviour of 
Spanish Income Tax Payers', (1994) 49 Public Finance 90-105; L Feld and B S Frey 
'Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated' (2002) 3 Economics of Governance 
87-99; J T Scholz and M Lubell 'Trust and Taxpayers: Testing the Heuristic 
Approach to collective Action' (1998)42 American Journal of Political Science 398-
417. 
94L Lederman 'Tax compliance and The Reformed IRS' (2003) 51 Kansas Law Review 
971-1011; see also M E. Kornhauser 'The Rhetoric of the Anti-progressive Income 
Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reaction' (1987) 86 Michigan Law Review 465. 
95Ibid. 
96 C Santiso 'Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and 
Conditionality' (2001) 7 Georgetown Public Policy Review 1. 
97 World Bank Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to Sustainable Development (1989) 
Washington DC World Bank 
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effectiveness of the aid provided to Africa. It called into question the 
ability, capacity and willingness of political authorities to govern 
effectively. 
In its 1991 Report98, the World Bank defined 'governance' as the 
manner In which power is exercised in the management of a 
country's economic and social resources for development. It 
identified three distinct aspects of governance: the form of political 
regIme; the process by which authority is exercised In the 
management of a country's economic and social resources; and the 
capacity of governments to design, formulate and implement policies 
and discharge functions. 
In the succeeding years (1992, 1993, 1994, and 2000),99 the World 
Bank refined its definition progressing from a value neutral definition 
to a more normative definition which recognized the existence of 'good 
governance' (as against 'bad governance). When speaking of good 
governance it put additional requirements on the process of decision-
making and public policy formulation. In the words of Santiso, 100 
good governance extends beyond the capacity of the public sector to 
the rules that create a legitimate, effective and efficient framework for 
the conduct of public policy. It implies managing public affairs in a 
transparent, accountable, participatory and equitable manner. It 
entails effective participation in public policy-making, the prevalence 
of rule of law and an independent judiciary. 
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), also emphasize the 
98World Bank Managing Development: The Governance Dimension (1991) 
Washington DC World Bank (a good analysis of the Bank report is given in J 
Faundez, M E Footer and J J Norton (eds) Governance, Development and 
Globalization, (2000) Blackstone Press Ltd, 152. 
99 World Bank Governance and Development (1992) Washington DC World Bank; 
World Bank Governance (1993) Washington DC World Bank World Bank 
Governance: The World Bank Experience (1994) Washington DC World Bank; World 
Bank Reforming Public Institutions and Strengthening Governance (2000) 
Washington DC World Bank. 
100 C Santiso 'Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and 
Conditionality' (2001) 7 Georgetown Public Policy Review 5. 
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normative character of governance. They do this by linking 
governance with participatory development, human rights and 
democratization. Kofele-KalelOI expanding on this context of good 
governance says it focuses on legitimacy of government (degree of 
democratization); accountability of political and official elements of 
government (media freedom, transparency of decision making, 
accountability mechanisms); competence of governments to formulate 
policies and deliver services; and respect for human rights and rule of 
law (individual and group rights, security, framework for economic 
and social activity, participation). 
There are other writers such as Pierre102 who offer a definition of 
governance which refers to the ability of the government to sustain 
coordination and coherence among a wide variety of actors with 
different objectives (institutions, interest groups, civil society, non-
governmental and transnational organizations), suggesting that 
governance IS broader than government. However, writing with 
Peters,103 Pierre adopts a more state-centric view of governance 
perceiving it to refer to processes in which the government plays a 
leading role, making priorities and defining objectives (that steer 
society and the economy). Hirst104 prefers a more general definition 
that governance is the means by which an activity or ensemble of 
activities is controlled or directed, such that it delivers an acceptable 
range of outcomes according to some established standard. 
Good Governance is the exercise of power by varIOUS levels of the 
government that is effective, honest, equitable, transparent and 
lOIN Kofele-Kale 'Good Governance as a Political Conditionality: An African 
Perspective' in J Faundez, M E Footer and J J Norton (eds) Governance, 
DeVelopment and Globalization, Blackstone Press Ltd., 2000 at 153. 
102 J Pierre (ed) Debating Governance: Authority, Steering and Democracy (2000) 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, United Kingdom. 
103 J Pierre and B G Peters Governance, Politics and the State (2000) St Martins 
Press, New York USA. 
104 P Hirst 'Democracy and Governance' in J Pierre (ed) Debating Governance: 
Authority, Steering and Democracy (2000) Oxford University Press, Oxford, United 
Kingdom. 
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accountable. lOS The true test of good governance is the degree to 
which it delivers on the promise of human rights: civil, cultural, 
economic, political and social rights. 106 This IS done through 
organizational, administrative and policy reform. 
Good governance exists when the authority of the government is 
based on the will of the people and is responsive to them; when open, 
democratic institutions allow full participation in political affairs; and 
when human rights protections guarantee the right to speak, 
assemble and dissent. Equally, it exists when government and 
governmental institutions are pro-poor, promoting sustainable 
human development of all citizens.lo7 
The UNDP understands good governance (i.e. the quality of a 
government's exercise of power), to mean the degree to which 
government institutions (such as parliament) and processes (such as 
elections) are transparent. It also means the extent to which 
institutions of government are accountable to the people, allowing 
them to participate in decisions that affect their lives and the extent 
to which these institutions are not susceptible to corruption. It 
means as well, the degree to which the private sector and 
organizations of civil society are free and able to participate in the 
affairs of government. 108 This study adopts this defmition wherever 
reference to good governance is made. 
l05The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has adopted this 
definition of good governance and uses it to measure a country's rating in the 
respect for human rights. 
l060ffice of the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights, 'Development -
Good Governance' internet source at http:((www.unhcr.ch(huridocda.nsf. 
accessed 3/8/2005 
107United Nations Human Development Report Office, Human Development Report 
2000. 
108UNDP (United Nations Development Program), 'Policy paper on governance and 
how it relates to human development', , 1997 New York; UNDP, 'Governance for 
sustainable human development', United Nations Development Program, 1997 New 
York. 
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With this definition of good governance, a government exercising good 
governance is one which has the qualities proposed by Hayden and 
Bratton. 109 It promotes equity, participation, pluralism, 
transparency, accountability and the rule of law and it is effective, 
efficient, responsive and sustainable over the long term. Good 
governance must be rooted in these principles to move society toward 
greater human development through poverty eradication, 
environmental protection and regeneration, gender equality and 
sustainable livelihoods. In practice these principles of good 
governance translate into tangible things such as free, fair and 
frequent elections; a representative legislature that makes laws and 
provides oversight; an independent judiciary that i terprets laws; 
guarantees for human rights and the rule of law; and transparent 
and accountable institutions. This is the view also taken by the UN 
High Commission for Human Rights which has identified the key 
attributes of good governance as being: transparency, responsibility, 
accountability, participation and responsiveness (to the needs of the 
people).110 It echoes the UN Secretary General's emphasis that good 
governance means greater partici pation coupled with 
accountability. 111 
An article by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for 
Asia and the Pacific,112 points out that good governance has four 
major characteristics; equity and inclusiveness, consensus oriented, 
effectiveness and efficiency, participation, transparency, 
accountability and the rule of law. 
Good governance ensures that corruption is minimized, the views of 
minorities are taken into account and that the voices of the most 
109 G Hayden and M Bratton (eds) Governance and Politics in Africa (1993) Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Boulder. 
lloUNHRC, Resolution 2000/64 of the United Nations Human Rights Commission. 
lllK Annan 'Preventing War and Disaster' 1999 Annual Report on the Work of the 
Organisation, UN, New York. 
112UNHRC, Millennium Report 2000, issued by the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights. 
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vulnerable sections of people in the society are heard and included in 
the process of decision-making. It is also responsive to the present 
and future needs of society. 
In today's interconnected and globalized world the terms "governance" 
and "good governance" are being increasingly used in the same 
context in development literature when speaking about a country's 
credibility and respect on an international basis. Needless to say, 
bad governance is regarded as one of the root causes of all evil within 
our societies. International finance institutions, multilateral lending 
agencies, and donor countries now subject loans and development 
assistance to a 'good governance' test. 
The existence of rule of law as an attribute of good governance 
deserves discussion. The discourse on rule of law pre-dates the 
discourse on good governance. However, the concept of governance, 
broad as it is, has now subsumed the rule of law such that rule of 
law is presented as a pre-requisite for good governance. The origins 
of the concept of rule of law are attributed to Dicey.113 His statement 
that rule of law means no person shall be punished or be deprived of 
property except by a law validly enacted, reinforced not only the 
limits on government power but emphasized as well a requirement for 
individuals to comply with law under the notion of 'law and order' 
necessary for public safety.114 Tamanahal15 accepts that in its most 
basic formulation the rule of law means that the government is 
limited by law. Beyond this, he says, there is substantial 
disagreement on the content of rule of law in the modern era. 
113 A V Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1885) 
Macmillan (1960) 10th ed 183 
114 M Neumann The Rule of Law Politicizing Ethics (2002) Ashgate Publishing 
Limited, Aldershot England 23-48 
115 B Z Tamanaha On the Rule of Law; History, Politics and Theory (2004) Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 32 
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Raz has argued that rule of law as an idiom imports a very simple 
concept "that people should obey the law and be ruled by it" .116 But 
Raz notes that in a political and legal theory context rule of law is 
understood in a narrower sense to mean that government shall be 
ruled by law and be subject to law such that actions not authorized 
by law cannot be 'actions of government as government'.117 
Trebilock and Daniels argue that when spoken of in relation to 
development, the conception of rule of law focuses on two elements of 
the legal system; procedural justice referring to transparency in law 
making and adjudicative functions, and to the predictability, stability 
and enforceability of laws. These last elements importing 'due 
process' or 'natural justice'.118 Rule of law also focuses on 
institutional values such as 'independence' and 'accountability'119 
The rule of law requires fair legal frameworks that are enforced 
impartially. It also requires full protection of human rights, 
particularly those of minorities. Impartial enforcement of laws 
requires an independent judiciary and an impartial and incorruptible 
police force. 
Transparency underpins rule of law and good governance because 
with it there is a requirement for decisions to be made and enforced 
following laid down rules and regulations in conformity with the law. 
Transparency also means that information is freely available and 
directly accessible to those who are affected by such decisions and 
their enforcement. In addition, it means that enough information is 
provided to the people in easily understandable form and media. 
This is especially relevant to taxation. 
116 J Raz The Authority of Law, Essays on Law and Morality (Chapter on 'The Rule 
of Law and its Virtue1 (1979) Clarendon Press, Oxford, United Kingodom, 212. 
117 Ibid 
118 M J Trebilcock and R J Daniels Rule of Law Reform and Development (2008) 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, United Kingdom. 
119 Ibid at 31. 
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Good governance requIres consensus building, the mediation of the 
different interests in society to reach a broad consensus in society on 
what is in the best interest of the whole community and the 
methodology in which this can be achieved. It also requires a broad 
and long-term perspective on what is needed for sustainable human 
development and how to achieve the goals of such development. This 
perspective of good governance resonates with the views of Peters and 
Pierre who see the role of government as that of 'steering society and 
the economy'. 120 
A society's well-being also depends on equity and inclusiveness. One 
must ensure that all its members feel that they have a stake in it and 
do not feel excluded from the mainstream of society. This requires all 
groups, but particularly the most vulnerable, to have opportunities to 
improve or maintain their well being. This inclusiveness makes every 
member of society feel part of the government process. 
Good governance means that there is an effective and efficient 
government, whose processes and institutions produce results which 
meet the needs of society, while making the best use of resources at 
their disposal. The concept of efficiency in the context of good 
governance also covers the sustainable use of natural resources and 
the protection of the environment, for the benefit of all sections of 
people in the society. The government must be seen to care for its 
people and the resources of the nation. 
Accountability is another key requirement of good governance for good 
reason. Governmental institutions, as well as the private sector and 
civil society organizations must be accountable to the public and to 
their institutional stakeholders. Every institution is accountable to 
those who will be affected by its decisions or actions. Accountability 
cannot be enforced without transparency and the rule of law. 
120 J Pierre and B G Peters Governance, Politics and the State (2000) St Martins 
Press, New York USA. 
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The United Nations, basing itself on these principles, is trying to 
strengthen the capacity of weak states to govern because countries 
that are well governed are both less likely to be violent and less likely 
to be poor. When people's interests, needs and human rights, are at 
the center of governance institutions and practices, there can be real 
progress in combating poverty. In short, a more peaceful and more 
prosperous nation contributes to a more peaceful and more 
prosperous world. 121 
Overall, good governance reinforces acceptability of government and 
social perception of its legitimacy. This acceptability and legitimacy 
in our view affects and determines the level of people's readiness to 
comply with existing rules and regulations imposed by government, 
including the requirement to pay taxes. 
While good governance is driven by rule of law, the existence of rule 
of law is itself predicated on the existence of constitutionalism in 
government and for those governed. Constitutionalism, as a concept, 
is the notion that government can, and should, be legally limited in 
its exercise of power by a Constitution.122 The authority and 
legitimacy of government depends on observing the constitutional 
limitations placed on government. These refer firstly to the existence 
of rules which create three separate arms of government; the 
legislature (with a power to make laws), the executive (implementing 
those laws), and the judiciary (adjudicating disputes under the laws). 
Constitutionalism also means the rules which limit the scope of 
authority of the state 123 and the procedural requirements governing 
the exercise of power given to each of the three arms of government. 
However, the limits on government power are reflected as well by the 
121 United Nations Economic and Social Council 'Report of the Committee of 
Experts on Public Administration' E/C.16/2006/4 issued 5 January 2006. 
122Stanford Enc:yclop:dia. of Ftrilooophy, internet rource at http:/ / ~.li1:Jrmy.usyd.edu.au/ stanf~ 
accessed 3/8/2005. 
123The terms 'state' and government' are, in this context, used interchangeably. 
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entrenched rights of individuals written into the constitution or in a 
separate Bill of Rights or Charter document. Constitutionalism in 
this latter context refers to the extent to which the exercise of power 
by the government is constitutionally conditioned to the observance 
of the civil and human rights of its subjects. 
Professor Yash Ghai, in one of his writings says, 
"constitutionalism ... is premised on the belief that the 
primary function of a constitution is to limit the scope of 
governmental power and to prescribe the method for its 
exercise, thereby preserving the autonomy of civil society. In 
its modern form, the constitution performs these functions 
typically through the separation of powers. The incorporation 
of democratic principles and some form of judicial review. The 
constitution validates certain fundamental values and, subject 
to their overriding supremacy, establishes a framework for 
formation of government and the conduct of 
administration." 124 
In essence then, constitutionalism refers to the extent to which the 
constitution entrenches the separation between the three arms of 
government, the rights of individuals and the procedural mechanisms 
for the exercise of the power given to government. All this is, in truth, 
the measure of the constitutionalism of any state, and the more there 
is of it, the more good governance exists. 
Constitutionalism is concerned with ensuring that the exerCIse of 
state power, which is essential to the realisation of the values of the 
society, should be controlled in order that it should not itself be 
destructive of the values it was intended to promote. 
Constitutionalism is averse to unlimited power. Thus, in its 
124Y Ghai, 'Constitutions and Governance in Africa: A Prolegomenon', in S Adelman 
and A Paliwala (eds), Law and Crisis in the Third World, Centre for Modern African 
Studies, University of Warwick, 1993, at 53-54. 
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traditional meaning, constitutionalism means the restraints imposed 
upon any usage of state power. All state power should have certain 
limits. There is to be no power without limits. 
For the ordinary citizen, the power to tax IS the most familiar 
manifestation of the government's power to coerce. This power to tax 
involves the power to impose on individuals and private institutions, 
charges that can be met only by a transfer to government of private 
property, or financial claims to such property. These tax charges 
carry with them elaborate powers of enforcement which underpin the 
tax system. 125 
Historically, governments have always possessed taxation powers, 
although in recent times the public have come to demand that 
sweeping powers of taxation must be constrained. Controls over the 
sovereign have been exercised through constraints on the taxing 
authority. The ascendancy of regional organizations and their desire 
to harmonize governance structures and political culture at the 
regional level have greatly helped in placing the rights issue at the 
centre of both political and economic debate, but also in enforcing 
supranational protections. The exercise of power by governments is 
now constrained by protections afforded by both the regional union(s) 
(in the case of the European Union under the EU Treaty) and 
multilateral treaties and institutions such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human 
Rights. 126 The corresponding institutions for Africa are the African 
Union (AU), the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights 
and the African Court of Justice and Human Rights. 
Even with countries that are not aligned to formal regional 
structures, the quest for constitutionalism and rule of law has meant 
that a service standard is now set for tax administrations at the heart 
125 G Brennan and J M Buchanan The Power to Tax: Analytical Foundations of a 
Fiscal Constitution (1980) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, at 8. 
126D Bentley 'Classifying Taxpayers' Rights' in D Bentley (ed) Taxpayers' Rights - An 
International Perspective, Chapter 2, 19. 
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of which is protection of taxpayer rights. Canada, Australia and New 
Zealand are among the non-European countries which have made 
significant strides in this direction. 127 
Constitutional restraints on tax administrations have an enormous 
impact on the legitimatization of taxes. The restraints and taxpayer 
protections help to bring understanding and acceptance of the tax 
system. 
Limiting the power to tax and also the powers of the tax authority, is 
not inimical to government interests in collecting taxes. It is often the 
case that taxing authorities operate outside the constitutional and 
administrative law because of perceived vital government interests in 
imposing and collecting taxes. However, when viewed from the 
perspective of constitutionalism, it emerges that constraining the 
powers of taxation does not undermine the vital interests of a 
government in taxing its people. On the contrary, limiting taxing 
powers constitutionally will enhance trust in the constitutionality of 
taxation and encourage taxpayers to voluntarily pay their taxes. The 
public assumption is that, when taxing powers are subject to 
constitutional limitations, legitimacy of taxation is achieved and the 
justification for tax compliance is entrenched. 
The proposition here is that limiting the powers of tax collection is in 
the long run in the best interests of the state, because it encourages 
voluntary tax compliance. Constitutional limitation of taxing powers 
also plays another important role in tax administration. It helps 
provide better guarantees for taxpayer rights which is another 
motivation for voluntary tax compliance. Taxpayer rights and the 
power to tax are not opposite forces, they are complementary 
features. When the power to tax is exercised within constitutional 
127D Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007. In Chapters 1 and 2, 
Bentley traces the origins of taxpayer rights, 1-58. 
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and legal limitations, good governance IS achieved and with it the 
legitimacy of taxation. 
It was previously mentioned that good governance requires 
responsible use of tax revenue. Governments are not usually limited 
in their use of tax money. They may tax revenues to finance public 
needs, or they may gIve to citizens part of the revenue in welfare 
payments. However, one needs to distinguish sharply between the 
need for taxing power and the manner of exercise of the power to tax. 
The power to tax, per se, does not carry with it any obligation to use 
the tax revenue raised in any particular way. The power to tax does 
not logically imply rational spending. 
Seen in this way, the power to "tax" is simply the power to "take." If 
the government wishes to obtain a particular piece of property, it is of 
no relevance whether it does so simply by direct appropriation or by 
purchase or by taxation. Both government and the owner are in an 
identical position after government action, irrespective of the precise 
details of the means of appropriation. The government takes and the 
person loses. Therefore if any distinction between taking and taxing is 
to be sustained, the tax alternative must involve certain additional 
requirements not present with direct appropriation. For example, if 
the power to tax is constrained by some generally uniform 
requirements that apply to all persons in similar circumstances (for 
example as regards persons with the same aggregate net wealth), 
then it may be accepted. Whereas the direct appropriation or other 
arbitrary taking may not survive electoral scrutiny, the tax alternative 
would do so. In this case, the fair distribution of tax burdens ensures 
(or, more accurately, increases), the likelihood that electoral 
processes will vindicate and compliment the constraints placed on 
taxation. 
Responsible use of taxation revenues as a feature of good governance 
helps to create and maintain public confidence in the government. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
60 
Control of expenditure has two aspects to it. The first is 
accountability. The need to fully account for all tax revenues 
collected and expended by government. The second is responsible 
spending. Braithwaite128 insists that the priorities of government in 
public spending must coincide with the public opinion as to current 
priorities. Levi129 agrees and adds that where government spending 
priorities sharply conflict with the way taxpayers feel their tax money 
ought to be spent, the seeds of resentment against the tax system are 
sown and with that tax resistance creeps in. The way the government 
expends public funds has a considerable impact on taxpayers' 
compliance with taxes. 130 Unwise spending of public funds fuels non-
compliance with taxation. 131 The wisdom of this Hindu saying cannot 
be ignored, "the ruler must act like a bee which collects honey 
without causing pain to the plant" .132 
In Tanzania, opposition against public spending patterns is common-
place. A survey by the National Bureau of Statistics in Tanzania 
revealed that only 2 in every 10 taxpayers who were interviewed have 
confidence in the tax system. Even the tax administration officers 
who were interviewed for this survey agreed that the tax system in 
Tanzania is unfair. 133 The survey showed the dim view taxpayers 
have of the lavish lifestyle of the TRA as an organization and the 
opulence of its officers. This was seen as an example of wasteful 
128V Braithwaite 'Communal and Exchange Trust Norms; Their Value Base and 
Relevance to Institutional Trust' in V Braithwaite and M (eds), Trust and 
Governance, Russel Sage Foundation, New York. 
129M Levi Of Rule and Revenue University of California Press, Berkeley, 1988, at 78. 
130 Ibid. 
131Ibid. 
132These words are quoted from The Mahabharata, a sacred Hindu writing. They 
are reproduced in Tax Law Design and Drafting, V Thuronyi (ed) Volume I, 
International Monetary Fund, 1996 {Chapter 4, 'Law of Tax Administration and 
Procedure1· 
133National Bureau of Statistics 'Assessment of the Effectiveness of Taxpayer 
Awareness Program and Attitude of Taxpayers Towards Tanzania Revenue 
Authority - Report' National Bureau of Statistics Report September 2003. This 
report is an indictment of the TRA and the Government of Tanzania. The report 
reveals that only 2 in every 10 taxpayers who were interviewed have confidence in 
the tax system. Even the TRA officers who were interviewed for this survey agree 
that the tax system is unfair. 
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government spending which the public does not approve. There are 
other examples often mentioned including government ownership and 
use of expensive four-wheel drive vehicles, or luxury cars, which add 
nothing to the ability of government to deliver services. The vehicles 
are used mostly in the city where the public officers live and work 
and are never used to go to remote rural areas which reason is often 
advanced to justify their purchase. The public also resents that every 
five years the government gives interest free loans for luxury vehicles 
to its 285 parliamentarians. Maintenance and repair of the vehicles 
is borne by the government. Tanzania also has cabinets consisting of 
61 ministers,134 too big for a small poor country ranked by donor 
agencies among the three poorest countries in the world. Ministers 
enjoy an opulent lifestyle, often with two official residencies. 135 The 
expensive lifestyle extends to seniors officers and heads of public 
institutions. In contrast one notes the lack of funding for hospitals 
and schools, the failure to maintain roads or build public facilities 
and the failure to adequately fund law enforcement agencies such as 
the police. Opposition to this pattern of government spending 
becomes the justification for tax resistance. 
Official corruption also undermines the trust in government. 
Corruption is an assault on the legitimacy of government. Obedience 
to government stems from the public approval of the government of 
the day. Odd-Helge and Berti1136 argue that public approval is the 
basis of the legitimacy of government. When institutions are 
legitimate, citizens have a predisposition to consider obedience to 
134The size of the cabinet was in February 2008 reduced to 49 following a crisis of 
public confidence in government in the wake of a serious corruption scandal and 
abuse of government office by the Prime Minister and two senior ministers. Further 
reduction of Cabinet size was implemented after the general election in October 
2010 but the public remains unconvinced that enough is being done. 
135In 1980 the government decided to move the seat of government to Dodoma, a 
town in central Tanzania that had to be built and upgraded for this purpose. The 
project is still ongoing to-date with the result that ministers have residences in Dar 
es Salaam where most of the official business is still carried out, but also in 
Dodoma in anticipation of the move. 
136F Odd-Helge and T Bertil 'Fiscal Corruption: A Vice or a Virtue?' (2003) 31 World 
Development 1459-67, at 1463. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
62 
them as reasonable and appropriate. 137 Where a government lacks 
legitimacy, or loses its legitimacy, the public equally loses the moral 
justification for obeying the laws of such government. 138 
Odd-Helge and Bertil have cautioned that the disrespect for tax laws 
can lead to disrespect for other laws and contribute further to 
undermining the legitimacy of the government. 139 Therefore there is a 
danger of a vicious circle emerging whereby distrust breeds more 
distrust. In contrast, trust in government and wide-spread public 
approval tends to legitimize everything related to government and 
reinforces the payment of tax as a social norm. 140 
The proposition made in this study is that when a government is 
perceived to be trustworthy, citizens are more likely to comply with its 
demands in genera1. 141 From this perspective, trust in government is 
closely linked to public perceptions of the capacity of the government 
to make credible decisions about the use of taxes, as well as the 
design and administration of taxes. Trust and responsibility bolster 
taxpayer inclination to pay taxes voluntarily. 142 
2.3 Governance and Tax Compliance 
Generally taxpayers have no problem with the justification for 
taxation. They accept that governments need money to meet their 
obligations to the public they govern. Taxpayers seem to recognize 
too that government's mam source of revenue is taxation. 
Governments have three major sources of revenue; borrowing, income 
from asset ownership, and taxation. Government borrowing is an 
expensive source of revenue because at the end it must be repaid. 
Government ownership of income producing assets is now largely 
137Ibid. 
138Ibid. 
139Ibid. 
140Ibid. 
141M Levi and L Stoker 'Political Trust and Trustworthiness' (2002) 3 Annual Review 
of Political Science 475. 
142Ibid. 
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discredited. Most governments have moved away from ownership of 
business entities and have privatized their assets reverting to the role 
of regulator and policy maker. This has further elevated taxation to 
the most important source for funding governments. 
However, opinions seem to vary greatly as to how best the obligation 
to tax must be carried out. It seems that many taxpayers prefer that 
the burden of taxation comes with as little pain and with as much 
respect, as possible. For governments, expediency and efficiency 
often override the convenience to the taxpayer. The government 
interest in collecting more revenue at times means it will cast a blind 
eye to the excesses of the taxation authority. There is some fear that 
if a tax administration is forced to observe good governance 
principles, tax collections could suffer. Governments need to 
recognize though that unfair taxation is ultimately self-destructive. 
Professor Bentley says that "without justice and the rule of law, 
taxation becomes an arbitrary exaction at whim". 143 
The ideal situation is to have high levels of voluntary taxpayer 
compliance, with as little cost of tax administration as possible and 
as minimal enforcement as absolutely necessary. In other words 
taxpayers comply with their tax obligations because they are ready 
and willing to pay without forcible intervention by the tax authority. 
When non-compliant taxpayers dictate the attitudes of tax authorities 
in making them act with mistrust and suspicion against the 
taxpayers as a group, and when in so acting tax authorities 
excessively use enforcement to extract tax, taxpayers will most likely 
resent the intrusive character taxation assumes in their lives. 
Therefore, in line with the ideal situation, voluntary tax compliance 
must be a priority for effective administration and collection taxes. 144 
143D Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 2. 
144M Blumenthal, C Christian and J Slemrod, 'Do Normative Appeals Mfect Tax 
Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota' (2001) 54 
National Tax Journal 125. Also see C Silvan and K Baer, 'Designing a Tax 
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In putting forward a conceptual framework for this study,14S chapter 
one underscored the complimentality of enforcement and persuasive 
strategies for effective tax administration. The proposition that 
taxpayers obey laws only when to do so is in their own self interest 
was discounted. 146 
There is an economistic perception that compliance with tax laws is 
driven by choice, often dictated by an individual's desire to maximise 
outcomes. 147 This economistic view holds that tax compliance 
decreases when audits decline because the fear of being caught is 
reduced. 148 Writers who uphold this economistic perception of tax 
compliance suggest a tax compliance approach focused on the 
cost/benefit model. 149 This is made up of intensified audits, followed 
by increases in the severity of penalties for non-compliance (non-
disclosure or under reporting of income). Supporters of this view 
believe that increasing the cost of non-compliance directly reduces 
non -compliance. ISO 
However, this study argues that an economistic perception of 
compliance does not fully explain tax behaviour. It is known that 
some people obey laws even when they are against their self 
Administration Reform Strategy: Experiences and Guidelines' I.M.F Working Paper, 
WP/97/30 at paragraph 30, 1977, International Monetary Fund, Washington D.C. 
145Chapter One, Part 1.5 Conceptual Framework. 
146The economic theory of crime deterrence starts from the premise that individuals 
are willing to breach rules if the expected benefits of such non-compliance exceed 
the expected benefits of compliance. Neoclassical economists rely on this theory as 
propounded by Garry Becker to push the view that tax evaders are motivated to 
bend rules of compliance as long as the benefits of doing so outweigh those of 
compliance. See G S Becker, 'Crime and Punishment; An Economic Approach', 
(1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169; M Block 'Optimal Penalties, Criminal 
Law and the Control of Corporate Behaviour' (1991) 71(2) Boston Law Review, 395-
419; M Wenzel, 'Tax Compliance and the Psychology of Justice: Mapping the Field' 
in V Braithwaite (ed) Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion 
(2003) Burling ton, VT Ashgate, 41. 
147 Ibid. 
148M E Kornhauser, 'Doing the full Monty: Will Publicizing Tax Information Increase 
Compliance? (2005) 18(1) Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 2. 
149Ibid. 
150 Ibid. 
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interest. 151 This altruism in tax compliance shows that, apart from 
self interest, there are other factors which account for compliance. 
Non-economic factors, such as the trust which the government 
commands among its people, the social norms dictating behaviour for 
taxpayers as members of society, the sense of fairness to others as 
well as the integrity of oneself and moral constraints which may 
derive from religion or upbringing, all influence tax behaviour and 
compliance with tax laws. 152 Bankman and Griffith 153 make a 
compelling argument against attributing tax compliance entirely to 
the intensity of audits; they observe that higher rates of compliance 
have been shown to exist even where there are no stringent audits 
and the chances of being caught are at the lowest levels. 
The question as to what role the standing of the government of the 
day plays in influencing taxpayer compliance behavior has been dealt 
with in earlier sections of this chapter. At this stage the study will 
attempt to provide more correlative evidence by examining the legal 
framework governing taxation in Tanzania to see if it is structured in 
a way that cultivates trust between taxpayers and the government 
and between taxpayers and the tax administration. The question 
asked is whether existing laws enable government to command trust 
and confidence leading to acceptable levels of voluntary tax 
compliance? 
Firstly, the reciprocity between taxpayers and the tax authority vis a 
vis the tax laws in place is examined. This is central to the concept of 
equity and inclusiveness. Do the existing tax laws ensure that every 
person pays tax to the fullest level required? Are the tax laws 
effective? Do they carry an ability to drive compliance? 
151 D M Kahan, 'Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and 
Social Norms' (2002) 36 University Richmond Law Review, 367, at 377. 
152Ibid., 
153 J Bankman & T Griffith "Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at 
Progressive Taxation' (1987) 75 California Law Review, 1905. 
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The need to have tax laws apply equally to everyone is important 
because taxpayers' sense of fairness stems from the belief that all 
persons will fulfill their tax obligation so that the costs of running the 
country are evenly distributed. No person should cause another to 
bear more tax burden by escaping his/her own tax obligation. 
Together with the need for fairness, there is a need for accountability 
of the government to taxpayers. The main argument is that, when the 
government is seen as accountable to the taxpayer, the taxpayer's 
desire to voluntarily pay taxes is enhanced. Good laws are not 
enough to drive compliance if the government is not acting 
responsibly. Good governance acts as the bedrock for tax laws to 
function in a society. The existence of a responsible government 
increases the taxpayer's inclination to voluntarily comply with the tax 
obligations imposed by the government because good governance 
justifies the right to tax. 
2.4 Public Perception of the Tax System in Tanzania 
The linkage between perce ved legitimacy of government, the state of 
governance and taxpayer reaction to taxation is aptly demonstrated 
by two surveys done in Tanzania. The first was carried out in 2003 154 
and the second in 2006. 155 
In the first taxpayer survey undertaken by the Tanzania National 
Bureau of Statistics in 2003, it is reported that 56.6% of the 2,399 
taxpayers surveyed consider the tax rates in Tanzania to be either 
high or too high. The respondents in this interview included 270 staff 
of the TRA. More than half of the TRA officers interviewed believe 
154National Bureau of Statistics 'Assessment of the Effectiveness of Taxpayer 
Awareness Programs and Attitude of Taxpayers Towards the TRA' National Bureau 
of Statistics Report, September 2003, Dar es Salaam. 
155PricewaterhouseCoopers, 'Stakeholders Perception Survey Report, September 
2006, Large Taxpayer Department, The TRA, Dar es Salaam. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
68 
Results on VAT refund claims show that 33% of the respondents were 
not aware of new procedures for handling VAT claims introduced in 
October 2004. 160 Only 25% believed that those procedures would be 
implemen ted impartially. Nonetheless, 40% believed that the 
procedures would improve the VAT refund process. 
The VAT refund procedures introduced in 2004 sought to speed up 
the VAT refund process. With these procedures, the TRA adopted a 
Risk Profiling System that categorises claimants for VAT refunds in 
three risk groupings; Gold Claimants, Silver Claimants and Other 
Claimants. Gold Claimants are those who are low risk with a good 
VAT payment and claim record. The compliance record relied on 
must include the past 2 years without any blemish in the regularity 
and quality of VAT returns and tax payments. Refund claims for this 
group are not audited and are paid within 30 days of being lodged. 
Audits for Gold Claimants are done only once a year. 161 Silver 
Claimants are those who fail to meet the Gold Claimant criteria. For 
this category, the first two VAT refund claims are paid within 30 days 
and without being audited. However, before the third claim is paid, 
the claimant is audited with respect to both current and previous 
claims. VAT refund claims falling into the Other Claimants group are 
those perceived by the TRA to be high risk. These are routinely 
audited. Understandably, VAT refunds for such claims are usually 
delayed depending on how quickly the audit process is completed. It 
is surprising that, according to the taxpayer survey by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, there was very little awareness of this VAT 
refund system. The fact that many of those aware of it thought it 
would not work, is evidence of the lack of confidence in the TRA as an 
institution. To a large extent their fears have been confirmed because 
160VAT General Guide, The TRA Booklet PN No 1 of April 2007, issued by the TRA 
Taxpayer Education Department, Tanzania Revenue Authority Head Office, Dar es 
Salaam. 
161Jf the end of the year audit discovers significant irregularity the Gold claimant 
will be demoted to the Silver or Other Grouping. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
69 
by June 2010 there was a substantial backlog of unpaid VAT refund 
claims. 
Given the concerns expressed on the sluggish clearance of goods by 
customs, the PricewaterhouseCoopers Report recommended that the 
integration between TISCAN (Tanzania Inspection Service Company 
Ltd) and ASYCUDA++ (Automated System for Custom Data )162 
should be fast tracked to enhance customs clearance processes. 
PricewaterhouseCoopers recommended that the complaints 
procedures should be improved by providing more explicit 
information in the Taxpayers' Charter. 163 The TRA can try to ensure 
the timely dissemination of changes or amendments to tax laws. 
Other recommendations include development of taxpayers education 
programs tailored to meet large taxpayers' needs and to revise 
arrangements on refund claims. 
To summarise, the points of complaint by taxpayers against the TRA 
and against tax administration in general, are the following; 
mUltiplicity of taxes, high tax rates, uncaring tax administration, high 
cost of tax administration, inconsistencies between tax policy and tax 
administration, unjust administration procedures and irresponsible 
use of tax revenue. 
A good number of taxpayers complain about the numerous taxes 
they have to pay, which leave them confused and unable to comply. 
The First Schedule of the Tanzania Revenue Authority Act164 lists 24 
tax laws which are administered by the TRA, each imposing a tax. 
162ASYCUDA++ is the later version of ASYCUDA. ASYCUDA was developed by 
UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) and made 
available to member countries of UNCTAD to assist their customs administration in 
improving revenue collection through electronic processing of customs data. 
ASYCUDA is in use only in developing countries. Countries which showed 
proficiency in the use of the original version of ASYCUDA were upgraded to 
ASYCUDA+ and thereafter to ASYCUDA++. ASYCUDA++ has the ability to allow 
clearing and forwarding agents interfaced with the Customs Department to input 
import/ export data directly into the Customs Department data system which 
speeds up the processing of customs information and the clearance of goods. 
163The Taxpayers' Charter is probably not the right place, such information could 
be more effectively disseminated in taxpayer education leaflets or booklets. 
164 Act No. 11 of 1995 
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There are also rates and local government taxes provided for under 
four separate statutes; the Local Government (District Authorities) 
Act,165 the Local Government (Urban Authorities) Act,166 the Local 
Government· Finances Act,167 the and Urban Authorities (Rating) 
Act. 168 In addition local governments and urban authorities have rule 
making powers which enable them to make by-laws for the imposition 
of ad-hoc charges to fund their activities. 
In addition to taxes and rates, there are numerous compulsory 
institutional levies and quite a few compulsory civic contributions are 
encouraged by government. For example, patients going to 
government hospitals are required to pay money before being 
attended to. This payment is not a charge for services or a user pay 
fee, it is dubbed a "contribution" to assist with the cost of running the 
public institution. Similar payments are required from parents 
towards the running of public schools owned and funded by the 
governmen t. 
Apart from the many taxes, there is also a feeling that some of the 
numerous taxes levied are driven by a desire to raise more revenue 
without regard to the paying ability of the persons against whom the 
tax demands are made. Wages in Tanzania are generally low. The 
minimum wage for the public sector announced in December 2007 
was Tzs 150,000169 per month. This was increased to Tzs 180,000 in 
July 2010 (possibly motivated by the general elections held in 
October 2010). The minimum wage announced in 2007 was intended 
to apply to the private sector as well, but had to be suspended for the 
manufacturing enterprises because of alleged inability to pay.170 For 
employees in the hospitality industry (waiters and waitresses) and for 
165 Act No.7 of 1982 
166 Act No. 8 of 1982 
167 Act No.9 of 1982 
168 Act No.2 of 1983 
169Around USD $125 at an average exchange rate ofTzs 1200. 
170Daily News of 6 th January 2008 at 1. 
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domestic employees, wages are as low as Tzs 30,000 per month and 
have proved impossible to regulate. An attempt in 2007 to raise 
wages for domestic employees and those of waiters and waitresses, to 
Tzs 65,000, led to mass terminations and had to be suspended. 
The complaint against high tax rates noted in the two taxpayer 
perception reviews referred to above is now commonplace. The high 
band marginal rate is 30% (giving an effective income tax rate for 
individuals of about 27% of income). Although this rate may appear 
lower than, for example, the South African maximum income tax rate 
of 40%, it is still a significant portion of gross wages considering the 
generally low wages in Tanzania. 
The corporate rate is 30% (25% for companies listed on the Dar es 
Salaam stock exchange). The upper band for customs duty used to 
be 30% (until 1st January 2005 when it was reduced to 25% upon 
introduction of the EAC Customs Act) and on many goods it is 
coupled with ad valorem excise duty of 7%, 10%, 20%, 30% and 
120%.171 To this is added the VAT for every import transaction at 
20% of the value of goods. VAT at the same rate also applies to all 
supplies of goods and services save for a few non-vatable 
transactions. 
The perception that the TRA is an uncaring institution is said to stem 
from the manner it carries out its functions. It is accused of acting 
without regard to the effect of its actions on the productive activities 
of the taxpayers. Officers of the TRA are often accused of being 
robotic, vindictive, un-caring and highhanded. Taxpayers complain 
that there is a very low level of professionalism in the manner the 
officers administer taxes. 
171The 120% is the excise on plastic shopping bags which clearly is a prohibitive 
tariff aimed at discouraging the importation and use of plastic bags; this prohibitive 
measure was accompanied by a government directive issued in 2006 to close down 
the manufacturing of plastic bags in Tanzania. 
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There is also another major perception problem. Allegations of 
corruption, bribery and extortion are rampant. Many of the incidents 
reported are blatant. Even the subtle ones leave the tax system 
choked with inefficiency as many times tax decisions are made only 
upon incentives being given. It takes a long time to get an answer to 
written queries. It is not uncommon for a letter from a taxpayer to 
remain unanswered for over a year. Often, remarks showing negative 
perception of the TRA are heard in drinking and eating places. 
In fairness to the TRA, part of this inefficiency is attributable to the 
fact that the tax administration in Tanzania is very small, 
inexperienced, unskilled and ill-equipped. As a result, its ability to 
process tax work is limited. The TRA's ability to assess everyone and 
enforce collection of tax assessed is severely limited. Similarly, the 
TRA's ability to undertake audits (specific or random) so as to assess 
the reliability of information received is also limited. Nevertheless, 
these inadequacies cannot fully account for the all-round inefficiency 
that the TRA as an institution exhibits. A large part of the TRA 
inefficiency stems from the static attitude of the staff. Whatever the 
reasons, or justifications, the inefficiency of the TRA results in 
selective taxation making the whole tax system unfair and 
unacceptable. 
Another concern for taxpayers is the high cost of taxation. Relative to 
revenue returns, many people believe that the cost of administering 
taxes in Tanzania is too high. The public also complains about the 
official lifestyle of the TRA as an institution and the lifestyle of the tax 
officers, all of which is funded by taxpayer money. The posh 
buildings, the overly comfortable interior, the clearly superior salaries 
paid to the TRA officers and the expensive four-wheel drive vehicles 
used by the tax officers are seen as wasteful living in the face of other 
priorities competing for government funding. 
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There are substantial funds allocated to the TRA by government to 
fund the operations of the TRA. Looking at the budget allocation 
trend for 2001 to 2008, the requirement for money seems to grow 
every year. Table 1 below shows the TRA expenditure figures for that 
period. 
2001/02 
34,77 
Annual 
Increase 
Table 1: Trends in Budget Allocation for the TRA 
(in Billion Tanzania Shillings) 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 
37.43 44.31 47.09 63.63 74.33 
10.8% 11.8% 10.6% 13.5% 8.56% 
* Source: TRA Annual Reports 2001/02 to 2007/08 
2007/08 
84.38 
8.80% 
An important point to note is that the budget allocation figures 
shown in Table 1 above do not include very substantial assistance 
funding and equipment donations from donor countries for the TRA 
under the Tax Administration Program (TAP) which in 2007 was 
replaced by the Tax Modernisation Program (TMP) through which all 
project funding by donors is now provided. Assistance funding from 
international agencies between 2000 and 2006 amounted to USD 75 
million as shown in Table 2 below. 
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Table 2: TRA External Support under TAP 2000-2006* 
Type of Funding Financier USD$ 
(i) Credits IDA Credit 40,000,000 
(ii) Grants European Union 7,000,000 
DFID UK 6,500,000 
SIDA Sweden 5,000,000 
DANIDA Denmark 2,500,000 
GTZ Germany 3,400,000 
USAID USA 2,500,000 
FINIDA Finland 800,000 
UNDP 300,000 
(iii) Government 7,000,000 
Total Project 75,000,000 
Funding 
* Source: TRA"A Decade ofTRA Transformation 1996-2006"172 
Additional grants from international agencies given to TRA under the 
TMP program amounted to USD 16 million ($9.116m for 2007 and 
$7.013m for 2008)173. One needs to read the figures in Table 1 and 
Table 2 together to appreciate the substantial funding consumed by 
the TRA. 
There is another dimension to the cost of tax administration. Often 
tax collection obligations are imposed on members of the public and 
private institutions without regard to the cost to the person or 
institution for undertaking the tax collection/payment obligations for 
TRA. 
172The TRA, A Decade of TRA Transformation 1996-2006, Tanzania Revenue 
Authority, Dar es Salaam, at 35. 
173 TRA Annual Reports 2006/07 and 2007/08. 
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Later it will be shown how withholding tax obligations, with regard to 
taxpayers who are only their employees, customers, or suppliers, are 
imposed on companies without regard to the cost of compliance to 
the company. These unacknowledged burdens on the public, 
together with perceived wastefulness in the TRA, compound taxpayer 
disillusionment with taxation. 
Given TRA's propensity for spending, taxpayers feel aggrieved by 
TRA's reluctance to administer even the most beneficial tax incentives 
allowed by the tax laws or other legislation. Taxpayers, both 
corporate and non-corporate, are frustrated by the reluctance of the 
TRA to honour measures announced by the government giving benefit 
to taxpayers and the partial manner in which tax credits and refunds 
are administered by the TRA. 
One such example are the tax incentives given to mining companies 
in order to encourage investment in and growth of, the mining sector. 
Mining companies execute Mining Development Agreements with the 
government, stipulating clearly the tax exemptions or preferential 
rates to be used in relation to tax on mining operations, but the TRA 
to a large measure frustrates the enjoyment of these tax breaks. 
Companies granted investment certificates 174 by the Tanzania 
Investment Centre (TIC) report similar frustration as tax holiday 
periods are at times ignored by the TRA which pursues tax claims 
against the companies abrogating tax holiday provisions contained in 
the certificates. At times too, some tax relief entitlements are denied 
for frivolous reasons. 
Additionally, there is a perception that the TRA is not consistent in its 
manner of administration. Actions taken against taxpayers in the 
same position are not always consistent. The treatment of the same 
transactions over time is also not consistent. Similarly, tax rules are 
174These are investment charters issued under statutory authority which serve as 
the blue print for the terms of investment and the entrenched protections relating 
to the investment. 
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not administered in a consistent and transparent manner. Officers 
and offices in various parts of the country do not act the same way in 
relation to the same matter. 
The problem of inconsistency between tax policy and tax practice, 
and examples of attempts by the TRA to frustrate the enjoyment of 
tax relief provisions, are discussed further in chapter six. 
Selective justice is another problem noted by taxpayers in Tanzania. 
The perception of selective justice is compounded by the inconsistent 
manner in which procedural requirements are enforced. It is often 
the case that procedures are used to frustrate substantive justice. 
For example, the TRA often refuses to receive and determine 
objections against tax assessments if the format of the objection has 
not been complied with. Form requirements include such things as 
each assessment to be separately objected to and the grounds of 
objection to be presented in numbered paragraphs. One would think 
that the better approach is to receive the objection and deal with its 
substance, or if need be, all w the taxpayer to rectify the 
shortcomings if the format of objection has not been adhered to. 
Another example of how the TRA frustrates justice for taxpayers IS 
the refusal by the tax Commissioners to use their statutory discretion 
to waive the requirement to pay one third of disputed tax In 
appropriate cases so as to enable a disputed assessment to be 
reviewed. It is quite rare to have a waiver request accepted by the 
TRA. The TRA sees the requirement to pay one third of the disputed 
tax as a revenue collection measure and insists on it without regard 
to the merits of the assessment objected to. The TRA's attitude is that 
officers should not look at any objection until one third tax is paid 
even if the objection to the assessment says there is a mathematical 
or accounting error to the tax assessment. 
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To demonstrate the negative approach by the TRA on use of 
administrative discretion, some data from the Tax Appeals Board is 
instructive. Between April 2002 and March 2010, 84 applications on 
administrative matters (not liability to tax) were filed against the TRA. 
More than half (44) were determined in favour of the taxpayer. Only 
15 were refused. A few (8) were withdrawn, and the rest are pending 
decision. A majority of these proceedings could have been avoided. 
Another perception problem against the tax system is that many 
taxpayers in Tanzania think that tax revenues are not properly 
utilized. The government's pattern of expenditure and the apparent 
lack of priority for social services, such as education, health and 
social welfare, is an area of complaint by many people. This 
perceived irresponsibility in government expenditure provides a good 
pretext for non-compliant tax behaviour and makes it impossible for 
government to rely on the notion of 'benefits received' to justify tax 
payment claims even from those who would otherwise have been 
willing to pay. 
Perceptions of equity, or the lack of it, affect tax behaviour. 
Individuals normally respond more or less in the same manner as 
others do. Kahan 175 and Legreman176 make the argument that trust, 
not only in the government, but also among taxpayers, is crucial in 
creating confidence in the tax system and in fostering voluntary 
taxpayer compliance. A taxpayer does not want to stand out as 
champion for the cause, paying taxes while aware that others are not 
doing so. Taxpayers will respond in a certain way if they are aware 
that others similarly placed will respond in like manner. Smith 177 
appears to agree with Kahan and Ledreman that widespread tax 
compliance creates in society an all round culture of compliance 
175D M Kahan 'The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action and Law' (2003) 
102 Michigan Law Review 71 at 80-82. 
176L Ledreman 'The Interplay between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance' 
(2003) 64 Ohio State Law Jouma11453. 
177K W Smith 'Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance' in J 
Slemrod (ed) Why People Pay Taxes, University of Michigan Press, 1992 at 223. 
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which is infectious on individuals. On the other hand, if some think 
they can get away with tax cheating, believing no harm will result to 
themselves and society will go on because others will pay, such 
thinking begins to spread and the band of non-compliant individuals 
starts to grow. 
Compliance will also increase under conditions of trust and 
reciprocity.178 If a taxpayer feels that others comply with their tax 
obligations, he/she too will feel the need to comply.179 If, however, 
the taxpayer believes that other taxpayers do not comply, or are 
unlikely to comply with their tax obligations, he/she will also feel no 
need to comply unless driven by fear of discovery and punishment. 
There may be a few people who comply with taxation for moral or 
other reasons, but for many, the sense of morality will be undermined 
by the lack of reciprocity on the part of others. As a result, tax 
compliance will decrease amid distrust and suspicion that others are 
not complying. 180 The two taxpayer perception surveys carried out in 
Tanzania demonstrate that the lack of reciprocity and the belief that 
there is widespread evasion results in increased non-compliant 
behaviour. 
Taxpayers may not feel the need to pay their taxes voluntarily when 
they believe that others in the society are cheating, or that the vice of 
cheating is not given the contempt it deserves. 181 However, 
reciprocity and inclusiveness does not end only with the assurance 
that everybody is paying tax, in addition, there must be a perception 
that the tax framework ensures that all taxpayers are paying their 
fair share of taxation. As many in Tanzania feel this is not the case, 
the TRA has the duty to ensure that every taxpayer pays their taxes. 
178D M Kahan, 'The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action and Law' (2003) 
102 Michigan Law Review 71 at 80-82, at 85. 
179lbid. 
18°lbid. 
181L Ledreman, 'The Interplay between Norms and Enforcement in Tax Compliance' 
(2003) 64 Ohio State Law Journal 1453. 
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There is also a responsibility on the part of the government to ensure 
that the tax system is designed in such a way as to enlist compliant 
behaviour and taxpayers are able to see that everyone who ought to 
pay tax is doing so. Good governance in this respect not only requires 
tax payment by all, but also taxpayers to be recognized as important 
stakeholders who must participate in the designing of the tax system 
and in the adoption of important tax measures. The government of 
the day must have a participatory system whereby taxpayer 
consultation is a necessary component of the process of tax 
legislation. Taxpayers must be given an opportunity to air their views 
and after the legislation is passed deliberate steps must be taken by 
both the government and the tax administration to educate taxpayers 
on their responsibility with regard to new tax measures. This is what 
inclusiveness and consensus-building entails. 
Spicer and Lundstedt182 argue that taxpayers will reciprocate with 
compliance to taxation if they are treated as important players and 
are accepted as partners in the tax system. Scholz183 agrees saying 
that when taxpayers are ignored, mistreated or merely used as a 
revenue source, they will respond with distrust and hatred for the tax 
administration. Such mistrust or hatred as exhibited in the two 
taxpayer perception surveys carried out in Tanzania, is the result of 
bad personal experience they have had with the tax administration. 
It may also have resulted from negative interaction with tax officers, 
or it could be the result of the experience of others which have led the 
taxpayer to form a biased view based on norms and habits of a 
reference group. 184 A taxpayer's experience relating to a tax audit or a 
tax investigation which is poorly carried out, or such other intrusive 
182M W Spicer and S B Lundstedt 'Understanding Tax Evasion' (1976) 31 Public 
Finance 295-305. See also M W Spicer and L A Becker 'Fiscal Inequality and Tax 
Evasion: An Experimental Approach', (1980) 33 National Tax Law Journal 171-175. 
183 J T Scholz 'Trust, Taxes and Compliance' in V Braithwaite and M Levi (eds) Trust 
and Governance (1998) Russel Sage, New York, at 135. 
184Ibid. 
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behaviour on the part of the tax authority, will account for lasting 
resentment against taxation and may increase tax resistance. 18S 
Good governance in this regard requires that there should be effective 
mechanisms in the tax system to compel tax administrators to treat 
taxpayers with respect and to respect taxpayer rights. Good 
governance also requires that any rights ascribed to taxpayers are 
effective because they can be enforced. This reciprocity between 
taxpayers and tax administrators will promote voluntary tax 
compliance. 
The fairness required in the administration of laws in other branches 
01 \a~ a-p-p\\e'2, e~'Ua\\'J to the adm.ln.l'2,tratlon. of tax laws. In all 
branches of law the question of justice is paramount, because justice 
is the objective of all law. 186 What makes society civilized is the belief 
that there are certain minimum standards which as human beings 
we must observe. These minimum standards are incorporated into 
the social contract and inform the legal system, establishing fair-play 
rules that govern members of society. When those disappear, 
lawlessness is unleashed. In the absence of justice, there is no place 
for law. 
Jurists agree that one's perception of justice in the society affects 
their compliance with laws. 187 When the common perception of what 
is just differs from the justice they see enshrined in the statutes, they 
lose confidence in the laws enacted and will deviate from compliance 
with those laws. 188 A perception that a law is unfair or unjust has the 
potential to make an individual less compliant with that law. 189 Such 
non-compliance may result in the domino effect whereby non-
185Ibid. 
186T R Tyler Why People Obey the Law, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1990, at 
4l. 
187M Silberman "Towards a Theory of Criminal Deterrence' (1976) 41 American 
Sociological Review 442, at 445-47. 
188 Ibid. 
189H G Grasmick and D E Green 'Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and 
Internalisation as Inhibitors of Illegal Behaviour' (1980) 71 Jouranl of Criminal Law 
& Criminology 325 at 334. 
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compliance is not limited only to the law which is perceived to be 
unjust, but to others as well which are unrelated. The standing of the 
whole legal system is put at risk by some unjust laws. The 
perceived fairness of a law increases the likelihood of compliance with 
it. The extent to which people feel that the particular conduct 
prohibited by law is morally wrong and the extent to which people feel 
that the law prohibiting that conduct deserves respect and ought to 
be obeyed, plays a crucial role in peoples' deference to law. 
Equally, administrative decisions which defy the common notion of 
what is just even though made according to law, will undermine the 
public confidence in the justice system. Judge Marshall succinctly 
summed up the concern with court decisions which undermine 
respect for the law. He said: 
"The jurist concerned with public confidence in and 
acceptance of the judicial system might well consider that 
however admirable its resolute adherence to the law as it was, 
a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it is, 
operates, so far as it is known, to diminish respect for the 
courts and for law itself." 190 
Perceived injustice can also arise from criminal punishment schemes 
that do not accurately reflect commonsense notions of crime and 
punishment. 191 Legal scholars recognIze the possibility that 
disproportionate punishments can promote lawbreaking among 
citizens.192 Hart has argued that in designing a morally acceptable 
system of criminal punishment one should draw upon commonsense 
notions regarding appropriate punishment given the gravity of the 
offense in question.193 He observes that, if a legally defined gradation 
of crimes differed sharply from the commonsense consensus, there is 
190Flood v Kuhn 407 US 258, 293 (1972). 
191J Nadler, 'Flouting the Law' (2005) 83 Texas Law Review 1399, at 1404. 
192Ibid. 
193H L A Hart Punishment and Responsibility Oxford University Press, 1968 at 25. 
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the risk of either contradicting common morality, or flouting it, 
bringing the law into contempt. 194 
Generally, therefore, people are more willing to comply with any law 
which they believe is fair in its content and is also fairly 
administered. 195 In the same way, people will generally be willing to 
pay taxes voluntarily if they believe that the laws governing tax 
payment are fair and are administered responsibly. 196 
In this regard, the role of good governance is to create the 
environment which influences positive responses from taxpayers. 
Good governance can create such conditions by imposing limits on 
those who are exercising statutory powers, by putting reasonable 
limits on what they can do and proscribing what they should not do. 
lt means circumscribing the powers of those who administer taxation. 
The need to circumscribe taxing powers does not take away anything 
from the equally compelling need to give tax administrators sufficient 
powers to collect tax efficiently and to deal effectively with non-
compliant taxpayers. Tax administrators need that power so as to 
reinforce attitudes against non-compliance and ensure that no 
taxpayer takes the chance to free ride. 
As shown in the two taxpayer surveys conducted in Tanzania, 
perceptions that taxes are administered selectively, or that tax rates 
on various types of income do not reflect a fair distribution of tax 
burden, or reflect the different tax position of the payers, greatly 
undermine confidence in the tax system. Equally, where some people 
are not taxed at all, the spirit of voluntary tax payment evaporates. 197 
From a perception perspective, the overall fairness of the tax system 
does not require a complicated definition. The fairness of the tax 
system is simply what is just as perceived by a majority of the 
194Ibid. 
195D M Kahan, "Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and 
Social Norms' (2002) 36 University Richmond Law Review 367, at 405. 
196Ibid. 
197Ibid. 
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taxpaying public representing what can be accepted as the public 
view of the tax system in place. 
In Tanzania, the feeling that tax laws are not fair, or are not fairly 
administered, is fuelled by the presence in the tax system of some tax 
exemptions which defy the common sense of fairness. Certain highly 
paid people such as Ministers and parliamentarians are exempted 
from taxation on the many lucrative allowances they receive, while 
poorly paid people such as nurses and primary school teachers bear 
the brunt of full taxation. 198 The feeling of selective taxation is much 
stronger among those who feel that the rich are not taxed in 
proportion to their wealth, but the poor are hounded for any little 
income they make. Where the tax framework exempts those who are 
better placed to pay taxes, but is stacked against those less fortunate, 
the feeling of the unfairness of taxation is hard to deny. This 
demoralizes many individuals who otherwise would have been willing 
to voluntarily meet their tax obligations. Such selective taxation 
greatly undermines voluntary compliance, as people will tend to 
associate tax with injustice. 
In the preceding section, the need for accountability in public 
spending was presented both as a feature of good governance and 
also as an incenti e to the tax-paying public to pay taxes. However, 
the accountability of government must go beyond accounting for what 
is collected and spent. It extends to the selection of priorities for 
government spending, and must extend as well to ensuring that all 
taxpayers meet their tax obligations so that compliant taxpayers do 
not feel they are being taken for a ride. 199 Cowell2oo argues that 
existing levels of non-compliance may generate resentment eventually 
escalating to taxpayers undertaking more acts of non -compliance as 
1985ection 10 of the Income Tax Act No 11 of 2004 read together with the Second 
Schedule paragraph l(s). 
199A Raskolnikov 'Crime and Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence and Self-
Adjustment Penalty' (2006) 106 Columbia Law Review 569 at 574. 
200 F A Cowell Cheating the Government: The Economics of Tax Evasion, MIT Press 
1990, at 101-124. 
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a form of protest against the government and the tax administration, 
or as a means of equalizing the tax burden. There is a duty on the 
part of the government to reign in the unwilling taxpayers, so that 
their non-compliance does not affect the compliant attitude of willing 
taxpayers. 201 Where the government fails to do that tax compliance 
could remain a matter of choice (driven by morality or other intrinsic 
factors) .202 
Accountability also extends to a duty on the part of government to 
identify and respond to taxpayer needs.203 Where a government is 
elected on a platform of promises which have fired up the public, it 
must deliver on those promises. The way the government delivers to 
the electorate influences compliance patterns not only for tax laws 
but for all laws. By so doing the government justifies or vindicates 
itself in its right to tax its citizens. 204 Unfortunately for Tanzania 
election promises are largely forgotten soon after the elections. 
Taxpayers accept that taxes have a purpose to serve in the society. 
Even those who are not motivated by patriotism in paying tax know 
that taxes serve a good purpose in society. Taxes are not nondescript 
donations thrown away to the state. Thus, as the state responds to 
the taxpayers' needs, it proves to them that taxes are meant to serve 
them and not otherwise. 
Taxpayers also have expectations that the government will supply 
certain services in return for taxes paid. 205 Many taxpayers are aware 
though that they cannot receive equal benefits in exchange for the 
amount of taxes paid. 206 However, they expect that the government 
will provide some services. 207 Where the government fails to deliver at 
201 Ibid. 
202 Ibid. 
203J S Carroll 'A Cognitive-Process Analysis of Taxpayer Compliance' in Taxpayer 
Compliance J A Roth and J T Scholz (eds) University of Pennsylvania Press, 1989. 
204M Levi Consent, Dissent and Patriotism, Cambridge University Press, 1997, at 67. 
205Ibid. 
206Ibid. 
207Ibid. 
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the expected level, there must be good reason.208 If no plausible 
explanation is given for failure to deliver, taxpayers will feel 
betrayed,209 a feeling that may well reflect itself in tax resistance. 
Taxpayers view the government as an investor. 210 As investor it is 
expected to invest in human capital and social infrastructure like 
health services and education. It is also expected to invest in 
physical infrastructure such as roads, railways, power systems and 
communication. Government's claim to taxation is legitimised by the 
extent to which it discharges its role as investor.211 Where the 
government fails to carry out investments in society, taxpayers may 
well say to the government 'you did not play your part, we will not 
play our part in payment of tax'.212 In other words the government's 
failure to discharge its role as investor puts its claim to tax in 
question, puts its people's trust in doubt and drives taxpayers to tax 
avoidance and tax evasion.213 There lies the link between governance 
and tax compliance. 
2.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to demonstrate that compliance theories 
which rely only on enforcement and economistic perception of tax 
compliance fail to appreciate the crucial influence which the 
legitimacy of government, the trust people have of the government, 
and the existence of good governance, have on tax compliance. 
Equally, theories that rely on fear of detection and punishment alone 
as the driving forces behind tax compliance cannot explain why some 
208J G Cullis and A Lewis, 'Why People Pay Taxes: From a Conventional Economic 
Model to a Model of Social Convention' (1997) Journal of Economic Psychology 305-
321, at 318; also M Levi 'A State of Trust' in V Braithwaite and M Levi Trust and 
Governance Russel Sage, 1997, at 56. 
209Ibid. 
21OIbid. 
211 I Budge The New Challenge of Democracy, Blackwell Publishers, Cambridge, 
1996, at 121. 
212Ibid. 
213Ibid. 
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compliance exists even where there is no risk of discovery and 
punishment. Sanctions alone do not drive tax compliance. The 
severity of sanction against deviant tax behaviour cannot fully remove 
the non-compliance syndrome which is so multifaceted. 
Non-economic factors such as social norms, the sense of fairness, the 
legitimacy of government, the trust people have in their government, 
the manner in which the government is accountable to its people, 
moral considerations and other factors, must all be recognized as 
influencing taxpayer behaviour. 
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Chapter Three: Taxpayer Rights and 
Compliance 
3.1 Introduction 
In one his writings, Professor Bentley has argued that "a tax 
authority intent on reducing tax avoidance and increasing voluntary 
taxpayer compliance should move away from the traditional strong-
arm tactics ... (because) taxpayers respond favourably to a positive 
and helpful approach by tax authorities". 214 
In the previous chapter a general proposition was put forward that 
good governance (rule of law and constitutionalism), is a prime 
foundation for better tax compliance. Building on that premise, this 
chapter advances the view that a tax system built on observance of 
the rule of law is better placed to offer recognition and protection of 
taxpayer rights in the administration of taxes, and that such 
recognition in itself provides an even better foundation for tax 
compliance. This chapter is also premised on the view that taxpayers 
who are aware of their rights, who expect, and in fact receive, a fair 
and efficient treatment, are more willing to comply with taxation.215 
It is in this regard that Professor Bentley's words above provide a 
sound starting point for the discussion on the protection of taxpayer 
rights and how this impacts on taxpayer compliance. 
A 1990 survey of OECD216 countries noted that tax administrations 
are given wide powers to determine the tax base, to verify information 
provided by taxpayers and third parties and to collect the tax due. 
214D Bentley 'Definitions and Development' in D Bentley (ed) Taxpayers Rights: An 
International Perspective, The Revenue Law Journal, School of Law, Bond 
University, Queensland, 1998, at II. 
21SD Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 50. 
216 OECD Taxpayers Rights and Obligations: A Survey of the Legal Situation in OECD 
Countries (1990) OECD 
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There may be a potential conflict between the use of these powers to 
minimise tax evasion and avoidance and to ensure that all taxpayers 
are fairly treated, with the need to respect the rights of individual 
taxpayers. 
The rights to privacy, to confidentiality, of access to information, and 
to appeal against decisions of the tax administration, for example, are 
fundamental rights in democratic societies. A high degree of 
cooperation from taxpayers is required if complex tax systems are to 
operate efficiently. Cooperation is more likely to be forthcoming if 
taxpayers perceive the system as fair and if their basic rights are 
clearly set out and respected. Croome217 proceeds from this premise 
in discussing how South African taxpayers have used the South 
African Bill of Rights to protect specific rights. 
Professor Bentley218 notes that with most tax systems, protection of 
taxpayer rights has for long depended largely on the general legal and 
constitutional protection afforded to citizens. It IS only in recent 
times that a rights protection approach specific to taxpayers has 
emerged. Even then there is still a lingering link between statute 
based and/ or constitution based taxpayer protection and the 
emerging set of rights distinct to taxpayers which are not necessarily 
founded in general statutes, but are internalised in laws specific to 
taxation. These distinct taxpayer rights are now found in documents 
such as taxpayer charters, which are not founded on statute law, but 
are evolving from the interaction between taxpayers and tax 
administrators and are internalised into tax administration. 
217B Croome Taxpayers'Rights in South Africa (2010) Junta & Co Ltd, Clairemont, 
South Africa. 
218D Bentley 'Definitions and Development'in D Bentley (ed) Taxpayers Rights: An 
International Perspective, The Revenue Law Journal, School of Law, Bond 
University, Queensland, 1998, at 12. 
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3.2 Classification of Taxpayer Rights 
In his previously cited work, Professor Bentley219 suggested that there 
are two categories of taxpayer rights. 22o The first type of rights 
referred to as 'primary rights' or 'statutory legal rights' encompasses 
those rights which relate to the specific validity, operation and 
application of tax laws. Rights of this kind mostly arise at the 
interface between the tax law and the taxpayer. 
The second type referred to as 'secondary rights' or 'administrative 
rights' encompasses the ordinary rights of most taxpayers who 
attempt to comply with the law and want to see fairness and 
efficiency in the daily operation of the tax administration, tax 
collection and tax enforcement process.221 These rights tend to occur 
at the interface between the tax authority and the taxpayer and focus 
on the process of administration. 
A suggestion that there is a third type of rights encompassIng the 
right to a standard of service and treatment by the tax authority has 
been dismissed because these so-called 'rights', when examined 
closely, encompasses things which are no more than goals, 
expectations or promises. Notwithstanding, Professor Bentley notes 
that these 'expectations or promises' which translate into norms of 
behaviour or service standards are themselves assuming great 
importance in changing the culture of tax administrations, especially 
now that the service-oriented culture of private enterprise has come 
to be applied to public administration. 222 Braithwaite223 sees the 
219 Note 219 at 4-6. In this book Professor Duncan Bentley teamed up with a group 
of 12 international authors for publication dedicated to various aspects of taxpayer 
rights. 
220D Bentley 'Definitions and Development' (Chapter 1) in Taxpayers' Rights: An 
International Perspective, The Revenue Law Journal, 1998, at 4-6. 
221D Bentley, Formulating a Taxpayers' Charter of Rights: Setting the Ground Rules 
(1996) 25 Australian Tax Review 97 at 100. 
222D Bentley, Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 15. 
223V Braithwaite 'A New Approach to Tax Compliance' in V Braithwaite (ed) Taxing 
Democracy: Understanding Tax Avoidance and Evasion, Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2003, at 1 
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same trend emerging whereby the traditional command and control 
approach to enforcement of taxation obligations is giving way to a 
responsive approach designed to motivate taxpayers to comply with 
their tax obligations. 
Primary rights (statutory legal rights) include such things as the right 
not to be taxed except in accordance with the law. This right, written 
into many constitutions, translates itself into several sub-rights. The 
first is the taxpayer's right to pay no more than the law requires. 
This is a controversial right and the extent to which it should be 
entrenched has been contested. Those who support its entrenchment 
point to such things as the desirability of interpreting the grey areas 
in tax laws in favour of the taxpayer. Those who oppose its strict 
entrenchment decry the avenues it opens for wide-scale tax avoidance 
schemes. The second sub-right is the prohibition against 
retrospective taxation. For example the Swedish Constitution 
contains a specific prohibition against the retrospective effect of tax 
statutes.224 However the existence of such prohibition when posted 
as a specific right attracts controversy. In many countries it is not 
uncommon that new tax measures are announced either in 
parliament (or outside) and take effect immediately, long before the 
legislative process for them is completed. The justification for 
immediate application is often that the delay required to complete the 
legislative process affords opportunity to taxpayers to re-organise 
their affairs such that the effect of the new tax measure on them is 
minimized or nullified resulting in the loss of tax revenue. There is 
another problem as well. For many countries, it is permissible for the 
tax authority to change its view as to the meaning and effect of a 
taxing provision. When this happens those affected by the change of 
view are effectively being taxed retrospectively. This can be prevented 
if an administrative arrangement is agreed not to review transactions 
which occurred before the change of view. 
224 (see Chapter 2 Paragraph 10 Regeringsformen). 
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A second type of pnmary right, is the right to equality (equal 
treatment before the law). In taxation terms, this often means that 
those with equal ability should bear the same burden of tax. 
However, this is not the same thing as saying that tax laws should 
affect all taxpayers in the same way. In a rather extreme application 
of the equality principle, a German Court ruled that a tax on real 
estate breached the equality principle as it placed a heavier tax 
burden on some taxpayers than they would have borne had they 
invested in other forms of property.22S 
There is bound to be some discrimination In the manner in which 
various taxpayers are affected by a particular tax. When considering 
the constitutionality of a differing treatment of taxpayers, the 
Supreme Court of Canada, in Thibaudeau v Canada,226 took the view 
that the essence of the income tax law is -
"to make distinctions, so as to generate revenue for the 
government while equitably reconciling a range of necessarily 
divergent interests". 
The third primary right is the right to privacy. The enforcement of 
this right has witnessed the restriction of the powers of search and 
seizure in income tax statutes and other laws in several jurisdictions. 
Canada and South Africa provide good examples.227 The right to 
privacy often goes hand in hand with the right to confidentiality and 
secrecy over information given or held by the tax authority relating to 
taxpayers which is examined at some point in this chapter. 
The right to information is the fourth primary right. It relates both to 
an obligation on the tax authority to provide adequate information as 
to taxes and tax compliance matters and to the right of access to 
information held by the tax authority relating to the taxpayer. 
225 (2Bvl 37/91 of 22 June 1995, BStBL II 1995 at 655). 
226 [1995] 1 CTC 212 at 392. 
227Canadian cases include MNR v Kruger Inc [1984] CTC 506 and Baron v Canada 
[1993] 1 CTC 111. For South Africa see D A Park-Ross v The Director, Office for the 
Investigation Serious Economic Offences (1995) (2) SA 198 (C). 
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The fifth right is the right of appeal against assessments or other 
taxing decisions made by the tax authority. A right of appeal is, In 
many countries, specifically provided for by statute. 
The sixth primary right is the right to a fair trial. In Funke v France228 
the European Court of Human Rights invoked Article 6 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights relating to the right to a fair 
trial and held that the right to silence and the right against self-
incrimination were a necessary part of the right to a fair trial in the 
context of a customs investigation. It held that the customs law must 
provide adequate and effective safeguards against abuse in the 
exercise of the powers of entry, search and seizure. The court stated: 
"in the absence of any requirement of a judicial warrant, the 
restrictions and conditions provided for in law ... appear too 
lax and full of loopholes for interferences in the applicant's 
rights to have been strictly proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued".229 
Professor Bentley230 has noted, though, that for many countries there 
is no requirement for a warrant in the exercise of powers of entry, 
search and seizure given under tax statutes, nor is there provision for 
a taxpayer to claim the right to silence, or the privilege against self-
incrimination as exist in criminal law investigations. 
On the other hand, secondary legal rights or administrative rights 
have as their main objective to eliminate the arbitrariness of officers 
and to ensure fairness of the processes that go with tax 
administration. 
Secondary legal rights or administrative rights include such rights as 
the right to receive timely decisions or timely responses to tax 
228European Court of Human Rights judgment of 25 February 1993 Series A No 
256-A 
229 Funke v France, op cit. at paragraph 57. 
230D Bentley 'The Commissioner's Powers: Democracy Fraying at the Edges?' (1994) 
4 Revenue Law Journal 85 at 101. 
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inquiries, the right to certainty in taxation decision-making (typified 
in advance rulings or clear administrative guidelines for officers), the 
restriction of entry and search powers to working hours or other 
reasonable times and the limitation on the use of information 
gathered during audit and investigation. 
Secondary legal rights have developed on the recognition that a tax 
system relies on the underlying support of the community. A tax 
administration will only perform its role effectively if it has the 
confidence of the community in the way it goes about its job.231 
Taxpayers respond positively to a good relationship with tax 
authorities. 
3.3 Taxpayer Rights and Procedural Justice 
Torgler232 and Frey233 have argued that there is a psychological 
contract between the taxpayer and those who collect taxes. This 
contract hinges on justice (fairness) cutting across the breadth of 
interaction between tax administrators and taxpayers. Procedural 
justice which, in essence, embodies the fairness of the system, is a 
central pillar of the psychological contract which exists between 
taxpayers and tax administrators. Procedural justice manifests itself 
in various factors. One of them is the extent to which taxpayers are 
effective players in the taxing game. Taxpayers must be given the 
opportunity to challenge tax decisions and to correct the mistakes of 
tax officers. To a large extent too, taxpayers, as stakeholders in the 
tax system, must playa part in designing or introducing new taxes. 
231These comments were made by Michael Carmody, the Australian Commissioner 
of Taxation in his paper 'Future Directions in Tax Administration of Community 
Confidence: The Essential Building Block' (Chapter 16) in C Evans and Greenbaum 
(eds) Tax Administration: Facing the Challenge of the Future, Prospect media, 1998 
232 B Torgler Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 
Cheltenham United Kingdom, 2007, at 270. 
233 B S Frey and L P Feld Tax Compliance as the Result of Psychological Contract: 
The Role of Incentives and Responsible Regulation, Centre for Tax System Integrity, 
2005. 
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Smith234 points to the need for consistency in decision-making. 
Procedural justice requires consistency in the making of tax decisions 
and in the actions of officers. Fairness requires that individual 
discretion plays a minimal part in tax administration so that all 
elements of arbitrariness are removed. It also requires that tax 
officers be considerate and even-handed as they go about extracting 
taxes from taxpayers. 
Taxpayers respond to the tax system depending on the way they are 
treated by the tax authority. Barzel235 has argued that taxpayers 
may use tax compliance to signify their co-operation with the system. 
Their actions will depend on the treatment they are given by the tax 
authority. Taxpayers will respond to enforcement which they 
perceive as overzealous by protesting or rebelling against the 
impending tax collection.236 Taxpayers are also quick to respond to 
what they see as violations of a performance standard they expect 
from a well run tax administration. The survey reports on the TRA by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (2003),237 and by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006),238 suggest that the TRA's 
unresponsiveness, unfair treatment of taxpayers and a perceived 
uncaring attitude, engenders disrespect for and rebellion against, the 
tax authority and tax laws. 
234K Smith 'Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance', in J 
Slemrod (ed) Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement, University of 
Michigan Press, 1990,311-329. 
23SY Barzel A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the 
State Cambridge University Press, 2002. 
236 Ibid. at 121. 
237National Bureau of Statistics 'Assessment of the Effectiveness of Taxpayers 
Awareness Programs and Attitude of Taxpayers Towards the TRA', Report 
September 2003; 
238PricewaterhouseCoopers "Stakeholders Perception Survey Report 2006', Large 
Taxpayer Department, the TRA, Dar es Salaam. 
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3.4 Taxpayer Rights in Tanzania 
In Tanzania, taxpayer rights are embedded In both the 
Constitution,239 and the various tax statutes in force. Tanzania also 
has a Bill of Rights in the Constitution. The Bill of Rights contains 
basic rights and duties such as the right to equality,24o the right to 
life,241 the right to personal freedom,242 the right to privacy and 
personal security,243 the right to freedom of movement,244 freedom of 
expression,245 freedom of thought and conscience,246 freedom of 
religion,247 the freedom of association,248 the freedom to participate in 
public affairs,249 the right to work,250 the right to just remuneration251 
and the right to own property.252 
The recognition and protection of the right to property is especially 
important because the right to tax is founded on recognition of the 
property rights of individuals.253 It is this recognition which sets 
taxation apart from other forms of government confiscation. Equally 
it is this recognition which has placed legal limits on the manner of 
extraction of taxes and dictated the legal content for the extraction of 
taxes as reflected in the requirement to observe laws and the 
constitution. Taxation is intrinsic to the overall system of property 
239'fhe Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania provides in Article 138(1) 
that no tax shall be imposed save in accordance with a law properly enacted by 
Parliament. 
240Ibid. Article 12. 
241Ibid. Article 13. 
242Ibid. Article 14. 
243Ibid. Article 15. 
244Ibid. Article 16. 
245Ibid. Article 1 7. 
246Ibid. Article 18. 
247Ibid. Article 19. 
248Ibid. Article 20. 
249Ibid. Article 2 1. 
250 Ibid. Article 22. 
251Ibid. Article 23. 
252Ibid. Article 24. 
253D Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 12. 
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rights designed to fund the maintenance and development of the 
social order and to promote beneficial economic results. 254 
The right to privacy and protection of private communIcations 
afforded by Article 16 of the Constitution has assumed great 
significance in the taxation field because of the powers given to the 
tax administration to access personal information for tax purposes. 
Relying on Article 16 it is possible to challenge actions of entry, 
search and seizure of documents, undertaken by tax officers in 
connection with tax investigations or audits. It is notable, however, 
that while the TRA has intensified its investigation and audit 
functions, there is still no case that has been taken in reliance on the 
protection of privacy provisions in the constitution.255 
In any case, the laws in Tanzania embody basic taxpayer rights by 
extension only. There are no specific protections for taxpayer rights. 
In order to benefit from the protection of law, the taxpayer must find 
a provision in the general laws which he/she is able to apply to the 
specific breach that has occurred, or threatens to occur. But the tax 
laws do have some provisions which reiterate basic rights as 
protected in the constitution of Tanzania. 
For instance, Article 13 of the Constitution which entrenches equality 
before the law and the right to protection of the law, also makes 
detailed provision of sub-rights which find expression in tax statutes. 
Article 13, sub-article (6) provides: 
"(6) To ensure equality before the law, the state authority shall 
make procedures which are appropriate or which take into 
account the following principles, namely: 
(a) when the rights and duties of any person are being 
determined by the court or any other agency, that person 
shall be entitled to a fair hearing and the right of appeal or 
254J Finnis Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford University Press, 1980, at 155, 
and 256-257. 
255See discussion in Chapter Seven. 
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the other agency concerned; 
(b) no person charged with a criminal offence shall be treated 
as guilty of the offence until proved guilty of that offence; 
(c) no person shall be punished for any act which at the time 
of its commission was not an offence under the law and 
also no penalty shall be imposed which is heavier than the 
penalty in force at time the offence was committed; 
(d) for the purposes of preserving the right or equality of 
human beings, human dignity shall be protected in all 
activities pertaining to criminal investigations and process 
and in any other matters for which a person is restrained 
on in the execution of a sentence; 
(e) no person shall be subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading punishment or treatment." 
97 
The sub-rights stipulated in sub-article (6) in relation to: (a) fair 
hearing and right of appeal, (b) presumption of innocence, (c) 
prohibition of retrospective punishment, (d) dignified investigation, 
search and arrest and (e) prohibition of degrading treatment, all find 
expression in tax statutes. 
Section 6 of the Tanzania Revenue Act256 provides for the right of 
appeal in the following terms: 
"6. Any person who is aggrieved by the decision of the 
Commissioner General in relation to any act or omission in the 
course of discharge of any function conferred upon him under 
the law set out in the First Schedule to this Act (tax laws), may 
appeal to the Board in accordance with the provisions of the 
Tax Revenue Appeals Act." 
256Tanzania Revenue Authority Act No 11 of 1995 (Revised Edition 2006) Chapter 
399. 
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The Tax Revenue Appeals Act257 entrenches in section 12 the right to 
dispute a tax assessment. Section 12 (1) provides; 
"Any person who disputes an assessment made upon him 
may, by notice in writing to the Commissioner General, object 
to the assessment." 
In section 16 (1), the Tax Revenue Appeals Act entrenches the right of 
appeal against tax decisions. It provides; 
"Any person who is aggrieved by the final determination of the 
assessment of tax by the Commissioner General may appeal to 
the Board." 
Section 7 of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act created the Board as a 
judicial body with exclusive jurisdiction258 to hear and determine 
disputes relating to taxation. Appeals from the Tax Appeals Board go 
to the Tax Appeals Tribunal which is chaired by a judge of the High 
Court of Tanzania. A final appeal lies to the Court of Appeal of 
Tanzania, but only on matters of law, not fact. Normal courts have 
no jurisdiction to hear tax disputes, except by way of judicial review. 
Some sections of society criticize the government for giving exclusive 
jurisdiction to quasi judicial bodies specially created rather than the 
ordinary courts. This criticism is not entirely justified. As will be 
shown later, both the Tax Appeals Board and the Tax Appeals 
tribunal have managed to operate with an acceptable degree of 
independence and have shown reasonable competence. In addition 
removing tax disputes from the ordinary courts (which are clogged 
with cases) has expedited the determination of tax cases. So the 
criticism is only true to the limited extent that special tribunals 
encroach on separation of powers and the institutional independence 
of the judiciary. It is not always the case that the operational 
257Tax Revenue Appeals Act No 15 of 2000. 
258Section 25 Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 
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independence of the tribunal will be affected simply because it is a 
special tribunal. 
Another right entrenched In the tax statutes is the right to a fair 
hearing reflected in provisions which recognize the right to legal or 
professional representation259 and the right to prove a case by 
evidence.26o However, it will be shown later that the constitutional 
right to be presumed innocent and the normal rules relating to proof 
are not fully respected in tax statutes.261 
The TRA has, in addition, adopted a Taxpayers' Charter262 which 
covers a wide range of both secondary and primary taxpayer rights. 
The Taxpayers' Charter also incorporates servIce standard 
pronouncements which act as a benchmark for customer service 
expectations. 
It is clear from the statements accompanying the Taxpayers' Charter 
that the Charter is premised on both the Constitution and the tax 
laws administered by the TRA. The TRA states in the background to 
the Charter that: 
"The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania among 
other things guarantees the right to equal treatment before the 
law, the right to privacy, the right to information, the right to 
fair treatment and the right to possess property. 
The Tanzania Revenue Authority (the TRA) was established by 
Act No. 11 of 1996, and has been given by law the 
responsibility of assessing, collecting and accounting for all 
Central Government taxes. In performing this responsibility, 
the TRA and the Government recognize the need to develop a 
productive partnership between the TRA and the taxpayer by 
259Sections 18 (2) (a) and 22 (3) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 
26oSection 22 (5) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 
261See part 5.5.3 of Chapter 5. 
262The TRA, Taxpayers' Charter, prepared by the Taxpayer Services and Education 
Department, Tanzania Revenue Authority Head Office, Dar es Salaam. The Charter 
was issued in October 2006 as part of the Tenth Anniversary celebrations for the 
TRA. 
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ensuring that the administration of taxes is carried out in 
accordance with the Constitution of the United Republic of 
Tanzania and the various revenue laws enacted by Parliament 
and administered by the TRA. 
The TRA, in carrying out its mandate, has adopted a corporate 
plan which underscores the fundamental strategies for 
effective tax administration among which is to ensure there is 
in existence a robust taxpayer education and customer care 
program, improved access to information, improved data 
keeping, and simplifying information fllling. 
In order to ensure that taxes are administered responsibly and 
fairly and that the tax practices adopted by the TRA are 
consistent with the Constitution and the laws of the country, 
the TRA has put forward this Taxpayers' Charter as a 
pronouncement of the commitment by the TRA to forging a 
good partnership with the taxpayer and to adopting tax 
administration practices which allow the partnership with the 
taxpayer to grow and thereby improve tax administration. 
The Taxpayers' Charter sets out the rights and obligations of 
the taxpayer on the one hand and on the other, the duties and 
service standards of the TRA in dealing with the taxpayer. As 
such the Charter is a performance standard only, it is not a 
legally binding instrument. Both the taxpayer and the TRA, 
must ultimately invoke the relevant laws in acting against, or 
seeki g to prevent, an action which is inconsistent with the 
Charter and the laws."263 
100 
The Taxpayers' Charter is largely a performance standard only, it is 
not a legally binding instrument. It does not replace or stand in 
tandem with the statutory provisions which prescribe enforceable 
rights. Only statutory provisions stipulating rights may be relied 
upon in acting against, or seeking to prevent actions which are 
inconsistent with, the TRA Taxpayers' Charter. 
263Ibid. 
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It is notable too that the intention is that the TRA Taxpayers' Charter 
is a work in progress which will keep changing. It is declared at page 
2 that-
"This Taxpayers' Charter is not a static instrument and will be 
reviewed and improved from time to time along with the 
changing economIC development and changing tax 
practices. "264 
Although the TRA Taxpayers' Charter is not a legally binding 
instrument, its importance should not be discounted. It embodies 
the vision of the TRA which is to build 'a modern tax administration'. 
The first, second and third TRA Five Year Corporate Plans265 all state 
that the "TRA is committed and dedicated to becoming a modern tax 
administration (by the end of the Plan period". 266 According to the 
two earlier corporate plans -
"... a modernized tax administration is one that has a strong 
enforcement capacity delivered by highly qualified, motivated 
and committed staff; has an integrated approach to the 
administration of taxes; is computerized; uses modern 
practices and processes; and enjoys high levels of tax 
compliance by creating a taxpayer-friendly environment."267 
The Third Corporate Plan running from 2008/2009 to 2012/2013 
states the features of a modern tax administration as being an ability 
to meet collection targets, to deliver services that meet customer 
expectations, a fair and consistent application of laws, and skilled 
and qualified staff with high levels of integrity. 
Corporate strategic plans have become important documents against 
which the performance of an organization over time is measured. The 
issuance of the TRA Taxpayers' Charter by the TRA and its 
2641bid. at 2. 
265The TRA, First, Second and Third Five Year Corporate Plans (1998/1999 to 
2012/2013, Tanzania Revenue Authority, Head Office, Dar es Salaam. 
2661bid. 
2671bid. 
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observance by the TRA staff, is an important milestone in meeting the 
TRA expectations under the Corporate Plans. 
As a service standard, the TRA Taxpayers' Charter also embodies the 
TRA's Mission Statement by which the TRA strives -
"... to be an effective and efficient tax administration which 
promotes voluntary tax compliance by providing high quality 
customer servIce with fairness and integrity through 
competent and motivated staff'. 268 
In addition, the Charter embodies the stated core values of the TRA 
and its employees who are expected to be business oriented and 
professional in appearance and approach, be fair and accountable for 
the decisions they make in their areas of responsibility, be prompt in 
the delivery of services and are accessible, treat taxpayers colleagues 
and stakeholders with dignity and respect, be honest and have 
integrity in their dealings, be committed and motivated to the 
achievement of the TRA goals and objectives. 
The taxpayer 'rights' proclaimed in the TRA Taxpayers' Charter are 
examined below. 
3.5 Taxpayer Rights in the TRA Taxpayers' Charter 
The TRA Taxpayers' Charter proclaims that in its dealings with the 
taxpayer, the TRA will observe and respect the following rights of the 
taxpayer: 
(i) Right to receive tax forms, returns and information written in 
plain language 
(ii) Right to impartial treatment 
268This Mission Statement is contained in the First and Second Corporate Plans of 
the TRA. The fIrst Corporate Plan was for the years 1998/99 to 2002/03. The 
second, which is about to come to an end is for the years 2003/04 to 2007/08. 
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(iii) Right to courtesy and consideration 
(iv) Right to privacy and confidentiality 
(v) Right to presumption of honesty 
(vi) Right to impartial review of tax assessment 
(vii) Right to tax benefits under the revenue laws 
(viii) Right to quality service 
(ix) Right to an internal complaints procedure 
Through the Taxpayers' Charter, the TRA commits itself and by doing 
so creates a duty upon itself, to provide tax forms, returns and 
information written in plain language. The taxpayer acquires a right 
to receive from the TRA complete, simple and accurate tax 
information through the print and electronic media i.e. newspapers, 
pamphlets, leaflets, website, radio and television, so as to assist 
him/her comply with the tax laws administered by the TRA. The 
declaration of this duty by the TRA to provide information, as a 
taxpayer right, is problematic. On the one hand, the TRA's 
declaration of a taxpayer right to information on tax laws and 
compliance obligations is unlikely to affect the now established 
common law principle that every person is presumed to know the 
law.269 This presumption, represented in the maxim ignorantia juris 
non excusat, is widely accepted by the courts in Tanzania270 and 
applies as well to taxation. On the other hand, there is no statutory 
basis on which the right to receive information on taxation laws can 
be enforced because it is not one of the rights recognized under 
269Under English law every person is presumed to know the law, in other words 
ignorance of law is no defence to liability for an offence. See Bilbie v Lumley (1802) 
2 East 469; see also P Mathews 'Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse?' (1983) 3 Legal 
Studies 174; and A T H Smith 'Error and Mistake of Law in Anglo-American 
Criminal Law' (1985) 14 Anglo-American Law Review 3. 
270 For example Yero Transport Services Ltd v Attorney General & 2 Others, Civil 
Application No. 58/2001, Court of Appeal of Tanzania (unreported); and Calico 
Industries v Pyaraliesmail Premji [1983] TLR 28. 
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statute, or by the Constitution. With this in mind it is proper to see 
"the right to information" as a performance standard only, desired to 
be achieved by the TRA as a tax administration, but not as a duty 
binding on the TRA as a matter of law. Therefore for the taxpayer 
who does not receive information regarding liability to tax, the 
obligation to comply will not abate because of the failure by the TRA 
to provide information. 
The right to impartial application of tax law is indeed a legal right. 271 
The taxpayer has a right to impartial application of the tax laws so 
that the TRA collects no more than the correct amount of tax. 
However, even this right is not without controversy. 
In contesting an assessment or a tax decision, the person objecting is 
required to demonstrate that the law has not been applied correctly 
to his / her circumstances. It is not enough to merely say that the 
same law has not been enforced on others, or that it has been applied 
differently. This will not of itself make what is done wrongful in 
terms of the tax statutes. It is possible, however, to mount a 
challenge against the validity of the officer's discriminatory 
application of law and have that quashed. But if the application of 
law is itself correct, the fact that it has not been applied to others in 
the same way will not render the tax illegal. I t is also accepted that 
the tax administration can change its view as to the interpretation 
and application of any tax provision. 272 This position may also impair 
the realization of the right against discrimination in taxation because 
as the tax administration changes its view on a tax provision, new 
cases will be treated differently. 
271The right to equality before the law is provided in Article 13 (2) of the 
Constitution which proclaims that "No law enacted by any authority in the United 
Republic of Tanzania shall make any provision that is discriminatory either of itself 
or in its effect.» 
272 In Australia positions taken by the Australian Taxation Office as to the 
application of a taxing provision only became binding on the tax administration 
after the enactment of the Freedom of Information Act 1982. Section 9 thereof 
requires copies of documents used by tax officers in making decisions to be made 
available to the pUblic. This is not the case in many other countries and is 
certainly not the case in Tanzania. 
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The Taxpayers' Charter states that a taxpayer has a right to receive 
courteous and considerate treatment in dealing with the TRA whether 
the TRA is requesting information or arranging for an interview or an 
audit of his/her business records. This too is a performance 
standard only. It cannot be enforced as a legal right. 
The Taxpayer Charter also declares that the taxpayer has a right to 
privacy and confidentiality over personal and financial information 
supplied to the TRA unless such privacy and/ or confidentiality is 
derogated by law. While the right to privacy and confidentiality is 
provided for by law, the extent of this protection is tempered by a 
number of factors. The first is that the tax statutes themselves 
contain many areas which erode confidentiality and secrecy of 
information given by the taxpayer or gathered from him/her. 
Secondly, even when it is proved that confidentiality and secrecy has 
been breached by an officer, there is no financial remedy for the 
taxpayer as the immunities placed on public officers will protect the 
officer from a civil claim for monetary compensation.273 The only 
remedy available is prosecution and punishment of the offending 
officer as a matter of criminal law. This is not a remedy for the 
taxpayer, but an action by the state to preserve the integrity of the 
system. 
The taxpayer right to privacy is also undermined by the wide powers 
given to the TRA for information gathering and for audits and 
inspections. These powers are discussed in the following sections. 
Looking at it from the perspective of Article 16 of the Constitution 
which guarantees the right to privacy, the inspection powers of the 
TRA are inimical to the protection afforded by the Constitution. A 
person's premises should be protected from intrusion except in 
relation to an investigation for a criminal offence. Tax laws need to 
limit the scope for which access to premises is permitted. 
273There is, however, an arguable case for a civil remedy against the government in 
its vicarious capacity, subject to the rules governing tortuous claims. 
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The intrusion on privacy IS compounded by the failure to requIre 
notice to the occupier of premises where entry is required. No notice 
or warrant is required to enter and inspect premises if entry is made 
between 9 am to 6 pm.274 Failure to require notice is a significant 
erosion of the right to privacy. It also undermines the right to the 
protection of the law and respect for the due process of law. 
The Taxpayer Charter recognizes that the taxpayer has a right to be 
presumed honest, unless previous conduct derogates from that 
presumption, or evidence to the contrary exists. The TRA's 
formulation of the right to the presumption of innocence departs from 
the understanding of that right under common law and also under 
the Constitution of Tanzania. As a common law principle and also as 
a basic right under the Constitution of Tanzania, the presumption of 
innocence is not qualified.275 Rules of evidence applicable to criminal 
prosecutions generally exclude evidence of character or previous 
conduct (criminal record), unless the accused has held himself to be 
a person of good character. 276 
It is therefore fair to say that the presumption of innocence as 
embodied in the TRA Taxpayer Charter is also a performance 
standard only. But even as a performance standard it falls short of 
the requirements of some provisions of the general law in Tanzania. 
It may indeed be reflecting the position of the tax statutes in 
Tanzania as many shift the burden of proof to the taxpayer and lower 
the standard of proof for the tax administration. 
The right to an impartial review of a tax assessment is truly a legal 
right. Tax statutes give the taxpayer a right to object to an 
274Section 138 ITA 2004. 
275Cross says "When it is said that an accused person is presumed to be innocent, 
all that is meant is that the prosecution is obliged to prove the case against him 
beyond reasonable doubt. This is the fundamental rule of our criminal procedure, 
and it is expressed in terms of a presumption of innocence so frequently as to 
render criticism somewhat pointless .... » R Cross and C Tapper Cross on Evidence 
(6th ed) Butterworths, London, 1985, at 114-115. 
276 R v Buttenuasser (1948) 1 KB 4, (1947) 2 All ER 415. 
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assessment or other determination by the TRA,277 unless that right is 
circumscribed by other law. Where an objection is lodged by the 
taxpayer the TRA has a duty to conduct an impartial review of the 
disputed assessment, acting as expeditiously as possible and 
notifying the taxpayer of the review decision made. If the review 
decision does not fully resolve the dispute the taxpayer has a right of 
appeal to an impartial body as provided by law and the TRA has a 
duty to explain that right of appeal to the taxpayer. This, indeed, is a 
taxpayer right and the laws in existence sufficiently provide for its 
realization. 
The taxpayer has a right to plan his/her tax affairs so as to reap 
maximum benefit allowed under the revenue laws. The TRA has a 
duty to apply the tax laws in a consistent and fair manner to every 
taxpayer. The right to pay no more than the law requires, or to take 
optimum advantage of the tax laws is glorified in its history only.278 
Provisions in modern tax legislation which aim to counteract tax 
avoidance have ensured that this right is a pale shadow of what it 
used to be. 279 In Tanzania, both the income tax law and the value 
added tax law contain prov sions which make it difficult to realize this 
taxpayer right. 280 
The taxpayer has a right to receIve quality servIce from the TRA 
officers. This is clearly a performance standard only. However, even 
277Section 21(1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act No 15 of 2000. 
278 IRC v Duke of Westminster (1936) AC 1 continues to be cited as putting forward a 
sound principle of law, but the observance of this principle is now severely eroded. 
More recent cases decided on tax avoidance have recognized the legitimacy of 
striking down tax avoidance schemes. The House of Lords made it clear in Ramsay 
v IRC (1982) AC 300 (HL) and in Furniss v Dawson (1984) 1 All ER 530 (HL), that 
transactions which have no legitimate commercial purpose except the minimization 
of tax will be struck down. 
279The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and United States of America all have 
statutory provisions which aim to counteract tax avoidance schemes. Modern tax 
literature premised on fair distribution of the tax burden also urge that tax 
avoidance be treated with the same stigma as tax evasion because both have the 
same effect on the economy. 
28oIncome Tax Act 2004 (sections 33 against transfer pricing; 34 against income 
splitting; and 35 aimed generally against tax avoidance schemes); the Value Added 
Tax 1997 (section 67 aimed against schemes for obtaining undue tax benefit). 
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as a performance standard, this vaguely stated right is hard to 
enforce and breaches of it will not lead to a legal remedy. 
The right to an internal complaints procedure, even though it is not a 
statutory legal right, is an important one. A taxpayer who believes 
that he / she has not been fairly treated by an officer of the TRA has a 
right to lodge a complaint administratively at a higher level. Where a 
complaint is made to an officer at a higher level, the officer has a duty 
to investigate the complaint and deal with it to the satisfaction of the 
taxpayer. As an addition to the right of objection to assessment and 
tax decision, the introduction of this right under the Charter is 
indeed welcome. Its value is limited by the fact that it is largely a 
concession by the tax authority but has no basis in law. 
By embodying such principles as right to information, right to be 
presumed compliant, duty of privacy and confidentiality, right to 
courteous treatment, the Charter sets a performance standard which, 
if adhered to in the day to day administration of taxation, will lead to 
a public belief that taxes are administered fairly and impartially.281 
This belief will improve taxpayer acceptance of the tax system282 and 
lead to higher levels of voluntary compliance.283 
In accordance with the Mission Statement of the TRA, the Taxpayer 
Charter commits the TRA officials to be courteous, polite and service 
oriented. They are to refrain from any form of arrogance, harassment 
or authoritarian behaviour towards taxpayers.284 Officers are urged 
by the Charter to respond to phone calls expeditiously and deal with 
all enquiries timeously. 
281The preamble in part declares that "to ensure that taxes are administered 
responsibly and fairly ... the TRA has put forward this Taxpayers' Charter as a 
pronouncement of the commitment by the TRA to forging a good partnership with 
the taxpayer and to adopt tax administration practices which allow the partnership 
with the taxpayer to grow and improve tax administration". 
282Clause 2 on Taxpayers' rights. 
283Clause 2.9 of the Charter. 
284Clause 4.1 on the TRA Officers Service Standards. 
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By way of comparIson, the Uganda Revenue Authority (the URA) 
Client Service Standards published in 2006, go much further in 
setting down a behaviour code for tax officers. In the foreword to the 
booklet containing the Standards, Mr. Allen Kagina, the URA 
Commissioner General, succinctly captures the need for a new mind-
set for tax officers. He writes: 
"In Uganda Revenue Authority, we recognize that we can only 
fulflll our mandate if we put the client first. URA has been 
engaged in various initiatives that were aimed at transforming 
ourselves into a professional tax administration agency 
providing quality service to all our clients. As we embark on 
the process of modernizing our services, we must do so with 
the client in fOCUS."285 
The Client Service Standards of the URA are in two parts, starting 
with a General Standard dealing with very mundane things such as 
the need for officers to maintain eye contact when speaking to 
taxpayers and good telephone etiquette, for example, answering calls 
within three rings and calling back immediately in case of inability to 
take the call when the phone rings. It also covers such professional 
behaviour as the requirement to wear identity cards, no jeans, tight 
fitting dress or provocative micro minis that enhance sex appeal and 
the need for general neatness of the person and place of work. 
In the second part are Service Standards. They deal with such things 
as limiting the duration of queuing to a maximum of thirty minutes, 
an obligation to provide tax information, a prohibition against 
exploiting taxpayer ignorance of the law, imposing a 10 day notice 
requirement for undertaking audits, an obligation to renew road 
licenses within 12 hours of payment, registration of motor vehicles 
within three hours, and the obligation to explain tax assessment. 
285 URA Client Service Standards, URA 2006 at ii 
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Although these requirements impose on URA officers a performance 
standard only and do not create enforceable legal rights, the mere 
existence of such taxpayer focused performance requirements makes 
the taxpayers feel valued. With this in mind, when slogans like 
"Developing Uganda Together" are used by the URA, or as in the case 
of the TRA "From Tax Collector to Partner in Development", the 
taxpayer can relate to those expressions and feel part of the tax 
system. 
3.6 Enforceability of Taxpayer Rights in Tanzania 
While the TRA Taxpayers' Charter is not a legally binding instrument, 
it is possible to isolate those taxpayer rights it deals with which are 
also entrenched in the tax laws (or other laws) and are capable of 
enforcement by taxpayers. 
The right of appeal against taxing decisions of the TRA provided in 
both the TRA Act and the Tax Revenue Appeals Act, and is capable of 
enforcement in a court of law. Section 6 of the TRA Act provides that 
any person aggrieved by a decision of the Commissioner General 
(which includes all other officers of the TRA) may appeal to the 
Appeals Board established under the Tax Revenue Appeals Act 2000. 
Section 16(1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act 2000 provides for a 
general right of appeal. Section 16(1) also provides for the right of a 
second appeal to the Appeals Tribunal (16(5)), with a third and final 
appeal lying to the Court of Appeal (section 25). 
The right of appeal to an independent judicial body or tribunal is a 
basic right. It ensures there is an effective check on arbitrary 
taxation, as Professor Bentley says, "without justice and rule of law, 
taxation becomes an arbitrary exaction at whim".286 The right of 
286D Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation , Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 2. 
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appeal is also an important remedy against injustice that may result 
from a tax administration vested with enormous powers which if 
exercised without challenge can very easily be misused. 
The right of appeal and the right of objection, against an assessment 
to tax, are fundamental to the tax system. They give the taxpayer an 
opportunity to challenge tax decisions. At times the right of objection 
and appeal has been attacked because it is capable of being used by 
taxpayers to delay payment of tax which is properly due. However, 
the value of such right in protecting the observance of law in the 
administration of taxes cannot be questioned. 
The existence of the right of objection and appeal confer on the tax 
administration the required legitimacy and sense of fair play in its 
dealings with taxpayers. A taxpayer who has the opportunity to 
challenge a tax decision, does so and loses, or chooses not to exercise 
that right, cannot complain that the taxation imposed on him/her is 
unfair. The right also underscores the transparency which must 
exist in the decisions of the administration. Perceived transparency 
promotes voluntary tax compliance. 
Nonetheless, the right of appeal with respect to taxation is not 
unique. It is part of the general law of Tanzania and applies with 
respect to decisions made under other laws. The right of appeal is 
guaranteed under Article 13 (6) (a) of the Constitution of Tanzania.287 
It is ancillary to the right to the protection of the law under Article 13 
(1),288 which in paragraph 13 (6) (a) extends to the right of a fair 
hearing.289 It has been said that the right to a fair hearing involves 
287Article 13 (6) (a) provides that: "(6) To ensure equality before the law, the state 
authority shall make procedures which are appropriate or which take into account 
the following principles, namely (a) when the rights and duties of any person are 
being determined by the court or any other agency, that person shall be entitled to 
a fair hearing and to the right of appeal or other legal remedy against the decision 
of the court or of the other agency concerned;" Constitution of Tanzania 1977 (as 
amended up to 2005). 
288Article 13 (1) provides that "(1) All persons are equal before the law and are 
entitled, without any discrimination, to protection and equality before the law." 
289 Ibid. 
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not only the opportunity to be heard, but includes as well the right to 
be heard by an independent and impartial body.29o As correctly 
recognised by courts in Australia, liability to tax cannot be imposed 
upon citizens without leaving open to them some judicial process by 
which they may show that they are not in fact liable to tax or not 
liable in the amount assessed. 291 
The realisation of the right of objection and the right of appeal in 
Tanzania is surrounded by certain impediments. A taxpayer who is 
aggrieved by a tax assessment must issue an objection and seek 
review from the same office which made the assessment. 292 It is often 
the case too that when an objection is lodged, the assessment is 
reviewed by the same officer who made the assessment. This practice 
reduces the value of the objection procedure as a way of impartially 
reviewing tax decisions and disputes relating to the correctness of 
tax. This impediment in the objection procedure is compounded by 
the requirement that, for an objection to be entertained, the taxpayer 
must pay one third of the tax assessed. 293 Such provisions have led 
courts in the United States America to say that the power to tax may 
equal the power to destroy.294 
It is arguable that circumscribing the right of appeal against tax 
assessments in the manner done by the Tax Revenue Appeals Act 
runs contrary to the spirit of the Constitution because the 
Constitutional right of appeal envisages an appeal to an impartial and 
un-inhibited appellate tribunal. The gravity of this limitation is best 
appreciated in the context that a combination of the incompetence 
290Article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides that: "Everyone 
is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal in the determination of his rights and obligation and of any 
criminal charge against him." UN General Assembly (adopted 10 December 1948). 
291 DFCT v Brown (1958) 100 Commonwealth Law Report 32 at 40-41. 
292Section 12 (1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act No 15 of 2000. 
293Section 12 (2) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 
294Bull versus United States, 259 U.S. 247, 259 (1935) where the Court observed 
that "taxes are the life blood of the government, and their prompt and certain 
availability an imperious need"; while in McCulloch versus Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 
431 (1819), it was observed that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy". 
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that permeates the TRA, together with a tendency towards 
overzealousness shown by some officers has led to inflated tax 
assessments. It can also be said that the requirement for payment of 
one third of the disputed tax, even though well intentioned,295 goes 
against the well established principle of the presumption of 
mnocence. Similarly, from a taxpayer rights standpoint, the 
requirement to prepay a substantial part of disputed taxes 
undermines the protection of the right not to be deprived of property 
without a hearing before an impartial tribunal. The problem with this 
provision is that rather than encourage voluntary tax compliance it 
undermines it. With such a provision in place, it is difficult to 
convince taxpayers that the tax system is fair. 
As indicated previously, the right to organise one's affairs so as to 
optimise tax benefits under the law is problematic. Likewise, "the 
right to pay no more than is provided by clear law" (as stated in the 
Taxpayers' Charter), is equally problematic. To appreciate the 
problem, one needs to start from the Constitution. In stating that no 
person shall be taxed except in accordance with law,296 the 
Constitution implicitly entrenches the right of the taxpayer to order 
his/her affairs in such a way that he/she takes maximum advantage 
of the tax law. In administering tax laws no person is to be taxed 
because he/she "ought to be taxed", a person is taxed because there 
is a clear law providing for the tax imposed on him/her. In saying 
this, one ought to be mindful of the fact there is in nearly all tax 
statutes in Tanzania clear provisions which give power to the TRA to 
nullify schemes for minimisation of tax.297 Therefore, while in terms 
29SPrepayment of part of disputed taxes has been justified on the premise that there 
is an equally compelling public interest in ensuring that the collection of tax 
revenue does not stall in litigation, and that taxpayers do not use the appeal 
procedure to delay tax payment that is rightly due. 
296Article 138 (1) of the Constitution of Tanzania 1977 (2005 edition). 
297Sections 34,35, and 57 of the Income Tax Act No 11 of 2004 empower the TRA to 
counteract transfer pricing, income splitting, dividend stripping and other schemes 
to reduce tax. Section 67 of the Value Added Tax Act No 24 of 1997 empowers the 
TRA to nUllify schemes which seek to enable the taxpayer to obtain an undue tax 
benefit. 
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of the Constitution and the Taxpayers' Charter, one may claim an 
entitlement to pay no more than is required by law, the operation of 
the anti-avoidance provisions in the tax laws make this right elusive 
and virtually un-enforceable. 
The right to information is a limited one and is not capable of 
enforcement. The presumption of knowledge of the law absolves the 
TRA from any legal duty to provide information. Therefore, the duty 
to provide information as presented in the Taxpayers' Charter is only 
a performance standard. No sanction can attend the TRA's non-
compliance with this objective. From the TRA perspective, giving 
concise and clear information in simple language enables the 
taxpayer to comply with what is expected of the taxpayer. 
There are two types of information taxpayers have a right to receive. 
The first type is general information regarding various taxes and how 
to discharge the compliance obligations placed on taxpayers. This 
information comes in the form of the tax statutes, subsidiary 
legislation and Government Notices. In addition, however, the TRA 
disseminates to the taxpayers ad-hoc pUblications in the form of 
booklets, leaflets and fliers, explaining the various taxes and the 
compliance procedures. 
General information is also given to taxpayers in the form of Practice 
Notes issued by the TRA outlining how the TRA, in relation to any 
matter, will interpret and apply a particular tax provision. Section 
130 of the Income Tax Act provides as follows: 
"(130) (1) To achieve consistency in the administration of this 
Act and to provide guidance to persons affected by this Act, 
including officers of the Tanzania Revenue Authority, the 
Commissioner may issue in writing practice notes setting out 
the Commissioner's interpretation of this Act. 
(2) A practice note shall be binding on the Commissioner until 
revoked. 
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affected by this Act. 
(4) The Commissioner shall make practice notes available to 
the public at offices of the Tanzania Revenue Authority and at 
such other locations or by such other medium as the 
Commissioner may determine." 
115 
Practice Notes serve two purposes. They set a common framework for 
decision making among officers of the TRA. Practice Notes also create 
certainty in tax planning because taxpayers are able to predict the 
tax consequences of their actions with a reasonable degree of 
certainty. A position expressed in a Practice Note is binding on the 
TRA until the courts express a contrary view of the statute, or until 
revoked by the TRA.298 Although section 130 (2) says that a Practice 
Note is binding on the TRA, the fact that this operates only until the 
Practice Note is revoked effectively means the Practice Note may be 
modified at any time if the Commissioner changes his view of the 
provision for which the Practice Note was issued. In any case too, 
Practice Notes are not binding on taxpayers.299 Taxpayers retain the 
right to challenge the correctness of the view the TRA takes in a 
Practice Note. Nonetheless, Practice Notes are an effective guide as to 
how the law will be implemented by TRA. A taxpayer relying on the 
position expressed in a Practice Note is protected from penalty or 
other adverse action by the TRA. 
The second type of information which a taxpayer has a right to 
receive is of a more specific nature and relates only to proposed 
transactions or transactions already undertaken. Under section 131 
of the Income Tax Act 2000, a taxpayer has the right to seek and 
obtain a ruling as to what view the TRA will take on a particular 
transaction which is proposed or has happened. Rulings issued 
298Section 130 (2) of the Income Tax Act. 
299Section 130 (3) of the Income Tax Act. 
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under section 131 are called Private Rulings. Section 131 provides 
that: 
"131 (1) The Commissioner may, on application in writing by a 
person, issue to the person, by notice in writing served on the 
person, a private ruling setting out the Commissioner's 
position regarding the application of this Act to the person 
with respect to an arrangement proposed or entered into by 
the person. 
(2) Where prior to the issue of a ruling under subsection (1), 
the person makes: 
(a) a full and true disclosure to the Commissioner of 
all aspects of the arrangement relevant to the 
ruling; and 
(b) the arrangement proceeds in all material respects 
as described in the person's application for the 
ruling, the ruling shall be binding on the 
Commissioner with respect to the arrangement. 
(3) A ruling shall not be binding on the Commissioner under 
subsection (2) to the extent to which the Act as in force at the 
time the ruling is issued is changed." 
A Private Ruling is binding on the TRA, if the taxpayer has disclosed 
to the Commissioner all relevant information and the taxpayer has 
carried out the transaction in all material respects as disclosed to the 
TRA.300 Private rulings are administrative guidelines which provide 
advice to taxpayers on the application of the tax law in particular 
situations. They guide taxpayers as to the tax consequences of a 
proposed transaction, or one that has just been undertaken. 
In binding the TRA, Practice Notes and Private Rulings are an 
important feature in enhancing taxpayer rights and ensure desirable 
transparency in tax decision making. The downside, though, is that if 
300 Section 131 (2) of the Income Tax Act. 
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the TRA takes the wrong view and is corrected by court, the taxpayer 
must pay tax according to the view taken by the court. However, no 
penalties or interest will be payable by the taxpayer in respect of 
actions which have relied on Practice Notes or Private Rulings issued 
by the TRA. 
The right to internal (administrative) review of taxing decisions is a 
right which is partly entrenched in the tax laws. All the tax statutes 
in Tanzania301 provide for the right of objection against assessments 
or other decisions of the TRA affecting the tax position of the 
taxpayer. But the Taxpayer' Charter appears to go beyond the 
objection procedures and contemplates an administrative remedy 
which enables taxpayers to lodge complaints with senior officers in 
respect of the actions of subordinate officers. This extended right is 
not capable of enforcement and may only be available as a matter of 
good administration. 
The TRA Taxpayers' Charter proclaims a right to secrecy for tax 
information provided to the TRA. However, in order to appreciate 
how this right has become unrealisable, one needs to look beyond the 
Taxpayers' Charter. 
The TRA duty to keep taxpayer information secret is akin to the duty 
of confidentiality imposed on banks and financial institutions. The 
only difference is that, for banks, the duty arises either from contract 
only, or from both contract and statutes which regulate financial 
institutions. For the TRA, the duty of secrecy is purely statutory. For 
instance, the Income Tax Act No 11 of 2000 requires that all taxpayer 
information supplied or obtained in connection with taxation must be 
301For example the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act, the EAC Customs Management 
Act and the Stamp Duty Act all provide for the right of objection which triggers an 
internal review of the taxing decision made which may well lead to vindication of 
the taxpayer position. 
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kept secret and may not be divulged. 302 Section 140 of the Income 
Tax Act 2004 provides that: 
"140 (1) Every officer authorised under or instructed with the 
administration of this Act or person who was formerly so 
authorised or instructed shall-
(a) regard and deal with all documents and information 
coming into the officer's possession or knowledge in 
connection with the performance of duties under this Act as 
secret; and 
(b) not disclose such documents or information to a court, 
tribunal, or other person except as provided for in subsections 
(2) and (3)." 
In Tanzania, tax officers have always had powers of access to 
information with the ability to inspect and seize records for tax 
purposes. Sections 126 and 127 of the Income Tax Act No 33 of 
1973303 were the first tax provisions to give tax officers "full and free 
access"304 to buildings or any other place where information is held. 
These powers included a power to compel production of information 
and a power to search and seize documents.305 While for a long time 
the inspection and audit powers were confined to income tax only, 
this changed in 1997 when VAT was introduced306 and VAT officials 
were given powers similar to those enjoyed by income tax officers.307 
Sections 138 to 140 of the Income Tax Act 2004, which replaced the 
Income Tax Act 1973, give wide ranging powers to the Commissioner 
to access information for income tax purposes. Similar amendments 
were made in the Stamp Duty Act No 20 of 1972,308 the Hotel Levy 
302For example section 140(1) of the Income Tax Act. 
303Act No 33 of 1973. This Act has now been repealed and replaced by the Income 
Tax Act 2004. 
304Section 127 of the Income Tax Act 1973. 
305Section 126 of the Income Tax Act 1973. 
306The Value Added Tax Act No 24 of 1997 re-issued in 2006 as The Value Added 
Tax Act Chapter 148. 
307Sections 37, 38, and 39 of the Value Added Tax Act No 24 of 1997. 
308Section 77 of the Stamp Duty Act No 22 of 1972 
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Act No 23 of 1972309 and the Customs and Excise Tariff Ordinance310 
before that law was replaced by the East African Community 
Customs Management Act No. 1 of 2005 which maintained the 
information access powers.311 The EAC Customs Management Act 
limits the information gathering powers of the Commissioner for 
Customs to auditing and inspecting documents associated with goods 
which are, or have been, the subject of customs action. 312 Even with 
that limitation, it is still a fairly wide power allowing unlimited 
examination of books, records, computer stored information, 
business systems, customs documents, commercial documents and 
other data related to the goodS.313 It also extends to a power to 
question any person involved directly or indirectly in the business, or 
any person in the possession of documents and data relevant to the 
goodS.314 
Relying on its information gathering powers in the tax statutes, the 
TRA has increased tax inspection and audit capacity by expanding its 
statutory power to access information and making the sanctions for 
non-cooperation more stringent. 
A good example of how extensive this power has become is found in 
section 138 of the Income Tax Act of 2004 which provides that: 
"138(1) For the purposes of this Act, the Commissioner and 
every officer who is authorized III writing by the 
Commissioner-
(a) shall have -
(i) at all times during the day between 9 am and 
6 pm and without any prior notice; and 
309Section 7 of the Hotel Levy Act No 23 of 1972 
31OSection 138 of the EAC Customs Management Act No 1 of 2005 
311Section 236. 
312Section 236 EAC Customs and Management Act of 2005. 
313Section 236 (a). 
314Section 236 (b). 
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(ii) at all other times as permitted by a search 
warrant granted by a District or Resident 
Magistrate's Court, full and free access to any 
premises, place, document or other asset; 
(b) may make an extract or copy, including an electronic 
copy, of any document to which access is obtained 
under paragraph (a); 
(c) may seize any document that, in the OpInIOn of the 
Commissioner or authorized officer, affords evidence 
that may be material in determining the tax liability of 
any person under this Act; and 
(d) may, where the document is not available or a copy is 
not provided on request by a person having access to 
the document, seize an asset to which access is 
obtained under paragraph (a) that the Commissioner or 
authorized officer reasonably suspects contains or 
stores the document in any form.» 
120 
Under section 139 of the Income Tax Act 2004, the TRA officers may 
choose not to come to the taxpayer's premises, but instead, compel 
the taxpayer to bring the information required to them. What is of 
interest is the fact that the power of access to information and the 
carrying out of audits by tax officers, is not limited to accessing 
information from the taxpayer. It extends to accessing information 
from any person in relation to the taxation of another person.315 
It is notable that under the Income Tax Act there is no limit on the 
type and scope of information which may be seized or requisitioned 
by the TRA. It is enough for the TRA to allege that the information is 
for the purposes of the Act. There is no obligation under the statute 
to disclose the particular purpose for which the information is 
accessed or requisitioned. In two recent incidents, the TRA 
investigation officers raided the operational offices of the Geita gold 
315Sections 138 and 139 ITA (read together). 
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mine and Bulyanhulu gold mIne. With lately acquired forensic 
software capable of accessing several servers at once, they copied 
information from all the servers used by the two taxpayers. 
In addition to expanding the statutory powers which enable tax 
officers to inspect the affairs of the taxpayers and undertake audits of 
any type, the TRA has vastly increased its technical capacity to carry 
out checks, especially in the area of customs enforcement. Recently, 
the Customs Department has acquired and deployed a sophisticated 
scanner capable of scanning the contents of imported and 
containerized goods which aims at increasing officers' capacity to 
detect and deter the mis-declaration of goods. 
These extremely wide powers are now seen by taxpayers as too 
intrusive and are resented. They are enormous powers and if not 
properly controlled can easily be misused. It is in this context that 
the right to have tax information kept secret becomes a very 
important right. 
Secrecy of information serves more than one objective. Firstly it aims 
at protecting the financial and commercial privacy of the taxpayer in 
his/her business or activity. Without the secrecy, sensitive 
information obtained from a taxpayer could easily fall into the hands 
of competitors and damage the taxpayer's business. Secondly, 
requiring secrecy of taxpayer information and limiting its use to 
taxation purposes only, encourages taxpayers to give information to 
tax officers. 
However, the secrecy of information provided for tax purposes has 
never been absolute. Numerous exceptions have been enacted in the 
secrecy provisions which now undermine almost completely the 
objectives of secrecy provisions in tax statutes. 
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Under section 140 (2) disclosure of taxpayer information is permitted 
in the following cases: 
"140(2) An officer may disclose a document or information 
referred to in subsection (1) -
(a) to the extent required in order to perform the officer's 
duties under this Act 
(b) where required by a court or tribunal in relation to 
administrative review or proceedings with respect to a 
matter under this Act; 
(c) to the Minister or the Chief Secretary of the President's 
office; 
(d) where the disclosure is necessary for the purposes of any 
law administered by the Tanzania Revenue Authority; 
(e) to any person in the service of the Government of the 
United Republic or the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar 
in a revenue or statistical department where such 
disclosure is necessary for the performance of the person's 
official duties; 
(f) to the Auditor General or any person authorised by the 
Auditor General where such disclosure is necessary for the 
performance of official duties; or 
(g) to the competent authority of the government of another 
country with which the United Republic has entered into 
an international agreement, to the extent permitted under 
that agreement." 
Section 140 does not prevent disclosures between/among officers of 
the TRA. There is no requirement that the officers to whom disclosure 
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is made must be working on the taxpayer's file. Therefore, disclosure 
between/ among tax officers could be for other purposes, or for no 
purpose at all, just idle conversation. 
Section 140 (2) also allows officers of the TRA to share taxpayer 
information with other sections or departments of the TRA so that 
information given to the VAT department in a VAT monthly return 
may be passed -on to income tax officers or customs officers and be 
used for tax purposes other than VAT. 
The exceptions to secrecy as contained in Section 140 (2) extend to 
divulging information to a court or tribunal. The TRA is also allowed 
to share the information it obtains for taxation purposes with other 
government departments such as the Anti-corruption Bureau and 
others.316 This erosion of secrecy can have far-reaching implications 
for taxpayer compliance and may fuel taxpayer resistance.317 
In conclusion it can be said that these provisions, namely section 138 
on the TRA's power to enter and inspect premises; section 139 on the 
power to require production of information; and section 140 on the 
derogation from the requirement of secrecy; and similar provisions in 
other tax statutes, all result in too much power being given to the 
TRA. Such powers infringe unjustly on the protection of taxpayer 
rights afforded elsewhere. It is questionable whether there is a 
compelling enough public interest to warrant these derogations. To 
the contrary, the public interest in promoting voluntary taxpayer 
compliance requires such powers, when given, to be measured and to 
be better regulated. 
The right to protection of property, recognised in the TRA Taxpayers' 
Charter and also entrenched under the Constitution, also requires 
317Section 140( 1) of the Income Tax Act. 
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discussion to how the protection 1S achieved 1n the Tanzania tax 
statutes. 
Article 24 of the Constitution of Tanzania provides that -
"subject to the provisions of the relevant laws of the land, 
every person is entitled to own property and has a right to the 
protection of his property held in accordance with the law".318 
From the wording of Article 24, the right to protection of personal 
property is not absolute; it is subject to what the laws of the land 
allow. Looking at tax laws, the right to the protection of personal 
property is eroded by the tax collection powers given to the TRA. 
Understandably, a tax collecting authority ought to be given sufficient 
powers to enable it to discharge its duties, but such powers should be 
no more than is necessary to enable the authority to perform its 
function. It is also important that powers are given in moderation and 
are well regulated to prevent abuse. 
The tax statutes impose obligations on taxpayers so that taxes are 
paid promptly. Where taxpayers become tax debtors, the TRA has 
substantial powers to ensure that tax is paid. Firstly, the TRA has the 
general common law right available to creditors, as well as specific 
statutory powers of collection given under each taxing statute giving 
the TRA a substantial advantage over other creditors. 
Taxes become due and payable immediately the notice of assessment 
is issued. Most notices are issued with an 'immediate payment' 
endorsement.319 For those taxpayers who are under the withholding 
system, the tax payable is withheld at source even before the payee 
receives the amount due to him/her.32o Taxpayers, who pay their 
taxes under the instalment procedure, are supposed to pay their 
318The Constitution of Tanzania of 1977 (as amended), Article 24(1),25. 
319Section 97 (d) of the Income Tax Act provides that the notice of assessment 
should specifically inform the taxpayer of the date by which the tax payable on the 
assessment must be paid. 
320 Sections 81, 82 and 83 require that withholding taxes shall be extracted at 
source before salaries, or dividends or service fees are paid. 
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taxes on a quarterly basis whether their accounting is on a calendar 
year basis or some other basis.321 This denies access to money which 
they otherwise would have had for the rest of the year. On the due 
date for payment, the tax becomes a debt due to the TRA and may be 
sued for in any court of competent jurisdiction. 322 
Where a corporate body fails to pay tax on the due date for which tax 
is payable, every person who is an officer of that company, or was an 
officer within the previous six months, is jointly and severally liable 
for the payment of the overdue tax.323 Where the company is put in 
receivership, the receiver must notify the TRA within 14 days of 
his/her appointment as receiver, whereupon the TRA will notify 
him/her of the company's tax debt. Following this, a notice by the 
TRA will instruct the receiver to sell sufficient assets under his/her 
possession to payoff the outstanding tax.324 To the extent that the 
receiver fails to pay the tax liability, the receiver becomes personally 
liable to the TRA on account of the tax debtor's tax liability.325 
The TRA also has power to recover unpaid taxes from third parties 
owing money to the tax debtor.326 The TRA may issue notice to any 
person owing money to the tax debtor,327 holding money on account 
of the tax debtor,328 holding money on account of another person for 
payment to the tax debtor, holding money on account of a third party 
for payment to the tax debtor,329 or to a person having authority from 
a third party to pay money to the tax debtor. 330 Finally, the TRA can 
321Section 88 (2) of the Income Tax Act. 
322Section 110 of the Income Tax Act. 
323Section 115 (2) of the Income Tax Act. 
324Section 116 (3) of the Income Tax Act. 
325Section 116 (4) of the Income Tax Act. 
326Section 117 of the Income Tax Act. 
327Section 117 (2) (a) of the Income Tax Act 
328Section 117 (2) (b) of the Income Tax Act 
329Section 117 (2) (c) of the Income Tax Act 
330Section 117 (2) (d) of the Income Tax Act. 
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recover unpaid tax from an agent of a non-resident person who has 
not yet paid his/her taxes.331 
In circumstances where the TRA has reason to believe that a person 
liable to pay tax may leave the country before the tax is due and 
payable, the TRA has power to bring forward the due date for 
payment of tax in which case the tax becomes due and payable on 
the date specified by the TRA, usually immediately on issuance of the 
notice to pay. Under the law,332 the TRA may issue notice to the 
Immigration Office requiring it to prevent the departure of a person 
until he/she has discharged the tax due for payment.333 
3.7 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has shown how immensely important 
the recognition and protection of taxpayer rights is to general tax 
compliance. It has also been argued that taxpayer charters, 
proclaiming lofty taxpayer rights are in themselves, not enough to 
lead to enjoyment of effective taxpayer rights. The tax laws must be 
aligned to give effect to what is said in the taxpayer charters and to 
the protection of taxpayer rights. The case for Tanzania shows that 
the protection of both primary and secondary taxpayer rights is to a 
large extent nullified by the tax statutes governing the administration 
and payment of tax. Although the basic tenets of constitutionalism 
and rule of law do exist and many taxpayer rights are incorporated in 
the tax statutes, other laws and the Constitution, the numerous 
derogations from full enjoyment of those taxpayer rights as found in 
tax statutes, significantly erode the foundation on which taxpayer 
rights would otherwise be effectively enjoyed. 
Equally, the institutional culture of the tax administration has not 
changed sufficiently. Its officers must espouse more the new service-
331Section 118 of the Income Tax Act. 
332Section 114 of the Income Tax Act. 
333Section 114 (2) of the Income Tax Act. 
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oriented culture proclaimed in the working documents of the TRA 
cited in this study. Continuing with the high-handed approach and 
relishing the derogations to taxpayer rights as is the case with tax 
officers, will only deepen the taxpayer perception that the tax system 
is not fairly structured and is not fairly administered. When 
taxpayers feel that the tax system is not fair, it is difficult to achieve 
the high levels of voluntary taxpayer compliance the TRA desires. 
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Chapter Four: Tax Administration and 
Compliance 
4.1 Introduction 
128 
This chapter discusses the efforts being undertaken to modernise the 
tax administration in Tanzania. It examines the overall objectives 
driving the transformation, and at the same time attempts to assess 
the performance the new tax authority. The discussion is both 
specific to TRA, and general touching on the regional and continental 
trend for reforming tax administrations in Africa. Finally the 
discussion turns to how the new tax administration has approached 
the vexing question of tax compliance and how the tax administration 
reforms undertaken have helped or hindered the tax compliance 
drive. 
A book published by the TRA and launched on the occasion of its 
Tenth Anniversary in October 2006, notes that -
"Government finance in developing countries 1S often 
constrained by the ability to collect taxes. Domestic revenue 
mobilization in these countries is often hindered by the lack of 
information on informal businesses, the difficulty in imposing 
income tax withholdings on millions of self-employed people in 
agriculture and services and extensive tax evasion. Such 
shortcomings have widespread socio-economic ramifications. 
Creating reliable, efficient and sustainable tax administrations 
has thus become an urgent and noble preoccupation of many 
governments. "334 
Acting on the need to create more effective tax administrations, the 
three East African countries (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) in the 
mid-nineties simultaneously embarked on the modernisation of their 
tax administrations. In each case, the process started with the 
334The TRA A Decade of TRA Transfonnation 1996-2006, Tanzania Revenue 
Authority, Dar es Salaam, 2006, at 3. 
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setting up of a semi-autonomous government agency with 
responsibility for all government taxes and, as well, non-tax revenue. 
The new tax authorities amalgamated and took over the functions of 
the former Customs Department, the Income Tax Department and 
the Sales Tax/ Goods and Services Tax Department, which, in each of 
these three countries, previously operated as singular government 
units reporting separately to the Ministry of Finance. 
The tax administration modernisation efforts of the East African 
countries were replicated in the nearby countries. Zambia and 
Rwanda both set up new and far improved tax administrations to 
replace the Tax Departments existing for many years, which both had 
inherited from their colonisers. 
The tax administration modernisation trend spread beyond the East 
Africa region. A report by the USA Agency for International 
Development (USAID)335 showed that by mid-2004 the following 
African countries had embraced tax administration reform and 
created new modern tax administrations; Botswana (2004/05), 
Ethiopia (2002); Ghana (1986), Kenya (1995/96), Lesotho (2001/02), 
Malawi (1995/96), Rwanda (1999/00), Sierra Leone (2002), South 
Africa (1996/97), Tanzania (1995/96), Uganda (1991/92), Zambia 
(1993/94) and Zimbabwe (2000). 
335United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 'Are Semi-
Autonomous Revenue Authorities the Answer to Tax Administration Problems in 
Developing Countries? A Practical Guide' Paper Prepared by A J Mann of 
Development Alternatives Inc, August 2004. Internet source 
http://ideas.respec.org/p/dai/wpaper/ accessed 26/01/2007. 
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4.2 Modernising the Tax Administration 
Dhillon and Bouwer336 have put forward the following reasons for tax 
administration reform in developing countries: 
"Many developing nations inherit tax laws that have long since 
been reformed in developed nations. These laws can be 
complex, inelastic, inefficient and inequitable,generating 
undesirable outcomes in the economy and limiting the 
community's acceptance of the tax system as a whole. Tax 
reforms have become an increasingly important element of 
adjustment programs in developing countries, supported by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
Along with tax reform, the community's experience of the tax 
administration system can be substantially improved, leading 
to improved acceptance of the wider tax system and improved 
collections. As the community's expectations of service from 
private sector organizations have grown, there is a 
corresponding increase in their expectations of the pu blic 
sector. This has played out over several years in developed 
nations, but there are signs this is happening faster in 
developing nations. The paradigm that a revenue agency will 
maximize compliance just by cultivating a fear of being caught 
is not sustainable into the future. Modern revenue agencies 
seek to maximize voluntary compliance by making it easy to 
comply, while operating an insightful compliance program to 
treat noncompliance. An equitable tax system where everyone 
is seen to pay their fair share increases the likelihood of 
voluntary compliance."337 
336A Dhillon and J G Bouwer 'Reform of Tax Administration in Developing Nations' 
Occasional Paper, Montgomery Research Institute, Tax Volume 1, 6/7/2005, 
Internet source http://www.revenueproject.com/document accessed 26/1/2007. 
337 Ibid. at 1. 
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4.3 Establishment and Reform of the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority (TRA) 
131 
For Tanzania, tax administration modernisation was premised on a 
number of concerns. There was great weakness in tax administration 
and tax policy formulation. This resulted in widespread tax evasion. 
There was also undesirable political interference in the operations of 
the tax Departments (especially by the Ministry of Finance). This 
created a need to limit political interference and to free tax 
administration from civil service constraints. The tax revenue/GDP 
ratio, at an average of 11.3 for 1995 and 1996, was very low (one of 
the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa). Tanzania had a fiscal deficit of 
between 5% to 7.9% of GDP in 1994 and 1995. These budget 
shortfalls, combined with fiscal deficits, generated a money supply 
expansion of 25% between 1994 and 1996 leading to high inflation 
and growth of the domestic debt. 338 
With intent to tackle these problems, the Tanzania Revenue Authority 
(the TRA) was established as a statutory body corporate operating 
under an Act of Parliament passed on 7th August 1995.339 The TRA 
was inaugurated in July 1996. Though a statutory body, the TRA is 
also a government agency. Section 4 of the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority Act provides, in part: 
"(1) There is established an Authority to be known as the 
Tanzania Revenue Authority which shall consist of the 
Board and all operating Departments. 
(2) The Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual 
succession and a common seal and, subject to this Act -
338 USAID Paper, at 19. 
339Tanzania Revenue Authority Act No. 11 of 1995, section 4(1). All laws in 
Tanzania were revised in 2006. The TRA Act is now Chapter 399 of the Laws of 
Tanzania. 
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(a) shall be capable of suing and being sued in its corporate 
name 
(b) may borrow money, acquire and dispose of property; and 
(c) may do all other things which a body corporate may 
lawfully do. 
(3) The Authority shall be an agency of the Government and 
shall be under the general supervision of the Minister." 
132 
Prior to the establishment of the TRA, the function of collecting taxes 
was performed by three Departments (the Income Tax Department, 
the Customs Department and the Sales Tax Department) operating 
under the Ministry of Finance. Each tax department was headed by a 
Commissioner, each reporting separately to the Ministry. 
Upon establishment of the TRA, all employment contracts with staff 
working with the Income Tax Department, the Customs Department 
and the Sales Tax Department, were terminated. They could, if they 
wished, apply for new positions in the TRA. Only 2,200 of the 
existing 3,300 tax staff were absorbed into the TRA. Of those 
absorbed, nearly 400 could not be confirmed after a probationary 
period. They were either dismissed or allowed early retirement, 
mostly on account of integrity considerations. Those who survived 
this transition were motivated by very significant salary increases, 
sometimes ten times higher than is paid for a comparable civil service 
position. 
The TRA, as an agency of the government, is responsible for collection 
and administration of all central government taxes, together with a 
few non-tax revenue items. Its functions are stipulated in section 5 
of the Act: 
"5. (1) The Functions of the Authority are: 
(i) to administer and give effect to the laws or the 
specified provisions of the laws set out in the 
First Schedule to this Act, and for this purpose, 
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to assess, collect and account for all revenue to 
which those laws apply: 
(ii) to monitor, oversee, coordinate activities and 
ensure the fair efficient and effective 
administration of revenue laws by revenue 
departments in the jurisdiction of the Union 
Government; 
(iii) to monitor and ensure the collection of fees, 
levies, charges or any other tax collected by any 
Ministry, Department or Division of the 
Government as revenue for the Government; 
(iv) to advise the Minister and other relevant organs 
on all matters pertaining to fiscal policy, the 
implementation of the policy and the constant 
improvement of policy regarding revenue laws 
and administration; 
(v) to promote voluntary tax compliance to the 
highest degree possible; 
(vi) to take such measures as may be necessary to 
improve the standard of service given to 
taxpayers, with a view to improving the 
effectiveness of the revenue department and 
maximizing revenue collection; 
(vii) to determine the steps to be taken to counteract 
fraud and other forms of tax and other fiscal 
evasions; 
(viii) to produce trade statistics and publications on a 
quarterly basis; and 
(ix) subject to the laws specified under paragraph (a), 
to perform such other functions as the Minister 
may determine." 
133 
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Looking at section 5(1), the pnmary function of the TRA is to 
administer and give effect to all tax laws which are levied by the 
central government. The taxes administered by the TRA are listed in 
the First Schedule340 to the TRA Act. They are the following: 
(i) income tax, under the Income Tax Act No 11 of 2004; 
(ii) customs duties, under the East African Community 
Customs Management Act No 1 of 2005; 
(iii) excise duties, under the Excise (Management and Tariff 
Act) Chapter 147; 
(iv) stamp duty, under the Stamp Duty Act No 20 of 1972; 
(v) the hote11evy, under the Hotel Levy Act No 23 of 1972; 
(vi) estate duties under the Estate Duty Act; 
(vii) airport departure tax, under the Airport Service 
Charges Act 1962; 
(viii) motor vehicle registration tax, under the Motor Vehicle 
(Tax on Registration and Transfer) Act No 21 of 1972; 
(ix) training levy, under the Training Levy Act No 26 of 
1972; 
(x) housing levy under the Housing Levy Act No 12 of 1985; 
(xi) land registration and transfer fees under the Land Act 
No 17 of 1997; 
(xii) any other taxes imposed by a law which may come into 
force and is enacted to mobilize and collect revenue 
34O'fhe list of taxes under the First Schedule has changed over time as many taxes 
considered nuisance taxes were repealed following the establishment of the TRA as 
part of the tax modernization program. The original list had 25 different taxes. 
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In terms of section 5 (1) (a) of the TRA Act, administering and giving 
effect to tax laws means to assess, collect and account for all revenue 
to which those tax laws apply.341 
Section 5 is a significant section of the Act. It encapsulates the 
government policy objectives for creating the TRA. For example-
(i) section 5 (1) (b) speaks of the need to ensure 'fair, 
efficient and effective administration of tax'; 
(ii) section 5 (1) (e) imposes on the TRA a duty to 'promote 
voluntary tax compliance to the highest degree 
possible'; 
(iii) section 5 (f) underscores the need to 'improve the 
standard of service given to taxpayers'; and 
(iv) section 5 (1) (g) charges the TRA with the responsibility 
to take steps to 'counteract fraud and tax evasion'. 
These objectives have come to form the core values of the TRA and as 
it is shown later, they are the pillars of the three TRA successive five-
year Corporate Plans.342 
The duties and responsibilities of the TRA are not clearly stipulated in 
the establishment statute. However, it is possible to formulate a clear 
set of duties and responsibilities from the statutory functions given to 
the TRA under section 5(1) and the powers of the TRA outlined in 
section 5(2. Section 5(2) provides that: 
"(2) The Authority shall in the discharge of its functions, have 
power to 
341Section 5(1)(a). 
342'fhe first five year Corporate Plan was adopted in 1998, the second in 2003, and 
the third in 2008. 
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(i) study revenue laws and identify amendments or 
alternations which may be made to any law for the 
purposes of improving the administration of and 
compliance with revenue laws; 
(ii) study the administrative costs, compliance costs and 
the operational impact of all intended legislative 
changes and advise the Government accordingly; 
(iii) collect and process the statistics needed to provide 
forecasts of revenue receipt and the effect on yield of 
any proposals for changes in revenue laws and advise 
the Minister accordingly; 
(iv) negotiate and agree with the Treasury on the revenue 
collection targets for any given financial year; 
(v) undertake work measurement exercises ill order to 
determine the manpower needs for the functions of 
each revenue department in the Authority; 
(vi) set appropriate objectives and work targets ill each 
revenue department and monitor progress in achieving 
them; 
(vii) take such other measures as it may deem necessary or 
desirable for the achievement of the purposes and 
provisions of this Act." 
136 
At the outset of this chapter we outlined them as being:- a duty to 
ensure the fair, efficient and effective administration of revenue laws; 
a duty to promote voluntary taxpayer compliance; and a duty to 
improve the standard of service given to taxpayers with a view to 
improving the effectiveness of tax collection. There are also 
additional instruments such as the TRA Strategic Corporate Plan 
which incorporates a Mission Statement calling on the TRA "to be A 
Modern Tax Administration rendering effective and efficient tax 
administration which promotes voluntary tax compliance by 
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providing high quality customer service with fairness and integrity 
through competent and motivated staff'.343 The Strategic Plan also 
charges the TRA employees with the following core values: 
(i) to be business oriented and professional m 
appearance and approach; 
(ii) to be fair and accountable for the decisions they 
make; 
(iii) to be accessible and prompt m the delivery of 
servIce; 
(iv) to treat taxpayers with dignity and respect; and 
(v) to act with integrity and honesty. 
These duties, as it will be recalled, are reiterated in the Taxpayers' 
Charter which was discussed in the previous chapter. There are no 
sanctions against the TRA if it fails to discharge the duties and 
obligations imposed on it, save for loss of standing in public 
perception for a sound organisation. 
Both from the TRA statute and the Taxpayers' Charter, it does appear 
that one of the core duties of the tax authority is to ensure a fair, 
efficient and effective administration of taxes. 344 It is possible to 
measure the efficient and effective collection of taxes from the 
effectiveness of the tax system and also from the volume of tax 
revenues realised by the tax administration. 
The TRA has since 1996 demonstrated an adequate capacity to meet 
tax revenue targets set by the Ministry of Finance. Tax collection 
figures for the years 2001 to 2010 (in Tables 3a and 3b below) show 
that, except for the initial years following its establishment, and for 
2009/10 (because of the global economic crisis) the TRA has 
343TRA Third Five Year Corporate Plan 2008/09 to 2012/13 at (iii). 
344Section 5 (1) (b) of the TRA Act. 
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consistently met and exceeded revenue collection targets. However, a 
big challenge for the government remains the narrow tax base in 
Tanzania as discussed in chapter two. The tax collection targets are 
achieved from a relatively small pool of taxpayers. 
Table 3a: Revenue Collection Performance for 1996/97 to 2002/03 
(Amounts are in Trillion Tanzania Shillings)* 
Year 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Revenue 0,632 0,672 0,667 0,770 0,815 1,102 1,102 
Target 
Actual 0,523 0,585 0,654 0,740 0,862 0,962 1,165 
Collection 
Performance 82% 87% 98% 96% 106% 87% 105% 
* Source: The TRA Dlrector te of Research and Pohcy 
Table 3b: Revenue Collection Performance for 2003/04 to 2009/10* 
(Amounts are in Trillion Tanzania Shillings)* 
Year 2003/4 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Revenue 1,310 1,631 2,026 2,448 3,457 3,847 4,855 
Target 
Actual 1,426 1,715 2,063 2,697 3,546 4,105 4,437 
Collection 
Performance 108% 105% 101% 110% 102% 106% 91% 
* Source: The TRA Dlrectorate of Research and Pohcy 
The steps taken by the TRA to ensure that taxes are efficiently and 
fairly administered345 and also in promoting voluntary tax compliance 
345Section 5 (1) (b) of the Tax Revenue Authority Act. 
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with the taxes administered by the TRA, are discussed in subsequent 
sections. 
For now, it is instructive to examine the tax reform scenano of 
Tanzania's neighbouring countries: Uganda, Zambia, Kenya and 
Rwanda have gone through and are continuing similar tax 
administration reforms. These reforms are discussed below. 
4.4 Tax Administration Reform in Uganda, Zambia, 
Kenya and Rwanda 
Uganda 
The Uganda Revenue Authority (the URA) was established by statute 
in 1991.346 It was set up as a semi-autonomous body charged with 
three primary duties; to assess and collect specified taxes, to 
administer and enforce the laws relating to those taxes and to 
account for the revenue collected. There is a fourth primary duty 
which is separately stated n the establishment statute for the URA, 
namely that the URA is required to advise the government of Uganda 
on matters of policy relating to government revenue, whether or not 
they relate to the taxes administered by the URA. 
The URA was also established with another broad objective in mind, 
namely, to provide the foundation for the development of Uganda 
through revenue mobilization.347 The taxes it collects are to finance 
current and capital development activities of the government, 
Increase the standard of living of all Ugandans and reduce poverty 
and increase the GDPjrevenue ratio to a level at which the 
government of Uganda can fund its own essential expenditure. 
346Uganda Revenue Authority Act No.6 of 1991. 
347Ibid., sections 3 and 4. 
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According to the URA, the role of the URA as reflected in its corporate 
plan348 is: 
(i) to identify taxpayers and inform them of their tax 
obligations and rights, providing them with the 
necessary information to enable them to discharge 
those obligations; 
(ii) to assess taxpayers fairly with regard to the taxes 
relevant to them; 
(iii) to collect taxes in accordance with the laws, regulations 
and practice instructions; to enforce collection of taxes 
where default has occurred; and 
(iv) to account to the government for the taxes collected. 
The URA administers a wide range of taxes including the income 
tax 349 stamp duty 350 the road toll 351 customs duties 352 excise , , , , 
duty,353the value added tax354 and various fees, levies and license 
payments.355 
There is some dispute regarding the autonomy of URA. The URA was 
the first modern tax administration to be established in the Eastern 
Africa region. The URA was expected to enjoy a much wider 
autonomy so as to have flexibility in decision-making, ability to 
implement incentives needed to improve performance and be 
protected from undue political interference. These problems had 
been at the centre of the failure to perform by the former tax 
348The URA Five Year Strategic Plan 1992-97. 
349Uganda Laws, Income Tax Act of 1997. 
350Uganda Laws, Stamp Duty Act [Chapter 172]. 
351The road toll was introduced in 1998 by Finance Act No 4 of 1998 (Section 12 
and the 7th Schedule), and is payable by road users as a road users tax. 
352Charged under both the Customs Tariff Act No. 17 of 1970 and the East African 
Customs Management Act 2004. 
353Uganda Laws, Excise Tariff Act [Chapter 174) and the East African Excise 
Management Act No 1 of the East Africa Community Laws [Chapter 26]. 
354The Value Added Tax Act of 1995. 
355For instance, under the Traffic and Road Safety Act No. 15 of 1998 and the 
Regulations made thereunder, the collection of license fees, or other fees, levies, 
and fines (other than those imposed by the Courts), are all administered by the 
URA. 
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departments which operated as government units in the Ministry of 
Finance. However, it appears that autonomy has been difficult to 
achieve. The URA continues to be required to report to Treasury 
regularly on matters of day-to-day administration and to seek 
clearance from the Ministry of Finance on institutional management 
and policy issues. As a result, many people in Uganda still perceive 
the URA as a government department. 
The URA also does not enjoy any autonomy in funding. Its 
operations are funded by government through the normal budget 
process. Shortfalls in funding requirement are made up by donor 
agencies who invariably arrange their funding of the URA through the 
Ministry of Finance. An arrangement which would have enabled the 
URA to retain for its own use 15% percent of tax collections starting 
in 2001 had not been acted upon by the Minister for Finance by 
2003.356 This is still the case to date. 
A study of the URA over a ten year period has shown that while its 
initial performance was . . ImpreSSlVe, it quickly stagnated amid 
accusations of corruption. Erosion of its autonomy and conflicts with 
the Ministry of Finance, as well as loss of taxpayer legitimacy are put 
forward as causes of the stagnation In performance. 357 
Therki1dsen,358 Devas,359 G1enday,360 Fje1dstad,361 and C1arke,362 
3560 Therkildsen 'Revenue Authority Autonomy in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Case for 
Uganda' Danish Institute for International Studies, Paper prepared for the 
Workshop on 'Taxation, Accountability and Poverty' 23-24 October 2003, at 8. 
357 Ibid. at 1. 
358Supra Note 294 at 3. 
359N Devas, S Delay and M Hubbard 'Revenue authorities: are they the right vehicle 
for improved tax administration?' (2001) 21 Public Administration and Development 
211-222. 
360G Glenday 'Capacity Building in the Context of the Kenya Tax Modernisation 
Program'in M S Grindle (ed) Getting good government: capacity building in the public 
sectors of developing countries Harvard University Press, 1997. 
3610 H Fjeldstad 'Fighting fiscal corruption, Lessons from the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority' (2003) 23 (2) Public Administration and Development 165-175 
362J Clarke and D Wood 'New public management and development: the case of 
public service reform in Tanzania and Uganda' in W McCourt and M Minogue (eds) 
The Internationalisation of Public Management: reinventing the Third World state 
Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2001, 181-189. 
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have undertaken studies which show that this pattern of initial 
revenue Increases followed by stagnation or decreases, has 
characterised tax administration reforms in Ghana, Kenya and 
Tanzania. These authors suggest that the success, stagnation and 
decline syndrome may indeed affect much of Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Rakner and Gloppen warn that the plateau at which increases in tax 
revenue performance appear to go into stagnation is well below the 
level needed to achieve fiscal sustainability.363 
Zambia 
The Zambia Revenue Authority (the ZRA) was established in 1994.364 
One would expect that the ZRA, coming into existence some three 
years after the establishment of the Uganda Revenue Authority, 
would be influenced by URA in terms of its set up, its general 
objectives and its experience. This is not the case. There are key 
differences, not only between the ZRA and the URA but also between 
the ZRA and the TRA and the Kenya Revenue Authority (the KRA), 
these two having been set up only a year later in 1995. 
The ZRA is a corporate body, similar to the semi-autonomous 
statutory government agencies such as the URA in Uganda, the TRA 
in Tanzania and the KRA in Kenya. 
The ZRA Act charges the ZRA with the responsibility of collecting 
revenue on behalf of the Zambia government under the supervision 
of the Minister for Finance and National Planning. 
The ZRA is overseen by the most inclusive of all the governing 
Boards in Eastern Africa. The membership of this board includes, 
the Secretary to the Treasury, the Permanent Secretary for the 
Ministry of Justice, the Governor of the Bank of Zambia, 
363L Rakner and S Gloppen 'Tax Reform and Democratic Accountability in Sub-
Saharan Africa' in Beyond Structural Adjustment: The Institutional Context of African 
Development, Palgrave - Mcmillan, London, 2003. 
364This followed the enactment of the Zambia Revenue Authority Act of 1993 which 
provided for the establishment of the ZRA as a statutory corporate body. 
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representatives from professional bodies such as the Law Society of 
Zambia, the Bankers' Association, the Zambia Institute of Certified 
Accountants, the Zambia Association of Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry and two private persons nominated by the Minister of 
Finance and Economic Development. In contrast, the TRA Board of 
Directors, which has 10 members, is made up almost entirely of 
government people. Of the 10 members, 5 are ex-officio. Although 
the Minister of Finance has discretion to appoint 4 members, these 
appointments tend to go to members of Parliament and people within 
the government system. The current 10 members of the Board of the 
TRA are the following; a public finance academician at the University 
of Dar es Salaam (Chairperson), two Permanent Secretaries 
(Finance / Planning), the Principal Secretary Finance (Zanzibar), the 
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania, two members of Parliament, the 
Commissioner General, the Commissioner of the Zanzibar Revenue 
Board (ZRB) and the Chief Legal Counsel of the TRA who is also the 
Board Secretary of the TRA. It is notable too that, in Zambia's case, 
the Board Members elect the Chairman of the Board. The Chief 
Executive of the Authority is the Commissioner General who is 
appointed by the President. In contrast again, for Tanzania, both the 
Chairman and Commissioner General of the TRA are appointed by 
the President. In Kenya, the Chairman of the KRA is appointed by 
the President, while the Commissioner General is appointed by the 
Minister of Finance. 
The people-centered approach of the ZRA is reflected also in its 
perception of who its stakeholders are. The ZRA Strategic Plan and 
its customer care program recognize the following sections of society 
as important stakeholders: the Zambian people, as represented by 
the ZRA Governing Board and by the Government and its agencies; 
Parliament; the Zambian business community and those groups 
which represent their interests, together with their professional 
advisors; the banks and other financial institutions; the taxpayers 
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in general; members of COMESA, SADC, WTO and other countries 
transacting business with Zambia, or transiting goods through 
Zambia; tourists, travelers and traders crossing Zambia's borders; 
the donor community and multilateral agencies, e.g. IMF, World 
Bank, DFID; staff and others within the ZRA; the mass media; 
NGO's and other interest groups. 
As result of the marked break with the trend in the appointment of 
its Board members and the commitment to wider involvement of 
sectors of society, the ZRA is described as an autonomous corporate 
body. The one thing the ZRA has in common with the rest of the 
revenue authorities of the region is that, it is funded through the 
national budget. This detracts from its otherwise apparent 
independence. 
The ZRA administers several taxes: the value added tax, the customs 
and excise duty, surtax, income tax, property transfer tax and 
mineral royalty tax. 
According to the statute establishing ZRA,365 the main responsibilities 
of the ZRA are: 
(i) to properly assess and collect taxes and duties timely; 
(ii) to ensure that all monies collected are properly 
accounted for and banked; 
(iii) to properly enforce all statutory provisions falling within 
the ZRA mandate; 
(iv) to provide statistical information on revenue to the 
Government; 
(v) to give advice to Ministers on aspects of tax policy; and 
(vi) to facilitate international trade. 
Zambia has a taxpayer charter366 which is brief. It states that "the 
taxpayer is entitled to impartial and equitable treatment by the 
365Zambia Revenue Authority Act No. 23 of 1993. 
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Zambia Revenue Authority in all dealings with it ... ".367 It also states 
that the taxpayer is entitled -
(i) to receive all the forms needed to comply with the legal 
obligations, 
(ii) to receive all the necessary information required to 
comply with the legal obligations under the Zambian 
tax laws, 
(iii) to provide fair treatment under the law, 
(iv) to provide prompt and courteous service from the ZRA 
at all times, and 
(v) to provide quality and efficient services at all times if 
the information received from the taxpayer is complete 
and accurate. 
Finally, the ZRA taxpayer charter says that "all personal and financial 
information provided to the ZRA is strictly confidential and is used 
only for the purposes allowed by law". 368 
These so called 'rights' in the Zambia Taxpayer Charter are not really 
rights. They are, largely, performance standards espoused by the 
ZRA, but they are not quite as elaborate as those adopted in Uganda. 
Kenya 
The Kenya Revenue Authority (KRA) was established in 1995 by an 
Act of Parliament,369 as a semi-autonomous government agency 
responsible for the administration of all taxes levied by the 
government of Kenya. The overall objective was to provide operational 
autonomy in tax administration and to enable the organization to 
evolve into a modern, flexible and integrated revenue collecting 
agency. KRA's immediate purpose was to enhance the mobilization of 
366ZRA, Taxpayer Charter, Zambia Revenue Authority, Lusaka, Internet source 
http://www.zra.org.zm/charter.php accessed 13/11/2007. 
367Ibid. 
368Ibid. 
369Kenya Revenue Authority Act of 1995, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 469]. 
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government revenue, while providing effective tax administration and 
sustainability in revenue collection. 
Consistent with its establishment objectives, the KRA was given the 
following functions: 
(i) to assess, collect and account for all revenues in 
accordance with the written laws and the specified 
provisions of the written laws; 
(ii) to advise on matters relating to the administration of, 
and collection of revenue under the written laws or the 
specified provisions of written laws; and 
(iii) to perform such other functions in relation to revenue 
as the Minister of Finance may direct. 
The KRA has a Board of Directors consisting of members from both 
the public and private sectors. The Board is responsible only for 
making policy decisions to be implemented by the KRA management. 
I t does not make policy relating to taxes. The Chairman of the Board 
is appointed by the President of the Republic of Kenya, while the 
Chief Executive of the Authority (the Commissioner General) is 
appointed by the Minister for Finance. 
The KRA administers the following taxes: 
(i) the income tax,370 
(ii) customs and excise duties,371 
(iii) the value added tax,372 
(iv) road levies,373 
(v) the air passenger service charge,374 
(vi) the entertainment tax,375 
37O'fhe Income Tax Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 470]. 
371The Customs and Excise Tariff Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 472]. 
372The Value Added Tax Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 476]. 
373The Road Maintenance Levy Fund Act No.9 of 1993. 
374The Air Passenger Service Charge Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 475]. 
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(vii) road licenses, transport licenses, traffic levies, and the 
second hand vehicle purchase levy, 376 
(viii) Parliamentary pensions together with the widows and 
children pensions,377 
(ix) stamp duty,378 
(x) gaming levies379 and 
(xi) levies under the civil aviation law.380 
147 
However, in addition to assessment and collection of taxes, the KRA 
has a much wider role381 to play in the Kenyan economy. A large part 
of this wider role relates to tax compliance as well as compliance with 
import/ export restrictions. 
functions given to the KRA: 
Below is a broad list of the wider 
(i) to administer and to enforce both tax and non-tax laws 
as specified in the Kenya Revenue Authority Act as 
regards assessment, collection and accounting for 
government revenues; 
(ii) to advise on matters relating to the administration and 
the collection of government revenue; 
(iii) to enhance efficiency and effectiveness of tax 
administration by eliminating bureaucracy, promoting 
efficient procurement and promoting training and 
discipline of staff; 
375The Entertainment Tax Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 479]. 
376Levied under the Traffic Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 403]; the Transport 
Licensing Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 404]; and the Second Hand Motor Vehicle 
Purchase Tax Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 484]. 
377The Parliamentary Pensions Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 196]; the Widows and 
Children's Pensions Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 195]. 
378The Stamp Duty Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 480]. 
379'fhe Betting, Lotteries and Gaming Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 131]. 
38DThe Directorate of Civil Aviation Act, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 394]. 
381The Kenya Revenue Authority Act of 1995, Laws of Kenya [Chapter 469]. 
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(iv) to eliminate tax evasion by simplifying and streamlining 
procedures, and by improving taxpayer service and 
education thereby increasing the rate of compliance 
with taxes; 
(v) to promote professionalism and eradicate corruption 
amongst KRA employees by paying adequate salaries 
that enable the institution to attract and retain 
competent professionals of integrity and sound ethical 
morals; 
(vi) to restore economic independence and the sovereign 
pride of Kenya by eventually eliminating the perennial 
budget deficits by creating organizational structures 
that maximize revenue collection; 
(vii) to ensure protection of local industries and facilitate 
economic growth through effective administration of tax 
laws relating to trade; 
(viii) to ensure effective allocation of scarce resources in the 
economy by effectively enforcing tax policies there by 
sending the desired incentives and shift signals 
throughout the country; 
(ix) to facilitate distribution of income in socially acceptable 
ways by effectively enforcing tax laws affecting income 
in various ways; 
(x) to facilitate economic stability and moderate cyclic 
fluctuations in the economy by providing effective tax 
administration as an implementation instrument of the 
fiscal and stabilization policies; and 
(xi) to be a 'watchdog' for the government agencies (such as 
Ministries of Health, Finance, and Agriculture) by 
controlling exit and entry points for Kenya to ensure 
that prohibited and illegal goods do not pass through 
Kenyan borders. 
148 
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There are serious questions concernmg the autonomy of the KRA. 
There have been repeated calls for the strengthening of the KRA and 
tax administration in general. 382 The focus of administrative reform 
has not shifted sufficiently to such areas as the implementation of 
the provisions of the KRA Act which provide the KRA with both 
operational and financial independence. Security of tenure for the 
tax commissioners is paramount so that they are able to make tax 
decisions without ministerial/political interference. Financial 
independence is also desirable so that the KRA can develop a 
performance based culture founded on its ability to raise and retain 
for its operations a specified percentage of tax collections. 
However, if financial independence is the measure of autonomy, none 
of the Eastern African tax administrations surveyed have been able to 
achieve that, or be given the freedom to retain for its own use a 
percentage of taxes collected. Provisions in the KRA Act of 1995 
relating to percentage retention remain largely ignored. This is also 
the case for the TRA in Tanzania, where initial proposals to fund the 
TRA by percentage retention and guarantee its independence, were 
shelved at the last minute when establishing that organization. 
Rwanda 
The Rwanda Revenue Authority (the RRA) was established as part of 
the reform program by the government of Rwanda, designed to 
restore and strengthen the main economic institutions of the country. 
These reform programs were instituted following the total collapse of 
government institutions during Rwanda's genocide of 1994 in which 
more than 800,000 people were killed. The law establishing the RRA 
was part of a package of measures aimed at restoring government 
institutions in Rwanda. The government sought to use this tax 
administration modernization program to improve its resource 
382H Waruhiu 'An Economic and Public Policy Agenda for Kenya' in W Gatheru and 
R Shaw (eds) Our Problems, Our Solutions 1998, Kenya, at 6-7, internet source 
http/ /www.iea.or.ke/ourpoblems.asp accessed 1/5/2001. 
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mobilization capacity, while at the same time, providing the public 
with quality customer service. 
Like the TRA, the KRA and the URA in East Africa, the RRA is a 
quasi-autonomous revenue collection agency of the government. It 
was established in 1998 under a law enacted in November 1997.383 
The RRA is charged with the function of assessing, collecting and 
accounting for government revenue. In addition, the RRA is also 
responsible for the collection of some non-tax revenues of the 
government in accordance with a Ministerial Order issued in May 
2003.384 
The RRA has two other broader functions. It is responsible for 
providing advice to the government on tax policy matters relating to 
revenue collections. It is also required to assist taxpayers in 
understanding and meeting their tax obligations. These broader 
functions are reflected both in the Vision and Mission Statement of 
the RRA Corporate Plan. Through an organization's Corporate Plan, 
one IS able to see its strategies and appreciate its immediate and 
future objectives. The 'vision' and 'mission' encapsulate the 
objectives of the organization. The vision represents a desired view of 
the organisation, it is a statement of its future. On the other hand, 
the mission is a statement of purpose, the raison d'etre. It shows 
why the organization exists. According to the RRA 6th Corporate Plan 
adopted in 2006, the RRA Vision is "To become a highly efficient and 
modern revenue collection agency enhancing national growth and 
development and instilling equity, transparency, and professional 
values among RRA staff'. Its Mission Statement is "To contribute to 
the national development of Rwanda by maximizing revenue 
383Law No. 15 of 1997, Laws of Rwanda. 
384Ministerial Order No. 006/03/ lO/Min of May 2003. 
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collection at minimum cost and providing quality input to tax policy 
development, while ensuring a high quality and equitable service". 385 
The taxes administered by RRA include the income tax,386 customs 
duties and excise,387 the value added tax,388 the property tax and the 
tax on licenses for carrying out trade and professional activities. The 
value added tax was introduced in 2001 to replace the sales 
taxi turnover tax in place since 1991. 
The revenue performance of the RRA has been reasonably good. In 
2005 the RRA exceeded the revenue collection target by 15.4% 
realizing Rwf 173.49 billion against a target of Rwf 150.33 billion. 
The RRA's revenue performance from 1998 to 2005389 is reflected in 
Table 4 below and shows that revenue targets have consistently been 
surpassed in those eight years except for the financial year 1999. 
Table 4 Rwanda Revenue Authority Performance 1998-2005* 
Year 
Target 
Actual 
1998 1999 2000 2001 
62,8 63,2 62,3 76,8 
68,2 60,7 65,3 79,5 
* Source: RRA Annual Report 2005 
** All Values in Rwandan Francs390 
2002 2003 2004 
93,9 112,4 126,3 
94,6 118,1 136,2 
4.5 Tax Administration Reform and Compliance 
2005 
150,3 
173,4 
It has been said before that taxation generally serves one maIn 
objective, to raise revenue to finance government operations. However 
a good tax system also stimulates economic activity by rejuvenating 
385 Rwanda Revenue Authority 6 th Corporate Plan 2006, the RRA, Kigali. 
386Levied under the Law on Direct Taxes on Income, Law No 16 of 2005 as 
complimented by Law No. 25 of 2005 on Tax Procedure, Laws of Rwanda. 
387The Customs Law - Law No. 21 of 2006 and the Import Duty Law - Law No 27 of 
2004, Laws of Rwanda. 
388The VAT is levied under the Code of Value Added Tax - Law No 06 of 2001, Laws 
of Rwanda. 
389 Data for later years could not be obtained. 
390520.45 Rwandan francs is equal to 1 USD$. 
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the productive sectors and generating employment. Tax system 
reform in Africa has aimed at achieving both revenue adequacy as 
well as the wider economic objectives. There is a belief that the 
existence of efficient tax administrations enables governments to 
formulate effective tax policies and to maximize revenue collections to 
sufficiently fund government operations. 
Looking at the tax modernization programs undertaken in Tanzania, 
Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia, a key purpose in creating new 
and efficient tax administrations has been to enhance the capacity of 
the tax administrations in collecting taxes. Therefore, the focus of tax 
reform has been increased taxation. Rejuvenation of the productive 
sectors has not been central to the reforms, although tax measures 
have been taken which aim in this direction. 
With optimization of tax revenues in mind, all the statutes setting up 
the modern tax administrations have included, as a core function of 
the tax administration, the need to promote optimum compliance 
with taxes. Ironically, however, while the laws establishing new tax 
administrations in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Rwanda, 
charge the tax authorities with the duty to promote tax compliance 
through enforcement as well as voluntary compliance, the tax 
authorities have devoted themselves almost entirely to having in place 
effective tax enforcement measures. The promotion of voluntary tax 
compliance has received at best token mention in the form of 
taxpayer charters as is the case in Tanzania,391 and Zambia,392 or in 
the form of adoption of customer service standards as is the case in 
Uganda.393 
391Relevant parts of the Tanzania Taxpayers' Charter were discussed in Chapter 3. 
392ZRA, Taxpayer Charter, Zambia Revenue Authority, Lusaka, Internet source 
http://www.zra.org.zm/charter.php accessed 13/11/2007. 
393Uganda has a very elaborate document stipulating the service standards to be 
adhered to by the URA staff. As is the case for large parts of the TRA taxpayer 
charter, the URA document sets down performance standards only. The lofty 
pronouncements contained in this document are not rights capable of enforcement 
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Strategies for promoting taxpayer compliance have not varied much 
among the new tax administrations in Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Rwanda and Zambia. At the centre of the measures taken is the 
desire to adopt the service-culture of the market driven private 
enterprises. Tax administrations in the region are all concerned with 
the service given to taxpayers. Phrases such as "prompt and 
courteous", "quality and efficient", "impartial and fair" constantly 
recur in taxpayer leaflets issued by the tax administrations in 
connection with their customer care programs. 
In incorporating these customer service concepts into their 
administration culture, the tax authorities aim to change the mind-
sets of tax officers so as to enhance procedural justice in the tax 
administration's interaction with taxpayers. 
Taxpayer treatment is an important factor of procedural justice. It 
impacts significantly on voluntary taxpayer compliance. In dealing 
with the psychology of the tax compliant mind, particular attention 
must be given to those things said and done which drive a person to 
comply with the obligation to pay tax. 
Previously, the point has been made that the notion of voluntary 
taxpayer compliance, as an ideal, assumes the unquestioning 
acceptance of the noble civic duty to pay taxes. With acceptance of 
this civic duty, taxpayers voluntarily come forward to disclose their 
taxable activities accurately and honestly. 
This ideal form of voluntary taxpayer compliance is something that 
was taken for granted in the 1950s and 1960s, when it was generally 
thought that taxes were the price paid for public services. In 
developed societies ideas of "good citizenship" led everyone to believe 
in a court of law. They range from the manner of taking telephone calls to such 
things as dress code for the URA staff. 
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that the tax system belonged to the people and that everyone will 
suffer if some people in the society defaulted on their tax payment 
obligations or engaged in tax avoidance practices. 
However, in today's context, voluntary taxpayer compliance in its 
ideal form is no longer a reality. Firstly, there is no quid pro quo 
between taxes paid and government services provided. For 
developing countries in particular, poor governance invariably leads 
to an eschewed co-relation between revenue collection and revenue 
expenditure such that persistent irresponsible spending by 
governments bears no relationship to the expectations of the 
taxpayer. Secondly, in today's world and more so in developing 
countries, tax regimes have substantially changed. Marginal rates of 
tax have increased significantly since the 1970s. The high rates of 
tax make it difficult for taxation to gain easy acceptance. In addition, 
tax laws have grown in complexity and are less understandable. This 
complexity has led to taxpayers disowning the tax system. 
Side by side with the growing alienation of taxpayers from the tax 
system, has emerged the growing size of tax administrations and the 
growing extent of their powers, ranking in many countries as the 
single most feared instrumentality of the government. 
Along with the increased powers of the tax administrations, has been 
the increased arbitrariness in the use of taxing power and the use of 
taxes to service interests, which are at times inimical to those of the 
society at large. 
The lack of rules which entrench procedural justice has also made 
taxing decisions difficult to challenge. In general, there is a growing 
disquiet reflective of the fact that fairness is fading in the tax system. 
In this setting, the lofty pronouncements on fairness, equity and 
courtesy, contained in the emerging taxpayer charters and tax service 
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standard manuals of the reformed tax administrations, seemed to 
herald a new beginning. But a decade of living with these reforms, 
without a significant shift in the service culture and without 
substantive improvement in procedural justice, has made the sound 
of these pronouncements ring hollow. 
Moreover, as wealth disparities continue to grow in these countries, 
an apprehension that the tax system is inequitable and favours a few, 
also grows steadily leading to an increase in tax avoidance and tax 
evasion activities. Increased tax evasion and avoidance jeopardises 
tax collections and the revenue efficiency of the tax system. 
It seems that the present day notion of voluntary compliance must 
shift from that of yester years. It must focus on those factors which 
influence taxpayer behaviour. If tax laws could be more transparent 
and understandable394, the challenge to rein taxpayers back into the 
fold may not be so difficult. While taxpayer education may playa role 
in tax acceptance, it can only be a limited one. Much effort must be 
directed at making the tax system relevant and making it more 
taxpayer friendly. Both the administration of taxes and the use of tax 
revenues must be directed to the common good of the society. This is 
the context within which voluntary taxpayer compliance becomes an 
integral part of the drive for good governance. It is also from this 
perspective of responsible governance, that taxpayer resistance can 
be properly understood and effectively combated. 
3941n one UK case an exasperated judge had this to say to a taxpayer contesting a 
tax claim by the Inland Revenue: "Your appeal must be dismissed. I will pass you 
back your documents. If I may add a word to you, it is that I hope you will not 
trouble your head further with tax matters, because you seem to have spent a lot of 
time in going through these various Acts, and if you go on spending your time on 
Finance Acts and the like, it will drive you silly." Singleton J in Briggenshaw v 
Crabb (1948) 30 TC 331. In line with the desire for simplicity in tax laws, the 
Rwanda Revenue Authority claims that, while implementing the tax modernization 
process, it has revised its tax laws to make them 'modem', 'simple', and 'clear'. 
Address by the Rwanda Revenue Authority Commissioner General, Mary Baine, 
Kigali, 2006, internet source http://www.rra.gov.rw/en/ accessed 13/11/2007. 
, 
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In the context of tax administration, voluntary taxpayer compliance 
does not merely address taxpayer willingness to pay taxes. The 
realities of the past years have compelled a shift from the "ideal 
based" understanding of voluntary taxpayer compliance underpinned 
on responsible citizenship alone. The challenge now is to pursue and 
attain voluntary taxpayer compliance as an objective of tax strategy 
and tax reform395. 
The quest for attaining high levels of voluntary taxpayer compliance 
has proved to be a tortuous one, particularly in developing countries. 
In developed countries the current fbcus is on making tax laws more 
acceptable and respectable by ensuring that taxpayers' rights are 
enshrined and observed. In these countries a perception has grown 
that public trust in tax administration is a prerequisite in fostering 
voluntary taxpayer compliance. Where people perceive the tax system 
to be unjust they remonstrate through non -compliance and other 
forms of tax resistance. 
On the other hand, tax reforms in developing countries appear to 
focus on prescriptive measures. Since the mid -1990s many 
developing countries have embarked upon tax reforms aimed at 
aligning their tax systems with the shift from centrally planned 
economies to market economies. In these countries tax reform often 
strives to sustain the needs of a nascent market economy, especially 
the expanding private sector. Initially it was envisioned that as 
governments relinquish the center-stage in the economic playing 
field, the tax system will be less stringent both in terms of levels of 
taxation and the manner of taxation. This shift would lead to the 
emergence of a more taxpayer-friendly tax system both in regard to 
the burden of tax borne by the taxpayer and the manner of extracting 
395This is the pursuit in many developed countries and resulted in emphasis being 
placed on balancing revenue needs and observance of taxpayers' rights. See K. C. 
Messere, 'Tax Policy in OECD Countries: Choices and Conflicts' in IBDF 
Publications BV, Amsterdam, 1993, at 1-16. 
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that tax. The reform would make the tax administration less intrusive 
and less coercive. Tanzania proceeded on these assumptions when it 
embarked on the tax reforms implemented from the mid 1990s. 
For Tanzania, the tax reform which was embarked on aimed at the 
expansion of the tax base, the repeal of taxes which were seen as 
outmoded or those fringe taxes seen merely as a nuisance to business 
and to private sector growth, the enhancement of private savings and 
the improvement of the tax administration to make it more compliant 
with the requirements of due process396. Additionally, the tax reforms 
implemented also sought to achieve technical and revenue efficiency. 
Thus the reforms adopted were under the banner of revenue 
maximization from an efficient tax administration. Indeed, successive 
studies carried out to inform the tax reform process in Tanzania have 
all focused on this approach397. 
The assumption by tax policy makers was that once a proper and 
efficient tax administration is in place then taxpayer compliance can 
. 'i 
be achieved. In large measure this thinking which informs tax 
administration reform in developing countries, hinges on the notion 
that voluntary taxpayer compliance must be compelled. This notion of 
unwilling compliance, relying almost entirely on the design of the tax 
~, 
system, assumes that once captured in an efficient tax net the 
taxpayer will comply without having to make a conscious choice as to 
compliance. Expressed this way, tax compliance becomes dependent 
on the creation of a tax administration which is well equipped, well 
staffed and well positioned to administer the taxes levied and to 
overcome taxpayer resistance. All forms of unwillingness, ignorance, 
or selfish un-civic tendencies are cast aside. Looking at the trends in 
396 Report of the Presidential Commission of Enquiry into Public Revenues, 
Taxation and Expenditure. Government Printers, Dar es Salaam, 1991. 
397'Tanzania: Proposals for Tax Reform in 1995/96 and Beyond' Ministry of 
Finance, FAD-IMF, Dar es Salaam, 1997; 'Tanzania: Strengthening the Tax System' 
Ministry of Finance, FAD-IMF, 1997; and 'Manual of Fiscal Transparency' 
Washington DC., International Monetary Fund 1999. 
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taxpayer compliance reform strategies which flow from the TRA, 
evidence of this thinking clearly abounds.398 
Tanzania started implementing tax reform strategies in 1995399 when 
the government took seriously the decision to reform its tax laws. 
What has emerged from this tax reform is that the laws have become 
more compulsive and in many ways more oppressive as well. 
Numerous provisions of law have been enacted giving much wider 
discretionary powers to tax officers and empowering them to enforce 
tax collection with the least resistance from taxpayers. The tax laws 
give TRA extra-judicial powers such as the power to access taxpayer 
monies from bank accounts without the need for a court order (even 
if the tax is disputed and under appeal), the power to attach and sell 
assets to recover taxes (even where there are ongoing proceedings in 
respect of the disputed tax), the power to collect taxes from third 
parties by issuance of agency notices (which can mean the transfer of 
a taxpayer's liability to the third party) and many more powers. 
Simultaneously, much wider information gathering powers have been 
given to tax officers in carrying out audits and verification 
exercises.4oo 
While the tax measures implemented so far have succeeded in 
increasing revenue collections substantially, this has not been on 
account of any demonstrated expansion of the tax base, or a 
demonstrated increase in "voluntary taxpayer compliance". Many 
attribute the increased revenue collection to the unfettered use of 
taxing power and the use of extra-judicial powers by the TRA in 
398The TRA Tax Revenue Report for August 2001' 1, Dar es Salaam, 2001; 
'Tax Administration and Structure in Tanzania' The TRA Taxpayer 
Education Department, 1999; The TRA Annual Report for 1998/1999, Dar es 
Salaam, 2000, 1-57; 'Proposals for the Review of the Tax Structure in 2001/2002' 
Report by the Tanzania Revenue Authority, 2001, 1-120. 
399'Amendments made to Tax Laws from 1996 to 2001' Tanzania Revenue 
Authority, Dar es Salaam, March 2002. 
400The Income Tax Act 2004, the VAT Act 1997 (as amended), the East African 
Community Customs Tax Management Act 2005, and the Stamp Duty Act 1977 (as 
amended). 
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meeting revenue collection targets. There has been no corresponding 
increase in the taxpayer base. 
Tanzania implements "revenue collection targets" whereby the TRA is 
assigned by Treasury an annual tax collection amount arising from 
the Government Budget. This omnibus figure is broken down into 
monthly revenue collection targets for the TRA. In turn the TRA 
assigns sectional targets to the TRA Regional Managers and Section 
Heads. All have to strive to meet the set targets timeously or risk their 
employment (which is performance based) being terminated. Such a 
system is prone to marginalizing the importance of taxpayer rights 
and the need to foster voluntary taxpayer compliance. 
What is also acknowledged is the persisting inability of the tax system 
to capture a large number of the fast growing economic activities 
within the informal sector. A number of explanations are put forward 
for this phenomenon, one is that little effort has been directed to the 
development of a suitable social infrastructure to support the tax 
, 
system. Items of social infrastructure which are not yet in place 
include all those things which enable tracing and verification of 
taxable persons and taxable entities. Among them are a formal 
system of personal identification on a national level (the national 
identity card), a voters' register, an efficient form of business 
licensing and registration, the surveyiflg and registering of land and 
many other forms of tracking economic activities. The negative effect 
which this lack of social infrastructure has on tax compliance is 
demonstrated by empirical evidence, especially having regard to the 
reaction of taxpayers to attempts to implement some of the above 
measures. 
In 2004, a pilot scheme was undertaken for the registration of 
citizens in the Voters Register in the southern regions of Mtwara and 
Lindi in Tanzania. This is an exercise which is ongoing for the rest of 
the country. The scheme has encountered strong resistance. Media 
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reports show that people in those two regIOns were reluctant to be 
entered in the voters' register because they believe the purported 
voters' register is only a ploy to identify their existence and 
whereabouts for the purpose of taxation401 . People are similarly 
apprehensive about the initiative of the Government to implement a 
project which seeks to ensure that all land is registered and owners 
issued with ownership licenses (a lesser form of certificates of title)402. 
While the stated objective of the project is firstly to secure people's 
ownership of land and enable them to access credit financing, many 
refuse to accept this explanation at face value. They suspect there is 
a tax motive and are reluctant to cooperate. The TRA's Taxpayer 
Education Department repeatedly faces similar resistance in its 
various campaigns to enhance taxpayer awareness and inculcate the 
culture of voluntary taxpayer compliance403 . 
Preliminary inquiries on what appears to be the perplexing challenge 
of achieving voluntary taxpayer compliance in developing countries 
, 
suggest that tax reform strategists are pursuing an incorrect 
approach. Research carried ut in Tanzania has ascertained that, 
people are not averse to taxation. They understand the role and 
importance of taxation in society. 404 What has been lacking is the 
necessary effort to put in place the social and economic conditions 
which enhance the desire to comply with taxes. 
It seems that efforts aimed at achieving voluntary taxpayer 
compliance have not been as successful because voluntary taxpayer 
compliance is not properly contextualized. While it is correct to take 
401President Benjamin Mkapa was reported to have condemned politicians who 
were bringing up tax to scare people. See, Daily Newspaper of 13/10/2004. 
402The President has invited Professor Hernando De Soto (the re-known Peruvian 
economist) to Tanzania to implement the sort of economic rights reforms suggested 
in his book Why Capitalism Triumphs in the West and Fails Everywhere Else, (2000) 
Basic Books. 
403This was revealed by the Taxpayer Education Director, Mr. Mmanda in reply to a 
question asked at a workshop held in Dar es Salaam at Bahari Beach Hotel on 14th 
February 2005. 
4040 H Fjeldstad and J J Semboja 'Why People Pay Taxes: The Case of the 
Development Levy in Tanzania' IDS Bulletin (2001) 33 (3) 21-29. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
161 
voluntary taxpayer compliance as a tax administration challenge, it is 
wrong to confine it to an exclusively tax administration issue. Such a 
narrow approach leads to emphasis being placed upon the behaviour 
of taxpayers rather than the manner of governance which underpins 
the tax administration and to a large extent determines taxpayer 
attitude to government and to taxation. The significance of good 
governance and that of the tax authority/taxpayer relationship is not 
sufficien tly a pprecia ted. Properly contextualised, this trio 
relationship places taxation within the context of governance. In this 
broad context of governance, it is possible to develop compliance 
principles which enhance voluntary taxpayer compliance. It is for 
this reason that the objective of voluntary taxpayer compliance and 
the understanding of it, is being re-examined in this study. 
As it is, the responses to tax resistance by tax authorities and 
governments over the years have been varied. In their bid to combat 
taxpayer resistance, governments have succeeded only in making tax 
laws more complex and tax administrations more oppressive. There 
are recorded instances of heavy reliance on stringent and 
indiscriminate sanctions in dealing with taxpayer resistance,40s which 
trend has produced more non-compliance. Professor Shavell once 
stated that, "it is impossible to deter a person with no assets by the 
threat of monetary sanctions."406 The taxpayer will indulge in 
avoidance or evasion if such conduct produces more benefit than the 
total punishment provided for violation, multiplied by the likelihood 
of punishment.407 
In examining the impact of procedural justice and customer care on 
taxpayer attitudes towards payment of tax, the question posed is 
405S Kramer 'An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal Deterrence and 
the Optimal Structure of Sanctions' (1990) 81 Journal of Criminal Law and 
Criminology 398. 
406S Shavell 'Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Non-monetary Sanctions as a 
Deterrent' (1985) 85 Columbia Law review 1232-1262. 
407A Blumstein in P Sawicki (ed) Income Tax Compliance: A Report of the ABA Section 
of Taxation International Conference on Income Tax Compliance, American Bar 
Association, Chicago, IlL, 1983. 
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whether a fair/courteous treatment of taxpayers will boost taxpayer 
disposition towards voluntary tax payment. What role does 
effectiveness of service delivery play in shaping taxpayer attitudes 
towards the tax administration and towards the tax system in 
general? An attempt is made here to contrast effectiveness of service 
with the 'detection and punishment' approach to see whether the two 
approaches contradict or compliment each other. In doing this, an 
attempt is made to show how taxpayer attitudes and tax compliance 
are affected differently by certain tax regimes. 
In this discourse the mind -set of both the tax officer as well as the 
taxpayer is addressed, so as to assess whether the tax modernization 
programs that have been embarked on are correctly premised. 
It is human nature to expect to be treated with courtesy and respect. 
Nobody wants to suffer indignity, more so where the indignity results 
from the taking by another person of what one believes to be 
rightfully theirs. " Personal endeavour, economic enterprise and 
employment toil are intrinsically individualistic. If a person's gam 
from endeavour, enterprise and toil must be shared with the 
government, as taxes aim to do, then the appeal for sharing has to be 
directed to the psychology of the producer/taxpayer. 
In most cases however, the method traditionally used or preferred in 
collecting tax revenues is enforcement. Enforcement, to a large 
measure, entails the actual use of force or the threat of use of force. 
Enforcement relies on the detection and punishment of non-
compliant persons. The use of tax audits and inspections, criminal 
prosecutions, fines and jail terms, all seek to induce submission by 
intimidation. 408 
However, enforcement presupposes the existence of sufficient 
capacity to police non-compliance. This ability to undertake audits 
and inspections extensively must exist at a level sufficient enough to 
408C Rossoti, 'Modernizing America's Tax Agency' (1999) 83 Tax Notes 1191 at 1195. 
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reach all the non-compliant taxpayers. No tax authority has that 
unlimited ability, or possesses such ability to the ideal levels desired. 
The inability to provide unlimited funding to tax administrations 
makes it impossible to achieve enforcement levels which would make 
it unnecessary to rely on other compliance strategies. 
I t is notable that the modernized tax administrations of Kenya, 
Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda and Zambia, all made it a priority to set 
up tax audit and tax investigation departments. A close look at these 
audit departments shows that they have spent the best part of ten 
years of existence putting in place systems and procedures that will 
improve the tax administrations' ability to detect and counteract tax 
non-compliance. It is possible to argue on behalf of these young tax 
administrations that, given the short period that the TRA, the URA, 
the ZRA, the KRA and the RRA have been in existence, it is too early 
to judge whether their enforcement strategies are effective. However, 
a ten year period is by no means a brief one. If the effectiveness of 
the enforcement program of the audit and tax investigation 
departments has not borne significant positive results, there may be 
a need to rethink this enforcement compliance strategy. In chapter 
seven, the effectiveness of the enforcement program of the TRA is 
assessed. 
There is also another drawback with enforcement, namely that it 
triggers a negative chain reaction. It produces more tax resistance 
because of its intrusiveness. Tax planning and avoidance activity 
become more intricate aiming to beat the increased detection ability. 
On the other hand too, the inadequate record keeping of tax 
administrations such as the TRA and the poor state of records kept 
by many taxpayers in countries such as Tanzania, make it unrealistic 
to rely only on detection and punishment for effective tax 
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compliance.409 As noted before, fear of detection and punishment 
becomes an effective tool of compliance only when there is a real 
likelihood of being caught. When that likelihood recedes, either 
because of a perceived lack of capacity, or because of the sheer 
enormity of the task, then detection and punishment cease to be an 
effective deterrent against non-compliance. 
In the past chapters, it was noted that the tax base in Tanzania is 
still very narrow. Taxpayer registration is proceeding at a very slow 
pace with only 686,980 taxpayers registered and assigned a Tax 
Identification Number (TIN) for income tax purposes.410 The reported 
population of Tanzania by 2006 was 37.5 million people.411 One may 
safely assume that at least one third of these (12 million) are of adult 
age and therefore productive and liable to payment of tax. If one 
adds to this number the companies and other forms of business 
entities also given TIN registration, then clearly a very small number 
of taxpayers captured such that tax registration has been quite 
ineffective. 
The position IS said to be the same in Kenya,412 leading to calls for 
extending the type of transactions which should require a Personal 
Identification Number (PIN)413 to complete so that such information 
can build up a good pool of data on taxable activities and the scales 
409The study by Professor Maliyamkono referred in chapter one showed that most 
individuals in Tanzania do not keep a record of their income earning activities. 
Likewise, many small companies do not maintain proper financial records, or 
engage auditors to examine their transactions and prepare audited accounts for 
submission to tax or other regulatory authorities. 
410A large part of those having a TIN registration are corporate entities, which 
shows that there is very little success in bringing more individual taxpayers into the 
tax net. 
411The Economic Survey 2006, Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, 
Dar es Salaam, June 2007, Table A - Basic Economic Statistics, xv. 
412E Maina 'Reduction and Payment of domestic debt' in W Gatheru and R Shaw 
(eds) Our Problems, Our Solutions 1998, Kenya, at 6, internet source 
http/ /www.iea.or.ke/ourpoblems.asp accessed 1/5/2001. 
413While taxpayers in Tanzania are assigned a TIN, in Kenya they are assigned a 
PIN (personal identification number). In both cases the TIN or PIN is a unique 
computer generated number used by the tax authority for the identification of a 
taxpayer. 
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of revenues by vanous people and entities within the economy.414 
This has not happened in Kenya. 
The TRA estimates that the underground economy In Tanzania 
constitutes about two thirds of the official GDP.41S A report issued by 
DANIDA416 in October 2003 seems to agree. The report notes that 
Tanzania's tax base is very narrow with 28% of GDP being generated 
by non-market production and an estimated 15% by the informal 
sector. The non-government formal sector accounts for only 47% of 
GDP.417 More recent data published by Professor Maliyamkono in 
2009 (already discussed) shows the trend to have worsened since the 
DANIDA report was issued. 
If taxpayer identification and registration remains at a very low level, 
enforcement cannot work effectively. Alternative strategies must be 
pursued rigorously. 
Given the above limitations for enforcement as a compliance strategy, 
persuasion (otherwise referred to as the cooperative approach) is now 
emerging as a serious alternative to enforcement in the quest for 
developing effective taxpayer-compliance strategies. U sing the 
cooperative approach, taxpayers are encouraged to pay their taxes 
voluntarily without the need to invoke sanctions. Rossoti418 has 
argued that the use of this strategy in tax revenue collection bolsters 
taxpayer's willingness to pay their taxes voluntarily.419 He is 
supported in this by Torgler420 who believes that rather than resort to 
high-handed directives and the issuance of threatening notices, tax 
414E Maina, 'Reduction and Payment of domestic debt' in W Gatheru and R Shaw 
(eds) Our Problems, Our Solutions 1998, Kenya, at 6, internet source 
http/ /www.iea.or.ke/ourpoblems.asp accessed 1/5/200l. 
415The TRA A Decade of TRA Transformation 1996-2006, Tanzania Revenue 
Authority, October 2006, Chapter 8 at 87. 
416DANIDA, Project Document, 'Danish Support to the Tanzania Revenue Authority, 
Phase II 2003/04 - 2007/08' October 2003, Danida File 104.Tanzania.213 
417lbid. 7. 
418C Rossoti 'Modernizing America's Tax Agency' (1999) 83 Tax Notes 1191 at 1195. 
419lbid. 
420B Torgler Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: a Theoretical and Empirical Analysis 
Cheltenham UK 2007; also B Torgler Tax Morale: Theory and Empirical Analysis of 
Tax Compliance, PhD Dissertation, University of Basel, 2003, at 123. 
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administration efforts must now be focused on taxpayer education, 
the provision of free tax compliance information, the giving of 
taxpayer compliance kits and the application of reward and 
incentives.421 Torgler believes that these efforts show greater promise 
in increasing taxpayer compliance than intimidation does. 
The ~ooperative approach has also come to be favoured in tax 
collection because research has shown that tax enforcement does not 
explain entirely the patterns of taxpayer compliance.422 In many 
jurisdictions, it is known that very few tax evaders are detected and 
prosecuted. Yet compliance levels even in these countries of low 
enforcement remain relatively high.423 This seems to be the case in 
Tanzania as well. In these circumstances, to argue that direct 
enforcement provides a complete answer to tax non-compliance is not 
logical. Other factors are at play in influencing tax compliance. 
Factors such as the trust people hav  in the government, the 
reasonable level at which social services are provided by the 
government, the transparency with which the government operates, 
the fairness of the tax system, the accountability of the tax 
administration and the accountability of the government generally, all 
have a significant impact on tax compliance. These factors combine 
well to produce a public desire to assume tax obligations voluntarily 
and to own the tax system. 
The tax collecting authority has a big role to play when it comes to 
influencing the taxpayer's behaviour towards voluntary tax payment. 
Its treatment of taxpayers wi11largely determine their behaviour and 
response to taxation. 
42 1 Ibid. 
422There are scholars who argue that the level of compliance is higher where the 
threat of sanction is not the only the driving force behind tax compliance. See J 
Andreon, BErard and J Feistein 'Tax Compliance' (1998) 36 Journal of Economic 
Literature 818-860. 
4230ne needs to caution that this is true only in the context of the limited tax base 
within which taxes are regularly collected from the known taxpayers. In taking this 
view, no consideration is given to the big number of individuals and entities which 
operate in the informal sector and are largely untaxed. 
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So what role should be played by tax administrations such as the 
TRA in shaping taxpayer behaviour and moving the taxpaying public 
towards higher levels of voluntary tax payment? 
The available data shows a compelling case for a cooperative 
approach rather than an antagonistic one as represented by 
enforcement. In the survey carried out by the National Bureau of 
Statistics referred to previously, the Report indicated that only 2 
taxpayers in every 10 taxpayers have confidence in the tax regime. 424 
The Report also noted a widespread perception that the TRA officers 
demand or accept bribes in the discharge of official duties. 425 Of the 
2,399 taxpayers surveyed, 10.5% had offered bribes to get services. 
This number may not reflect fully the seriousness of the problem as 
many other persons interviewed declined to answer the survey 
question on bribes within the TRA for fear of prosecution.426 
The reasons given for this serious integrity problem in the TRA are 
worth noting. According to this survey report, one third of those who 
gave bribes to the TRA officers said that their motive was to speed up 
the process in receiving the services they wanted. 427 However, 
another group making up 41.7% of those interviewed said they gave 
bribes so as to get assistance from the tax officers to pay reduced 
taxes.428 A third group making up 14.2% gave bribes to create a 
conducive relationship with the officers in relation to future tax 
transactions.429 Whatever the reasons for seeking and/ or accepting 
bribes, the lack of integrity on the part of tax officers and the officers' 
failure to discharge their tax functions impartially, greatly 
424National Bureau of Statistics, Report on the Assessment of the Effectiveness of 
Taxpayers Awareness Programs and Attitude of Taxpayers Towards the TRA, 
September, 2003, at 14. 
425Ibid. 
426Ibid. 
427The ploy used by tax officers is to delay the services so that the statutory time 
limit may expire. The threat of time bar, the burden of interest and penalties for 
late payment, leave the taxpayer vulnerable to bribe extraction. 
428Supra, note 355 at 15. 
429 Ibid. 
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undermines the public respect and confidence for the TRA and 
prevents acceptance by the public of the tax system. 
It is no surprise therefore that the same report shows that 28.4% of 
taxpayers surveyed believe that the tax administration is not good. 
That is to say it does not meet taxpayer needs. Only a meager 3.2% of 
those interviewed responded that the services of the tax authority 
were excellent. At the other extreme, 6.3% responded that the 
services offered were poor or very poor. 
The survey results documented by the National Bureau of Statistics 
as shown above, demonstrate the degree to which taxpayer thinking 
is influenced by the treatment received from those who administer 
taxes. Taxpayers wish to be served with dignity. The customer care 
concept which has come to be applied to tax administration and now 
shapes the thinking of tax administrators, has found favour because 
there is significant taxpayer dissatisfaction with the tax authorities. 
The TRA has declared as one of its strategic objectives the desire to 
provide high quality and responsive customer service. 430 The TRA 
identifies two ways for achieving this. The first is to enhance the level 
of tax knowledge among taxpayers. The second is to improve the 
quality of customer service provided to taxpayers.431 
Deliberate steps have been taken to change the institutional 
orientation of the TRA from a government department/parastatal, to 
a more corporate orientation. There is an improved telephone inquiry 
system in place with toll free numbers for taxpayers to use to access 
information on any tax issue or compliance requirement. The TRA 
has also made its front desk operations more responsive to quality 
customer care, ensunng front desk officers are sufficiently 
knowledgeable about the organization and about the various taxes 
43O'fhe TRA second Five Year Corporate Plan 2003/04 - 2007/08. 
431The TRA First Five Year Corporate Plan 1998/99-2002/2003 and the TRA 
Second Five Year Corporate Plan 2003/2004-2007/2008. The same thrust is being 
carried into the Draft TRA Third Five Year Corporate Plan 2008/2009-2012/2013 
to be adopted some time in 2008. 
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administered, or at least know where to direct an inquirer for 
appropriate answers. 
The TRA seems to be vindicated in its recognition of premIer 
customer care as an imperative in the drive to better taxpayer 
compliance. In the survey report by the National Bureau of Statistics 
referred to above, a majority of 69% of taxpayers interviewed believed 
that better customer relations would encourage taxpayers to be 
compliant. 
The more recent survey report by PricewaterhouseCoopers,432 
recommended inter alia that the taxpayer education program of the 
TRA be expanded to reach more taxpayers. It also recommended that 
a help line be set-up to assist in dealing with taxpayer inquiries 
giving taxpayers information which improves their ability to comply 
with taxation. The view shared here is that taxpayers who receive 
sufficient guiding information on taxation are likely to comply better 
with tax filings and tax payment requirements. The availability of tax 
~ '} 
information will reduce the amount of errors in filling tax returns and 
claiming tax reliefs. This will reduce the workload of tax officers who 
process tax returns and claims. 
In improving the quality of its service to taxpayers the TRA has 
adopted a wide range of measures. These now comprise the TRA tax 
compliance program, 433 and include the following measures: 
(i) Taxpayer education 
(ii) Taxation teaching in schools 
(iii) Improved access to tax services 
(iv) Simplification of procedures for tax payment 
432PricewaterhouseCoopers, 'Stakeholders Perception Survey Report 2006, Large 
Taxpayer Department, the TRA, Dar es Salaam. 
433RM Bird 'Administrative Dimensions of Tax Reform' (2004) 10 (3) Asia Pacific Tax 
Bulletin 134-150 at 136, makes the point that "facilitating compliance involves 
such elements as improving services to taxpayers by providing them clear 
instructions, understandable forms, and assistance and information as necessary". 
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(v) Improved data keeping 
(vi) Simplifying tax filings 
(vii) Front desk improvement 
(viii) Taxpayer satisfaction surveys 
(ix) Taxpayer registration 
According to the TRA Act, the TRA has a duty to take all necessary 
measures to ensure that the revenue laws are complied with434 . In 
doing this, the TRA is required to educate taxpayers on their tax 
responsibilities with regard to all taxes administered by the TRA. It is 
also the duty of the TRA to educate taxpayers on taxpayer rights. 
With this responsibility in mind, taxpayer education was one of the 
initial tax measures embarked upon by the TRA when established in 
1996. It was seen as a key component in promoting taxpayer 
compliance. 
A department known as the Taxpayers' Public Education Department, 
with the mandate to educate the public on tax matters, was created 
within the TRA. The functions of this department are mainly to 
disseminate knowledge to the public on the importance of paying 
taxes voluntarily and the role of taxpayers in meeting their civic 
responsibility with regard to taxes. 
The program for taxpayer education included a weekly radio program, 
regular radio announcements, live radio talk back programs, 
television programs explaining various taxes, seminars and 
workshops which target various types of taxpayers, 
advertisements/ commercials on radio, television programs, 
infomercials, print media advertisements, press releases/ statements, 
booklets, tax guides, leaflets, pamphlets, public announcements done 
by mobile units in residential areas, distribution/ sale of souvenir 
articles such as calendars, T-shirts, bags, pens, (which carry a tax 
434Section 5(2) (g). 
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message) and mUSIC performances or drama pIeces involving 
taxation. 
However, an examination of the taxpayer education program 
undertaken by the TRA shows that it focuses almost entirely on tax 
compliance. There is very little effort to educate taxpayers on 
taxpayer rights. The taxpayer charter which was adopted at the end 
of 2006 stands out as a lone effort in this direction. But as noted 
above, the TRA has taken seriously the duty to impart knowledge of 
taxes and tax payment procedures as a civic obligation. 
It is arguable that the funding of the taxpayer education department 
has not sufficiently reflected the importance that the TRA claims to 
attach to this compliance measure. Money provided to fund taxpayer 
education since 1996 is shown in Table 5 below. 
Table 5: Budget Allocation for the TRA T~payer Education Activities* 
1996/97 1998/99 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 
0,210 0,240 0,287 0,491 0,382 0,671 1,175 1,232 
* Source: The TRA Annual Reports (amounts given for some of the years 
could not be obtained) 
** Values are billion Tanzania shillings 
Although Table 5 shows that there has been a consistent growth in 
annual budget allocations for taxpayer education activities, the 
allocation as a percentage of total TRA expenditure has been 
negligible at around 1% only. This level of funding does not seem to 
reflect the seriousness that both the TRA and government claim to 
attach to promoting taxpayer education as an important component 
in voluntary taxpayer compliance. 
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The taxpayer education program of the TRA has not been directed 
only to those already at the tax-paying age. The TRA recognizes that 
the culture of tax compliance needs to be nurtured from an early age 
if young people are to grow into adulthood as law abiding citizens and 
tax compliant individuals. With this recognition, the TRA has 
introduced tax education in primary schools as part of its civic 
education program to promote tax awareness. The TRA also carries 
out school visits to secondary and high schools explaining to 
youngsters the various taxes levied in the country, but also 
explaining to them the importance of payment of tax as a civic duty. 
The other customer service improvement measure undertaken by the 
TRA is to restructure itself as an institution in order to Improve 
accessibility to its offices and to its officers. Traditionally, the TRA 
offices have been set up on a tax-type basis, namely, VAT office, 
Income Tax office and Customs office. The TRA is now moving away 
from this tax-type arrangement and promoting office integration 
whereby one office of the TRA undertakes all tax functions. Such 
integrated tax offices have been set up at the regional and district 
level. Officers for the three major taxes share the same building even 
though their operations and reporting lines continue to be distinct. A 
further move to actually merge the administration of some taxes 
commenced with the creation in 2002 of the Large Taxpayers 
Department which made it possible for large taxpayers to deal with 
one office only in respect of all taxes (excluding customs). This was 
followed in 2005 by the merging of VAT and Income Tax into what is 
now known as the Domestic Revenue Department. These 
administrative reforms were also carried out at the district level, then 
at the regional level and have been finally implemented at the zone 
level.435 
435There are 127 administrative Districts, falling into 26 Regions. The Regions are 
grouped into 5 Zones. 
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Another customer service improvement measure undertaken by the 
TRA to improve tax compliance is the simplification of tax payment 
procedures. In 2001, the TRA invited one of the commercial banks to 
locate a bank branch at the TRA headquarters dedicated to receiving 
tax payments on the TRA account. With time more commercial 
banks have become involved in the project. Direct payment into 
banks has now been extended to all regional centers. The banking 
facilities are located within the TRA premises in all places where this 
service is available. With time too, it is intended to remove the 
burden of paying tax by cash so that taxpayers are able to utilize 
bank cards for all tax payment transactions. Direct payment into 
banks has also improved cash management, reducing theft incidents 
and cheque frauds. 
Improvement of the payments procedure also aimed to interface the 
TRA electronically with commercial banks. Currently the TRA is 
interfaced with CRDB Bank, NBC Ltd and National Microfinance 
Bank. Arrangements are underway to interface the TRA with three 
more banks namely; Standard Chartered Bank, Citibank and Stanbic 
Bank. The TRA provided these commercial banks with specifications 
of the TRA requirements. By June 2007, NMB and CRDB completed 
the development of the interface between the TRA and their systems, 
and NBC Ltd did soon thereafter utilizing the ITAX.436 
The initiative for electronic interfacing with banks had to be 
supported by an amendment of the Evidence Act,437 to allow 
electronic records obtained in the course of investigations to be used 
as evidence. 
436ITAX stands for Integrated Tax Administration System. 
437Written Laws Miscellaneous Amendment Act No 2007 (enacted by Parliament in 
February 2007). This is an amendment to the rules of evidence to enable the use of 
electronic evidence in courts of law. Previously the only evidence allowed with 
regard to written material was printed matter in original form. The amendment 
became effective in March 2007. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
174 
Since the introduction of the system of payment through banks, 97% 
of payments made through banks are collected free from fraudulent 
acts. The remaining 3% of revenue is collected from district offices 
and other revenue sources such as stamp duty, driving license and 
road license fees for which payment is made by cash transactions. 
Another customer service improvement measure undertaken by the 
TRA is in relation to data keeping. Improved data keeping is the key 
component of the computerization program of the TRA and aims at 
improving access to taxpayer data by tax officers. The TRA believes 
that if at the press of a button and through the TIN, a tax officer is 
able to access all the information relating to a taxpayer's activities for 
all tax purposes (income tax, stamp duty, VAT), then the tax officer is 
able to serve the taxpayer better, attend to inquiries faster and also 
provide more precise answers to taxpayer queries. 
The computerization of the TRA systems also aims at doing away with 
manual systems and providing officers with electronic systems in 
relation to the collection of income tax, VAT and customs, which 
improves the functionality of the TRA as a tax collection agency. 
Electronic storage of taxpayer data makes information retrieval easy 
enabling the tax officer to access and work with the available 
information all the time. This reduces substantially the guess work 
or arbitrary estimates which have characterized tax collection 
practice in Tanzania for a long time. With accurate tax assessments 
there are less tax disputes and the tax systems gains easy 
acceptance. 
In its desire to ensure it provides high quality services to its 
customers, the TRA commenced the implementation of a Quality 
Management System (QMS) in 2004/05 with the aim of being ISO 
9001:2000 certified by the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO). A Working Group for the implementation of the 
QMS was appointed in July 2005. The group comprised the Quality 
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Coordinator, Quality Auditor and Quality Manager for Large 
Taxpayers Department (LTD). Fourteen Internal Quality Management 
Auditors (QMSA) were appointed in March 2006 to oversee the 
Quality Management System audit throughout the organization. The 
Quality policy and Quality Manual were prepared and approved by 
the Quality Management System Steering Committee in June 2006. 
Awareness training was conducted for all heads of department at the 
LTD attended by LTD staff (as this was the pilot site), the QMSA and 
representatives from all other departments. The QMSA attended 
further intensive Quality Management System Audit training. As a 
result the QMSA was able to carry out two audits at LTD in June and 
October 2006. 
An External Auditor M/S BVQI Company Limited of the United 
Kingdom was appointed to carry out a certification audit in November 
2006. The auditor recommended LTD for ISO 9001:2000 certification. 
LTD was ISO certified on 18th December 2Q06. 
Following this achievement, a commitment was made by the TRA 
Management to ensure that the entire organization implements the 
Quality Management System and for it to be ISO 9001:200- certified 
during the 2007/08 financial year. This was achieved in 2008/09. 
Another customer service improvement measure implemented by the 
TRA is simplification of information filing by taxpayers. Income tax 
returns and import declaration have been re-designed making them 
simpler to complete and also streamlining the information required. 
For instance, previous customs import forms comprised 9 separate 
documents, but now the customs declaration required is only the 
Single Bill of Entry (SBE) which caters for all purposes for clearing 
goods from customs. This move cuts out much of the bureaucracy 
normally attending the clearing of goods and assists importers and 
their clearing agents to go through the customs process more quickly. 
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Front desk improvement is another customer servIce improvement 
measure being undertaken by tax administration in Tanzania. The 
TRA has set up front desks as the first contact point at every office of 
the TRA. In doing this, it has endeavoured to ensure that the front 
desk becomes an efficient enquiry point for taxpayers. The front 
desks are designed to project a friendly image enhancing the 
customer care program of the TRA. 
The TRA professes to take seriously any feedback or suggestions it 
gets from taxpayers, encouraging them to make suggestions and to 
express views about the service they receive from the TRA through 
suggestion boxes installed at its offices. All suggestions and views 
collected from the suggestion boxes are referred to the Public 
Relations Manager for follow-up action. 
Taxpayer registration is also an important part of the TRA program 
for customer service improvement. Taxpayer registration promotes 
compliance by enswing that each taxpayer is unique and that there 
is no duplication of identities. TIN was introduced as a sole identifier 
for all taxpayers in 2004/05. 
In an effort to enhance the TIN system and improve efficiency in the 
registration process, 10 regIOns namely Arusha, Mwanza, 
Kilimanjaro, Shinyanga, Dodoma, Morogoro, Mbeya,Tanga, Zanzibar 
and Dar es Salaam were linked to the Central Server. This enabled 
these regions to print and issue certificates, update taxpayer 
information, query and search in the TIN central database from local 
workstations. 
After centralization an average of 1 hour is taken to process the 
certificates compared to three weeks prior to centralization. As 
previously noted, by June 2010 a total of 686,980 taxpayers were 
registered on the system. The system has been incorporated and 
operates as the registration module for the ITAX system. 
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However, as noted m chapter one, taxpayer registration has 
proceeded quite sluggishly with only a total of 686,980 taxpayers 
registered by June 2010 in a country whose adult population is at 
least 18 million. 438 These TIN registrations include companies and 
other business entities. So it is baffling that the number is so 10w,439 
especially taking into account the wide range of activities which the 
TIN rules say cannot be completed without a TIN registration. 
In speaking of an adult population of 18 million who in one way or 
another must be income earners, only marginal allowance needs to 
be made for unemployment.44o There is very little unemployment in 
Tanzania because Tanzania has a very small urban population. Most 
people of productive age live in the rural areas engaged in primary 
agriculture. Therefore unemployment is not a significant factor in 
defining the tax base. 
However, the real consideration in bringing the rural population and 
informal sector operators, into the tax net would be the structure of 
the income tax rates. As noted in chapter two, the taxpayer surveys 
carried out in Tanzania showed that there are already complaints 
that income tax rates are too high. It was also noted that the tax 
rates peak at a much lower level of income because of generally low 
incomes in Tanzania as compared to other countries where the higher 
tax bands apply only to truly high incomes. Given this consideration, 
438According to the census statistics issued by the government, Tanzania had a 
population of 33.6 million people by 2002 (the last census). At least 54% of these 
are above the age of 15 years. Internet source http://www.tanzania.go.tz/census 
See also The Economic Survey 2006, issued by the Ministry of Planning, Economy 
and Empowerment, Dar es Salaam, June 2007 which estimates the current 
population in 2007 to be 37.5 million people (Table A at xv). 
4390ne would expect an aggressive taxpayer registration program to reach at least 
half the adult population in a period of ten years from 1997, but information from 
the TRA Modernisation Program Manager indicates that the TIN registrations 
shown in the Table relate mostly to corporate taxpayers as very few individuals 
have been captured. 
44O'fhe Economic Survey 2006, Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, 
Dar es Salaam, June 2007, where it is noted on page 88 that in 2005/06, out of the 
18.3 million people in employment, 76.5% were in agriculture, 9.3% were in the 
informal sector, 8% in the private formal sector, 3.5% were domestic workers, and 
2.8% were in the public sector; only those in the private and public sector make up 
the tax base (for direct taxes). 
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income tax thresholds will need to be lowered, as well as the income 
tax rates, to ensure that expansion of the tax base to include the 
rural population and the informal sector does not distort the equity of 
taxation. 
One needs to refer to the desire to vastly expand the TIN registration 
program, especially with the enactment of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
In terms of that Act, a TIN registration became a mandatory 
requirement for a wide range of transactions including the 
registration or transfer of vehicles, registration of land title, 
application for business license, or other licenses such as fishing, 
logging, hunting, mining, industrial licenses, VAT registration, 
incorporation of new company or registration of patent or mark, 
clearing of goods through customs and contracts for supply of goods 
or services to public sector institutions. Given this wide ranging 
requirement for TIN, the low number of TIN registration can only be 
attributed to failure to enforce the requirement. 
On a completely different point, considering the broad requirement 
for a TIN, a real concern is the use to which the information fed 
against a taxpayer's TIN will be put when it is fully computerized and 
bar-coded. This concern arises from what was said earlier when 
discussing the right to privacy and confidentiality of information that 
it is quite easy for the tax information gathered or provided to the 
TRA to be shared between tax departments as well as with other 
government departments. 
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Chapter Five: The Tax Framework in Tanzania 
5.1 Introduction 
Building on the theme that tax laws ought to be designed to 
encourage voluntary tax compliance, this Chapter examines the tax 
framework in Tanzania. It analyses the Income Tax Act, the VAT Act 
and Customs Act. These three statutes regulate the payment of 
income tax, VAT and customs duties, which are the three major taxes 
in Tanzania. The objective is to examine the content and show how 
these laws are administered and to assess the extent to which 
provisions in these statutes encourage or discourage voluntary 
taxpayer compliance. The question sought to be answered is whether 
the content of the laws creates a conducive environment for voluntary 
taxpayer compliance. 
5.2 Income Taxation and Payment 
In Tanzania, income tax is levied under the Income Tax Act (ITA).441 
For residents it is an annual charge on total income on a world-wide 
basis.442 A resident taxpayer's total income from all sources world-
wide is computed for the year and SUbjected to income tax. Non-
residents are liable to income tax only on income derived from 
Tanzania. Income tax is mostly on a calendar year basis (January to 
December), but a taxpayer may seek approval to report income on a 
different year basis to coincide with the financial year of his/her 
business. 
There are three methods of paying income tax. Tax may be withheld 
at source ,443 or may be paid by the taxpayer in quarterly 
441The Income Tax Act No 11 of 2004. 
442Sections 4, 5, and 6 (ITA. Under section 20(2) it is possible to pay income tax on 
a basis other than the calendar year provided approval by the Commissioner for 
Domestic Revenue is obtained. 
443Section 81 of the Income Tax Act. 
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instalments,444 or may be paid at the end of the year after an 
assessment is issued by the TRA.44s 
Looking fairly at the scheme of the Income Tax Act, it appears that 
the legislature tried to strike a balance for competing considerations 
and addressed the varying positions of different taxpayers with regard 
to the manner of payment of tax and the timing for such payments. 
The three payment methods, namely, withholding tax arrangement, 
instalment payment and payment by assessment, all serve different 
objectives. 
Payment by withholding tax applies to three categories of income. 
Firstly, it applies to income from employment and is collected by 
employers through the pay as you earn (PAYE) arrangement.446 
Employers deduct and remit the tax to the TRA. The withholding tax 
arrangement also applies to income in the form of dividends, interest, 
natural resource pctY;:ments, rents, royalties and retirement payments. 
All persons making such payments are required to deduct income tax 
at the time of making the payment whether to a resident or a non-
resident.447 Finally, the withholding tax payment applies to payment 
of fees for technical services in mining operations and to payment of 
insurance premiums from Tanzania to a non-resident person.448 The 
obligation to withhold tax is on the resident person who makes a 
payment to which the withholding tax arrangement applies. 
The withholding tax arrangement is intended to maximise tax 
collection by trapping the tax at the source of payment, be it a salary, 
a dividend, a royalty, rent, or other. In collecting tax at source before 
the payment reaches the recipient, the possibility of tax evasion is 
minimised. There is also a psychological advantage to both the tax 
444Section 88 of the Income Tax Act. 
445Section 91 of the Income Tax Act. 
446Section 81 (1) of the Income Tax Act. 
447Section 82 (1) (a),(b) of the Income Tax Act. 
448Section 83 (1) (a), (b) of the Income Tax Act. 
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authority as well as the taxpayer. For the taxpayer, he/she does not 
suffer the agony of receiving money and then having to surrender it to 
the tax authority, which experience when in financial need can be 
quite disconcerting. For the tax authority there is a significant 
psychological advantage in avoiding the aggravation that comes with 
dealing directly with the taxpayer when demanding tax. 
There is also cost saving for the tax authority when the expenditure 
associated with collecting tax on salaries, rents, royalties, dividends 
and fees (i.e. the cost of the paperwork, the accounting, the record 
keeping and the bank payments) is all passed-on to third parties. 
There are complaints from entities upon which the duty to withhold 
tax is imposed that the cost of tax withholding ought not to be borne 
by them without allowing a tax deduction for the cost or some other 
form of compensation. The explanation that this is a civic duty or 
service to the nation is inadequate to answer this complaint. If the 
ITA was to provide a tax deduction for the withholding costs incurred 
by the third parties in withholding tax for the TRA, this would go a 
long way in bringing fairness to the system. 
Taxpayers who derive income from business, an investment, or from 
employment where the employer is not under the obligation to 
withhold tax, are required to pay income tax using the instalment 
payment arrangement.449 There are four quarterly instalments falling 
due on 31 st March, 30th June, 30th September and 31 st December. A 
taxpayer who pays income tax by instalment must work out an 
estimate of the income tax payable for the year of income during the 
first quarter of the year and make the four payments on the due 
dates.450 
449Section 88 (1) (a), (b) of the Income Tax: Act 2004. 
450Section 89 (1) (b) of the Income Tax Act 2004. 
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The payment of tax by instalment serves a dual purpose. It spreads 
the burden of payment thus easing the strain on cash flow. It also 
accelerates tax payment and evens the flow of tax revenue into 
government coffers. In addition, the instalment payment mechanism 
is intended to increase the trust levels between the tax authority and 
the taxpayers. It reinforces the trust in the authority by taxpayers, 
which is important in increasing the levels of voluntary taxpayer 
compliance. By allowing taxpayers to assess themselves and pay 
taxes accordingly this mechanism internalises a civic responsibility 
owed by every citizen to discharge tax obligations without being 
forced to do so by the state's coercive instruments. 
All taxpayers (who are not covered by the withholding tax 
arrangement) are required to file income tax returns with the 
Commissioner for Domestic Revenue not later than six months 
following the end of the income year.451 They include persons 
deriving income froIll, business or are self employed. The ITA provides 
for three types of assessments, namely; self assessments,452 best 
judgement assessments,453 and jeopardy assessments.454 However, 
all assessments are subject to adjustment if it transpires that the 
original assessment did not truly reflect the full extent of the 
taxpayer's tax position.455 Employees subject to the PAVE system do 
not have to file income tax returns unless in addition they have 
income from other sources. Where this is the case, the employee's 
total income including salaries is recomputed upon filing a return 
and tax assessed at the appropriate scale taking into account the 
total income. 
451Section 91 (1) Income Tax Act 2004. 
452Section 94 (1) (a) (b) Income Tax Act 2004. 
453Section 94 (4) Income Tax Act 2004. 
454Section 95 ITA. 
455Section 96 ITA. 
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A self assessment is one made by the taxpayer upon filing the income 
tax return. In essence it is the estimated amount of the tax payable 
for that year of income as shown in the taxpayer's return. 456 The 
assessment is taken to be made on the date of filing the income tax 
return and where no return is filed, the assessment is deemed to be 
made on the date the income tax return ought to have been filed. 457 
Even with self assessment income returns, the Commissioner for 
Domestic revenue is given power to examine the return for accuracy 
and make any necessary adjustment to taxable income as well as the 
tax payable on the adjusted income.458 
Where the Commissioner receives an income tax return which he has 
reason to believe is not a true reflection of the taxpayer's tax position, 
he may, to his best of his judgement, estimate an income amount 
which accurately reflects the tax position of the taxpayer and assess 
tax on it. Such assessments are referred to in the ITA as best 
judgment assessments, or simply, estimated assessments,459 because 
the Commissioner bases his assessment on an estimation of taxable 
income. 
Estimated or best jUdgment assessments are also made where a 
taxpayer has not filed an income tax return, but the Commissioner 
considers that such person has income chargeable to tax.460 
While tax payment is usually required following year end and only 
upon filing the tax return, it is possible for a jeopardy assessment to 
be made and payment to be required at any time. This may happen 
when a taxpayer has become bankrupt, or is wound up, or goes into 
liquidation, or is about to leave the country with an apparent 
intention not to return, or is about to cease doing business in 
456Section 94 (1) ITA 
457Section 94 (2) ITA 
458Section 96 ITA. 
459Section 94 (4) ITA. 
46oSection 94 (5) ITA. 
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Tanzania. In such scenarios the Commissioner for Domestic Revenue 
may require such person to file an income tax return at any such 
time and pay tax.461 If a return required is not filed, or the 
Commissioner has not required a return to be filed, the 
Commissioner may Issue a jeopardy assessment.462 A jeopardy 
assessment is a protective assessment and is issued to protect the 
revenue against the events which make it unlikely for the proper tax 
to be paid if the Commissioner waits for the normal due dates for 
payment of tax. However, any income tax paid on a jeopardy 
assessment is available as a tax credit against the tax payable on 
assessment made for the full year of income,463 if such taxpayer is 
still available for payment of tax. 
The power of the Commissioner to adjust the amount of tax on a 
return is predicated on reliability or otherwise of the tax return. 
Where a person files a tax return under self assessment provisions,464 
and the Commissiqper has reason, or information, showing that the 
return filed is unreliable, he may adjust the tax shown on the return. 
An assessment, following the adjustment of taxable income, is 
referred to by the ITA as an adjusted assessment.465 Under the ITA 
1973, they used to be known as amended or additional 
assessments466 and are still referred to as such under the Tax 
Revenue Appeals Act.467 
Where an assessment is actually made by the Commissioner for 
Domestic Revenue, he must issue a notice of assessment468 to the 
taxpayer notifying the taxpayer of the assessed tax and time limit for 
paying the tax assessed. Where the taxpayer does not agree with the 
461Section 91 (3) (d) ITA. 
462Section 95 (2) (a) and (b) ITA. 
463Section 95 (4) ITA. 
464Section 94 and 95 ITA. 
465Section 96 ITA. 
466Section 83 Income Tax Act 1973. 
467Section 13(1)(a) Tax Revenue Appeals Act, [CAP 408 R.E.2002]. 
468Section 97 ITA. 
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tax assessment made, hel she may file a notice of objection with the 
Commissioner469 within 30 days of being served with the notice of 
assessment. Upon the objection being made, the Commissioner IS 
required to either issue an Amended Assessment in the light of the 
objections raised, or amend the assessment in light of new 
information which was not before him at the time of making the 
assessment; or refuse to amend the assessment and thus confirm the 
original assessment. 
One can say that the income tax assessment and payment method is 
more of an enforcement measure, unlike the self-assessment which is 
clearly a voluntary tax payment mechanism. Payment following 
assessment involves examination of the taxpayer's accounts and 
other financial information. It is the final step in processing income 
tax returns. As shown above, the failure to submit an income tax 
return, or the failure to make truthful declarations in the income tax 
return, will not prevent tax officers from making an assessment on an 
estimated basis. 
As payment following assessment captures even those who have not 
filed tax returns, and those who have filed untruthful tax returns, 
this gives it an enforcement character rather than a voluntary 
compliance process. 
469Section 12(1) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act. 
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5.3 The Value Added Tax 
The value added tax (VAT) in Tanzania is levied under the authority of 
the Value Added Tax Act.47o It is an indirect tax levied on the supply 
of goods or services by a business which is registered for VAT. A 
taxable supply is a transaction made in the course of business or in 
the exercise of a profession or trade.471 Taxable supply in relation to 
goods472 includes: 
(i) the sale or delivery of taxable goods (including imports) 
to another person; 
(ii) the appropriation of taxable goods for personal use; 
(iii) the making of gifts or loans in the course of business; 
(iv) letting, hiring, or leasing of goods; and 
(v) barter trading or exchanges of goods. 
VAT in relation to the supply of services covers things such as: 
(i) the supply of professional or commercial services 
by accountants, engineers, architects, lawyers, 
secretaries, plumbers, builders, motor vehicle 
repairers, employment agencIes, advertising 
agencies, transport service operators and the like; 
(ii) registrations for intellectual property rights 
(patents, trademarks and copyrights); and 
(iii) any other supply which is not money or goods. 
The VAT also applies to the importation of goods or services.473 
47!Yfhe Value Added Tax Act [Cap 148J of the Laws of Tanzania (originally enacted as 
Value Added Tax Act No. 24 of 1997). 
47 1 Ibid. sections 4 and 5 of the VAT Act. 
472Ibid. sections 5 (1) (a) - (d). 
473Sections 4 and 5 of the VAT Act. 
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Sections 18 and 19 of the VAT Act as originally enacted in 1997 
required every person with a business whose annual turnover 
exceeded Tanzania shillings 20 million to register for VAT. By 2004 it 
had become obvious that this threshold was too low because many of 
those registered ended up in a credit position. In July 2005 the 
annual turnover threshold was raised to Tanzania shillings 40 
million. This change of threshold resulted in a 50% drop in VAT 
registrations. All persons registered for VAT must and file monthly 
VAT returns474 to the TRA reflecting all the transactions carried out 
during the previous month together with the VAT payable on each of 
those transactions. The standard VAT rate was reduced to 18% in 
July 2010. The rate has been 20% since VAT was introduced in 
1997. However, certain items liable to VAT are zero-rated.47s There 
are also categories of goods and services which are exempt from 
VAT. 476 Additionally, certain persons and organisations are also 
relieved from liability for VAT.477 
A VAT registered person is issued with a VAT registration certificate 
bearing his/her registration number. Upon being registered, every 
supply transaction by a VAT registered person must be evidenced by 
a tax invoice. Output VAT is accounted for on a monthly basis.478 
VAT collected during the previous month must be remitted to the 
Commissioner for VAT. Late lodgement of a VAT return carries a 1% 
penalty on the total VAT payable for that period.479 Any VAT or 
penalty remaining unpaid beyond the due date attracts interest at the 
commercial bank lending rate.480 
474Section 26 of the VAT Act. 
475Sections 8 and 9 read together with the First Schedule 
476Section 10 VAT Act read together with the Second Schedule 
477Section 11 VAT Act read together with the Third Schedule (Diplomats and 
diplomatic missions, bilateral and multilateral organizations, aid agencies, certain 
charitable organizations, religious and educational institutions, medical 
practitioners and veterinary personnel). 
478Section 26 VAT Act. 
479Section 27 VAT Act. 
48oSection 28 VAT Act. 
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5.4 Customs and Excise Duties 
Since July 2004, the importation and exportation of goods in 
Tanzania is governed by a harmonised customs tariff arrangement 
under the East Africa Community (EAC) Protocol on the EAC 
Customs Union481 which binds Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda. The 
EAC customs protocol creates a trading block with harmonised tariffs 
and common classification of goods. The protocol also provides for 
either free movement of goods between member states, or preferential 
customs tariffs compared to those used in respect of non-EAC 
countries. 
The payment of customs and excise duties in Tanzania is one area of 
taxation which has lengthy compliance requirements. These 
compliance requirements emanate mostly from departmental 
manuals and technical instructions used by customs officers. 482 
They are not listed in the customs statute. 
The customs department within the TRA is responsible for enforcing 
all compliance procedures associated with the movement of goods in 
and out of the country. Entry or exit has to be through authorized 
points and routes. Goods crossing the borders should pass through 
Customs clearance formalities. Clearing and forwarding processes 
involve the facilitation of other institutions such as clearing and 
forwarding agents, the Tanzania Ports Authority (TPA), a customs 
inspection company and other shipping agencies. 
In addition to the enforcement of compliance with customs 
requirements, the Customs Department does enforce other 
481Protocol on the Establishment of the East African Customs Union adopted on 2nd 
March 2004. Issued by the East Mrican Community Secretariat, Arusha, Tanzania. 
482J J Mbunda Customs and Excise Department: Practical Experience on 
Processing of Customs Data in Tanzania, presented as a Paper by the Tanzania 
Revenue Authority at a Workshop on the Compilation of International Merchandise 
Trade Statistics held in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 8-11 November 2004, under the 
auspices of the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Statistics Division. 
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government laws such as certification, verification and testing of 
quality or standard of imported goods, which are administered by 
other government institutions with respect to imports and exports. 
These institutions include; the Tanzania Food and Drugs Authority 
[TFDA], Tanzania Bureau of Standards (TBS) , Tanzania Radiation 
Commission, the Ministry of Agriculture (for importation of plants 
and animals) and the Tanzania Pestcides Research Institute (TPRI). 
Prior to 1st July 2004, goods entering the country were subjected to 
Pre-shipment Inspection (PI) in the country of export. However with 
effect from July 2004, Tanzania moved away from pre-shipment 
inspection and adopted Destination Inspection (DI). 
Under DI, all imports are inspected483 upon arrival in Tanzania by a 
government-contracted company called TISCAN.484 Inspection is 
either physical inspection, or X-ray scanning for Full Loaded 
Containers (FLC). All imports are also now risk-profiled. Each 
import is assigned a profile according to the perceived risk associated 
with it. Three profiles are in use. Low Risk (Green Channel) goods 
are often released without physical inspection. These are goods 
belonging to an importer who, as a business entity, has a good 
customs compliance history and the goods are themselves low risk 
(e.g. normal consumer items or machinery) and the clearance is being 
done using a reputable clearing agent. Medium Risk (yellow Channel) 
Full Container Load (FCL) goods are subjected to x-ray scanning. 
These are goods which fall short of low risk and are not high risk. 
High Risk (Red Channel) goods are subjected to physical inspection to 
verify compliance with importation restrictions. These are goods 
483The following imports are exempted from DI (commercial samples and goods 
returning after repair, supplies to diplomatic missions and international 
organizations, transit goods to other countries in the region, postal/ courier goods 
with a value less than USD 5,000, airlifted emergency supplies as are approved by 
the TRA, goods for use by educational institutions, charitable and religious 
organizations, and approved non-profit NGOs. 
484Tanzania Inspection Service Company which is a subsidiary of the COTECNA SA 
Group. 
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which are susceptible to contraband or contamination. They include; 
arms and munitions, edible products, drugs and medications. 
DI involves the following procedures -
Submission of an Import Declaration Form (IDF) to a bank and 
payment by the importer of 1.2% of the FOB value to a TRA 
bank account 
Review of the IDF by TISCAN and verification of the import 
information by a TISCAN affiliate in the country of origin of the 
goods. 
Classification and valuation of the goods on the basis of the 
Final Invoice and the freight/ shipping document. 
Price verification by a TISCAN affiliate overseas and indication 
of the appropriate tariff code(s) and the value for duty. 
Preparation .of a Clean Report of Findings (CRF) by TISCAN and 
submission by the importer of the Single Bill of Entry (SBE) 
along with the Provisional Classification and Valuation Report 
(PCVR), a copy of the IDF, original or certified true copies of the 
Final Invoice, Airway Bill/Bill of Lading and originals or 
certified true copies of supporting documents if the importer 
applies for a particular tax relief or duty exemption. 
Issuance by TISCAN of a Final Classification and Valuation 
Report (FCVR) together with the SBE signed by the importer 
followed by payment of the duty and other taxes (e.g. VAT on 
imports) at a TRA bank account. 
The TRA requires that the importer or the importer's customs clearing 
and forwarding agent is required to lodge the SBE attaching the 
following original documents; the bill of lading or airway bill; the 
commercial invoice; the Import Declaration Form (IDF); a permit in 
the case of restricted goods; a packing list; the Certificate of Origin 
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and any other certificates if they exist and if relevant to the clearance 
of the goods. The SBE is signed and stamped by an authorized 
customs officer. 
The documents are firstly subjected to a completeness check and if 
there is a required document missing, the SBE is rejected and 
returned to the importer or agent. If complete, the SBE is forwarded 
to the Data Input Section. At this stage no further documents are 
envisaged and the documentation process is deemed to be complete. 
All declarations are keyed into the computer through ASYCUDA. 
ASYCUDA is short form for "Automated System for Customs Data". 
This computer program is now used in most developing countries. In 
its initial form it was simply ASYCUDA, then it was upgraded to 
ASYCUDA+. The generation now in use in East Africa is ASYCUDA++ 
which has advanced on line features that enable clearing and 
forwarding agents to input shipping data on line. 
All Declarations have to pass through HDO electronically for risk 
profiling so that an appropriate risk category is assigned ('Low Risk', 
'Medium Risk' and 'High Risk). The combined implementation of 
CRMS and X-ray scanning allows the Customs Department to focus 
physical inspection on high risk shipments while creating a fast 
clearance channel for the majority of compliant importers. 
The valuation stage is one area of customs clearance procedure which 
generates many disputes. Valuation of goods for customs purposes 
involves two considerations which can impact significantly on the 
import duty to be paid by the importer. The first consideration is 
classification of the goods. Goods are rated according to 
classification. A wrong classification can result in higher or lower 
duties. Tanzania uses the Harmonised Commodity Descrption and 
Coding System (HS Code 1996) which falls under the Agreement on 
Customs Valuation adopted by WTO and GATT. Often though, 
zealous officers misclassify goods so that they fall into a higher duty 
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rate category. Even when the goods are properly classified, when 
they come to the second consideration which is determination of 
value, some controversy still arises. The EAC Customs Management 
Act485 in Tanzania requires that customs officers use the transaction 
value. This is the invoiced price paid for the goods. But customs 
officers are allowed to use an alternative value where the invoiced 
price is unreliable. In doing this, consideration must be given to the 
market value for identical or similar goods. Instead of performing the 
valuation process judiciously, there have been repeated cases of 
arbitrary uplifting of value to maximize customs duty collections.486 
5.5 Compliance with Taxes 
Tax authorities globally use a combination of voluntary tax payment 
and enforced tax collection in trying to ensure that every person pays 
tax. The prevalence of one type of method over the other is indicative 
of the dominant t<:pc collection strategy used in that country. In 
Tanzania there appears to be a dominance of enforced collection to 
realise tax. While there is repeated mention of voluntary tax payment 
in TRA working documents, TRA practice and the tax laws do not 
demonstrate that voluntary tax payment is a strategy of equal 
importance. 
In the following section, the tax collection measures used by the TRA 
are examined so as to ascertain whether these measures are in line 
with the overall objective of 'promoting voluntary compliance to the 
485Section 122 read together with the Fourth Schedule. This prOVISIon has 
reproduced section 108 of the East African Customs Transfer Management Act (Cap 
27) which applied to Tanzania until 2005 when the new EAC law was adopted. 
486A good example is the case of Samuel John Ezekiel v Commissioner General TRA 
Tax Appeal No. 11 of 2004 where the taxpayer successfully challenged the Customs 
Department over its action disputing the invoiced price and uplifting the value of an 
imported vehicle belonging to the taxpayer by nearly 100%. An appeal by the TRA 
was not successful (Commissioner General v Samuel John Ezekiel Tax Appeal No. 13 
of 2005). 
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highest degree possible' stipulated in the TRA Act and boldly 
proclaimed in the Taxpayers' Charter issued by the TRA. 
Of the three tax statutes examined here (income tax, VAT and 
customs), the Income Tax Act487 incorporates more voluntary tax 
payment provisions.488 As stated earlier, it requires all persons who 
derive or expect to derive income chargeable to tax either from 
business or from investment to make payment of tax in four quarterly 
instalments.489 The tax instalment payments must be made on the 
last day of March, June, September and December.49o Taxpayers 
required to pay tax by instalment must file a statement declaring the 
amount of income they expect to derive for the following year, at least 
three months prior to the end of the preceding year.491 The estimated 
amount they declare is the basis on which they pay the four 
instalments. 
Other tax statutes such as the Stamp Duty Act,492 the Land Act493 
and the Companies Act,494 also have' provisions for voluntary 
payment of tax. Under the Stamp Duty Act, no instrument for which 
stamp duty is chargeable can be registered, or used in evidence if no 
proof of payment of stamp duty is produced. Stamp duty must be 
paid at the time of the transaction. A similar provision exists in the 
Land Act which requires all taxes payable in a land transaction to be 
made at the time of the transaction or else the transfer of title, or 
assignment or mortgage will not be registered. Under the Companies 
Act too, no sale of shares or other change occurring in the company 
will be registered if the taxes payable have not been made. 
487Income Tax Act No 11 of 2004. 
488Sections 78 and 79. 
489Section 88(1). 
490Section 88(2). 
491Section 89 ITA 2004. 
492Stamp Duty Act 1972 (Cap 198). 
493The Land Act No 4 of 1997. 
494The Companies Act No. 12 of 2002. 
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In the discussion of the customs duty payment arrangements in use 
under the East Africa Community Customs Management Act,495 
several voluntary payment methods were outlined by which customs 
duty is paid in Tanzania. These include the pre-payment of 1.2% of 
expected duty through the bank on lodgement of import documents 
and the payment of duty following final classification and assessment 
where value for duty and tariff classification is not disputed. There is 
also the payment of a bond for duty in respect of goods imported into 
the country for a temporary period. 
In order to reinforce voluntary tax payment, the TRA uses both 
persuasion and punishment. The taxpayer education program is used 
by the TRA to persuade taxpayers to meet their tax obligations 
voluntarily. Radio and television broadcasts, seminars and 
workshops, are held all over the country trying to win the hearts and 
minds of taxpayers. 
In addition, the tax laws provide for a wide range of penalties for non-
compliance with the tax payment requirements described above. 
These will be discussed in the succeeding section. 
The withholding tax arrangement applying to a wide range of 
payments such as employment income,496 dividends, interest, rent, 
royalties,497 management/professional fees and/or technical fees, is 
an example of enforced tax payment. There is no requirement for the 
taxpayer to declare the payment; instead, a duty is cast on the person 
making the payment to deduct tax. Heavy penalties attend non-
compliance. 
495The EAC Customs Management Act No 1 of 2005. 
496Under section 81 ITA 2004 an employer must withhold and remit to the TRA the 
income tax on salaries, wages, allowances and other emoluments paid in 
connection with an employment. 
497Section 82 ITA 2004 (a company must withhold tax on dividends; banks and 
financial institutions must withhold tax on interest earned; a landlord must 
withhold tax on the rent received; and all persons making payments of royalties are 
subject to the withholding tax requirement). 
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The value added tax operates in nearly the same manner. It is not 
the buyer of goods or services who must declare and account for the 
VAT to the TRA; it is the supplier of goods or services who has that 
duty.498 
As pointed out earlier, the withholding tax payment mechanism is an 
effective tax collection arrangement not only in its ability to reduce 
tax evasion, but also in easing the taxpayer's psychological burden 
related to cash or direct payment which affects the pocket 
immediately. By capturing the tax before the payment gets to the 
recipient, the trauma of receiving a payment only to see a significant 
amount of it disappear in taxes is avoided and so is the aggravation 
associated with that trauma. 
5.6 Dealing with Non-payment of Tax 
Both voluntary tax payment and enforced tax payment are backed up 
by a number of measures which aim at ~nforcing compliance by the 
taxpayer. 
The powers of access to information already discussed and which are 
the basis on which tax audits and tax investigations are undertaken, 
seek to uncover non-compliance with tax. Whenever discovered, non-
compliance is dealt with by prosecuting the offenders, or imposing 
fiscal penalties for the tax breach. 
The Customs Management Act499 has the most sweepmg powers of 
prosecution. All offences alleged to have been committed may be 
prosecuted in subordinate courts regardless of the enormity of the 
offence or the monetary quantum involved. 500 In this regard, the 
498Value Added Tax Act No 148 of 1997 (sections 3, 5 and 17). 
499EAC Customs Management Act No 1 of 2005. 
500Section 220. Notably too, there is a wide range of offences provided under Part 
XVII of the Customs Management Act (Sections 193 to 217). They include offences 
against vessels and crafts used by customs officers, possession of uncustomed or 
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Customs Management Act overrides the civil procedural laws which 
allocate the jurisdiction of courts by setting tiered pecuniary limits 
and the nature of subject matter. The Customs Management Act also 
overrides normal rules of evidence in criminal matters which require 
proof beyond reasonable doubt by the accuser. Section 112 of the 
Evidence Act [Cap 6] provides that the burden of proof as to any 
particular fact lies on that person who alleges its existence. In terms 
of section 3 (2) of the Evidence Act, a fact is said to be proved in 
criminal matters when it is established beyond reasonable doubt that 
it exists. Admittedly, tax laws are not alone in setting a lower 
threshold for the standard of proof. Other examples in Tanzania 
include: sections 26 and 49 of the Drugs and Prevention of Illicit 
Traffic in Drugs Act 9/2002; section 30 of the Immigration Act; 
section 28 of the Pools and Lotteries Act; and section 34 of the Sugar 
Industry Act. For most customs offences, the standard of proof 
required is only a prima facie case.50l In cases involving smuggling or 
possession of smuggled goods, the burden of proof is shifted to the 
person accused. 502 There is a good case for arguing that, as customs 
offences are criminal offences, the procedure for prosecution ought to 
conform to criminal procedural laws. 
Criminal prosecutions are also provided for under the Income Tax 
Act, the Value Added Tax Act and the Stamp Duty Act and in the 
majority of cases the burden of proof is shifted to the accused, but 
the standard of proof is on a balance of probability. 503 
In nearly all the tax statutes too, the Commissioner for Domestic 
Revenue, Commissioner for Customs and the Commissioner for Large 
prohibited goods, interfering with customs seals or signs, conspiracy to commit 
offence, impersonation of officer, smuggling, uttering false documents and aiding 
and abetting the commission of an offence. 
501Sections 209 and 223 Customs Management Act. 
502Section 223 Customs Management Act. 
503For instance section 77 of the Stamp Duty Act relating to whether an instrument 
is subject to stamp duty, or that it is properly stamped, or that it was stamped at 
the time it was required to be stamped. 
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Taxpayers, have been given power to compound offences.504 This is a 
wide penal power which enables the Commissioners to seek and 
obtain admission of offence and proceed summarily to impose fiscal 
penalties which can be quite substantial. For instance, for interfering 
with a customs seal, or warning an offender against arrest, the fine is 
USD 2,500.505 The fine for offences relating to importation of 
prohibited, or uncustomed goods, is half the duty payable on those 
goods.506 Use of false documents, which is a commonplace offence, 
carnes a fine of USD 10,000.507 An order of the Commissioner 
compounding an offence is final and conclusive. It cannot be 
challenged in any court of law,508 and is also enforceable as if it were 
a court order. 
However, the powers which are most regularly used by the TRA are: 
the power to attach and sell assets, the ower to issue agency notices 
and attach bank accounts and the power to prosecute for tax 
breaches. The use of these powers has diverse impact on tax 
compliance attitudes and patterns. 
The power to attach a taxpayer's bank account(s) is widely used. The 
TRA can seize or freeze the bank account of any person to recover 
taxes claimed. All tax laws in Tanzania have provisions which 
empower the Commissioners to issue an Agency Notice declaring the 
manager of a bank holding an account for the taxpayer to be an agent 
of that taxpayer and compel the manager to pay over to the TRA the 
taxes claimed.509 A bank manager's failure to comply with an agency 
504See for instance Section 119(3) ITA and Section 49 VAT Act [CAP 148 R.E.2002]. 
505Section 195 and 197 EAC Customs Management Act 2005. The fiscal penalties 
under the Customs Management Act are expressed in US dollars because the Act 
applies to all three EAC countries. Although Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda are a 
customs union and common market, they are yet to adopt a common currency. 
506Section 200 EAC Customs Management Act 2004 
507Section 2003 EAC Customs Management Act 
5081t is doubtful if this exclusion removes the power of the High Courts to inquire 
into the validity of actions taken by the Commissioners, given the court's inherent 
power for judicial review. 
509For instance sections 117 and 118 of the ITA 2004, and section 32 of the VAT 
Act (Cap 148). 
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notice will result in prosecution and fine and make the bank directly 
liable for the taxes claimed. 
The power to attach and sell assets is also regularly used by the TRA 
to recover unpaid taxes. In doing this, the TRA can undertake to sell 
attached assets itself, or it can appoint any person to be a receiver 
and compel such receiver to sell the property or assets of the person 
against whom the unpaid tax is claimed. 
As said before, the TRA is required to administer taxes fairly. 
Therefore one needs to assess the fairness of the above compliance 
measures. However, it is not easy to measure the fairness of tax 
collection, or the general fairness In the exercise of tax powers, 
because fairness is largely a matter of perception. Tax commentators 
tend to look at certain elements which are essential in forming a 
perception of fairness. These include: transparency in the application 
of tax laws; consistency and impartiality in the decisions made or 
actions taken; allowing for sufficient taxpayer input in reaching tax 
decisions; respect for the right to challenge decisions or actions 
taken, both administratively and through external impartial bodies; 
and respect for the decisions of adjudication bodies. The presence of 
these elements in large measure denotes the existence of fairness in 
the tax administration. 
One way to ensure that there is transparency in the application of tax 
laws is for the government and the tax administration to ensure that 
everyone who ought to pay tax is paying tax. It has been said 
previously that one problem with the tax system in Tanzania is the 
narrow tax base. The 2003 DANIDA report,510 previously referred to, 
noted that Tanzania's tax base is very narrow with 28% of GDP being 
generated by non-market production and an estimated further 15% 
by the informal sector. This shows that taxes are collected from a very 
51ODANIDA, Project Document, Danish Support to Tanzania Revenue Authority, 
Phase II 2003/04-2007/08, Danida File:104.Tanzania.213, October 2003, at 7. 
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small section of society. Although the government is aware of this 
problem, there appears to be a reluctance, or lack of political will, to 
attack the rural sector seriously in order to bring rural farmers into 
the tax net. Additionally, not enough is being done to expand the 
taxpayer registration program to people deriving incomes from the 
informal sector. A narrow tax base results in selective taxation and 
undermines transparency in the application of tax laws. 
The small size of tax revenue and selective taxation is also caused by 
substantial tax exemptions allowed by the government. 
Maliyamkono511 says that for 2005/2006 tax exemptions amounted 
to 38.6% of total revenue. An earlier DANIDA report notes that in 
2001/02 exemptions from indirect taxes resulted in revenue losses 
estimated at approximately 250 billion Tanzania shillings (3.1% of 
GDP). A majority of these were exemptions on import duties 
amounting to 183 billion Tanzania shillings (2.2% of GDP). VAT 
exemptions amounted to 67 billion Tanza?ia shillings. The DANIDA 
report recommended that these exemptions be removed in order to 
broaden the tax base. 
The two taxpayer survey reports already referred to have showed that 
taxpayers do not think there is sufficient consistency and impartiality 
in the decisions made or actions taken by the TRA. Often too, the 
decisions or actions taken defy the common notion of justice. 
Coupled with a robotic application of tax laws even when it leads to 
absurd results, the verdict on consistency and impartiality is a 
negative one. Justice Marshall once said: 
"The jurist concerned with public confidence ill and 
acceptance of the judicial system might well consider that, 
however admirable its resolute adherence to the law as it was, 
a decision contrary to the public sense of justice as it IS, 
511 Op cit. at p20. 
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courts and for law itself."512 
The TRA ought to heed this warning. 
200 
In fairness to the TRA there is, visibly, respect for the right to 
challenge decisions or actions taken by the TRA. This is seen in the 
administrative arrangement put in place to enable taxpayers to 
complain to a superior officer against the actions of a tax officer. The 
respect for the right to challenge tax decisions is also visible in the 
TRA's respect for the tax objection and tax appeals procedures 
already discussed. 
The objection procedure being the first tier of tax dispute resolution 
aims to give the TRA an opportunity to review the assessment or 
action they have taken when disputed, before the dispute goes on 
appeal to an adjudicative body. However, as the TRA does not have a 
system which ensures that the objection is received and reviewed by 
someone other than the officer who first made the assessment, the 
benefit of the objection system is many times lost. There is an 
obvious bias and self interest which often prevents an objective 
review being undertaken by the tax officer who made the assessment 
or took the decision contested. Nonetheless, there are many 
instances where this first tier of objection/review has helped resolve 
tax disputes which would otherwise end up on appeal. 
There is a real impediment, though, to the success of the 
objection/review process because of the requirement that an 
objection will only be entertained upon payment of one third of the 
disputed tax. Section 12 (6) of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act513 
requires that a person who objects (disputes) to a tax assessment and 
wishes the assessment to be reviewed must first pay the amount of 
tax not in dispute or one third of the assessed tax if the whole tax is 
512Justice Marshall in Flood v Kuhn, 407 U. S. 258, 293 n.4 (1972). 
513Act No 15 of 2000. 
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disputed. The prepayment condition in section 12 (6) puts revenue 
efficiency ahead the taxpayer's right to appeal to judicial bodies. 
Section 12(6) flies in the face of accepted good governance principles 
such as observance of the rule of law and the age-old presumption of 
mnocence, because it condemns the taxpayer to a fiscal burden 
before the legal validity of that tax burden is established by an 
impartial body. The provision breaches this fundamental principle of 
rule of law and good governance which is stipulated in the 
Constitution of Tanzania under Article 13(6) (b). Similarly, the 
provision contradicts Article 13(6) (a) of the Constitution of Tanzania 
which provides for an unhindered right of appeal. Every person has 
this right regardless of any circumstances in which he finds 
himself/herself. While this provision in the Tax Revenue Appeals Act 
does not explicitly take away the right to dispute a tax assessment 
and even appeal against it, the condition precedent put in place for 
the exercise of the right of objection and appeal make it difficult for 
some taxpayers to exercise this fundamental right. 
Provisions which impose some pre-payment of disputed taxes have 
been justified on the reasoning that, while allowing for the right to 
dispute tax assessments, there is higher interest in ensuring that the 
flow of government revenue is not jeopardized by litigation. 
Additionally, it is argued that the risk must be reduced for the appeal 
process to be used to delay payment of taxes which are properly due. 
It is difficult to argue against the merits of both cases, but a balance 
needs to be struck in favour of protecting the right to contest a tax 
assessment. If need be, there must be a system in place which 
enables evaluation of pre-payment claims in every case. There must 
also be discretion built into the system to waive the pre-payment 
requirement in meritorious cases. 
Quite apart from the constitutionality or otherwise of provisions like 
the section 12 cited above, such provisions are likely to increase 
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resistance to taxation because they undermine the trust that must 
exist between the taxpayers and the tax administrators. Rather than 
build confidence, prepayment provisions which operate unfairly, or 
are used badly by tax officers, breed and nurture hostility towards 
the tax authority and the tax system. 
Notwithstanding, it is fair to acknowledge that the TRA maintains 
high regard for the decisions of the courts and the judicial tribunals 
charged with the responsibility of adjudication upon tax disputes. 
Another area of concern is tax refunds. Tax statutes provide for 
refunds of overpaid tax, or wrongly paid tax. This is in line with the 
principle that the subject should pay no more than the law requires 
them to do. 
The VAT area is where immense difficulties are being experienced 
with the processin~.tand payment of refunds. The VAT procedure in 
Tanzania is that input tax is deducted from output tax and any credit 
resulting is claimed as a cash refund by the VAT registered person. 514 
The VAT Act requires the TRA to refund VAT credits within 30 days of 
lodging the refund claim.515 When first introduced in 1997 the VAT 
refund procedure worked well. Within a short while the turn around 
period stretched to three months. As the years have gone by, it has 
become quite common for VAT refunds to remain unpaid for periods 
stretching to a year or two. 
The figures in Table 6 below presented by the TRA in September 2009 
at a Tax Forum meeting give a misleading impression of the delays 
experienced with VAT refunds. The percentages in the Table refer to 
the total VAT refund claims paid as against those received. They do 
not show the percentage of what has been paid against what is owing 
to taxpayers, i.e. the total VAT claim amounts still outstanding. In 
514Section 16 of the VAT Act. 
515Section 17 (2) of the VAT Act. 
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other words the percentages are not for the amount of money paid 
but rather for the number of claims paid. As there is a tendency for 
the TRA to sit on big claims such as those made by mining 
companies516 and big manufacturers, significant amounts of money 
have become tied up in delayed VAT and fuel levy refunds. For 
example, by June 2010, the TRA owed VAT refunds to Geita Gold 
Mine Ltd amounting 57 million USD; Africa Barrick Gold - 62.7 
million USD; Resolute Tanzania - 11.3 million and DTP Terrassement 
- 8.6 million USD. TRA also owed significant fuel levy refunds to these 
companies; Geita Gold Mine Ltd 48.4 million USD; Africa Barrick 
Gold - 65.2 million USD and Resolute Tanzania - 12.9 million USD. 
These unpaid refunds have become a source of aggravation in 
compliance with VAT and customs payments. 
Table 6: Percentage of VAT Refunds Made within 30 Days* 
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
" 
36% 80% 92% 62% 15% 63% 55% 
*Source: The TRA ModernlsatlOn Program SectlOn 
Fairness of the tax system also means that the tax rates used are fair. 
Taxpayer compliance is improved by the realisation that the tax laws 
are fair and equitable, easy to comply with and difficult to evade.517 
In Tanzania, these principles are not heeded. Many taxes are levied at 
rates which are higher than those prevailing in other countries within 
the region, to the extent that rather than improve compliance the 
high rates exacerbate tax resistance.518 It is a cry of many taxpayers 
that tax rates are too high thus making the paying of taxes too 
burdensome. 
516Source - the TRA VAT refunds section. 
5I7R K Gordon 'Law of Tax Administration and Procedure', in V Thuronyi (ed.) Tax 
Law Design and Drafting, Vol 1, IMF, Washington, 1996, at 17. 
518It is notable too that in Tanzania partnership firms cannot opt to be taxed as 
companies, as is the case in some countries, so as to avoid the application of the 
high personal rates to partnership income. 
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Comparing the tax rates in East Africa, Tanzania has higher rates for 
income tax and VAT. While Kenya and Uganda have 17% and 18% 
respectively for VAT, the VAT rate in Tanzania has been 20% 
(reduced to 18% only in July 2010 to comply with the requirement to 
harmonise taxes within the EAC framework). The corporate tax rate 
is 30% for both resident and non-resident companies which rate is 
higher than the 25% rate applying in Kenya and Uganda. Individual 
marginal rates are also quite high as they stand at about 30% for 
higher income earners. The 30% percent rate may be comparable to 
tax rates used in developed countries, but the wages in Tanzania are 
quite low. Therefore, the tax on individuals peaks at a much lower 
level in Tanzania than does in countries where wages are relatively 
high. The government appears to recognise the problem of high tax 
rates and is beginning to bring them down. In the 2007/08 budget 
the income tax rates were reduced by 3% for each income bracket,519 
and in 2010/ 11 'the thresholds for each income bracket were 
increased. 
The high tax rates act as a significant disincentive against voluntary 
taxpayer compliance. In fact high tax rates may encourage taxpayers 
to evade taxes. When the tax burden is perceived to be unfair, many 
find it justifiable to devise ways of evading the tax rather than 
comply with it. The only way to achieve higher tax collections and 
lower rates of tax is to widen the tax base. A wider tax base enables 
government to lower tax rates without affecting the ability of 
government to meet tax revenue targets. 
S19Budget Speech to Parliament by the Minister for Finance Zakhia Meghji on 14 
June 2007; see also Finance Act of 2007. 
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5.7 Conclusion 
Tax compliance is a vast and complex issue. Voluntary tax 
compliance is even more complex. There is no single approach to 
achieving voluntary tax compliance. Tax compliance requires multiple 
strategies. Since non compliance (tax resistance) has mUltiple causes 
and spans as well, different taxes and different taxpayers, an effective 
response must equally be multifaceted. 
The question to be asked is whether tax enforcement alone can 
provide an effective answer to the compliance paradigm? Quite apart 
from the cost element which is a significant limitation to enforcement, 
there are psychological factors against enforced tax compliance. For 
emerging economies like Tanzania, the more immediate problem is 
the limited capacity to undertake wide ranging enforcement that is 
effective. 
Witte and Woodbury520 present an economic model of compliance 
which indicates a negative relationship' between the probability of 
being caught and severity of punishment. An increase in either the 
probability or severity of punishment can alter the non-compliance 
from positive to negative, thereby deterring the "would be tax 
evaders". The correlation between increased enforcement and 
compliance appears to be stronger when the probability of 
punishment is increased than when the punishment is more 
severe521 . In either case, however, enforcement policies relying on 
punitive strategies with severe punishment do not always alleviate 
the problem of non-compliance and, at times, might even worsen the 
situation522. 
520A D Witte and D F Woodbury 'The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on 
Tax Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax' (1985) (1) 38 National 
Tax Journal, 1. 
521Ibid. 
522Ibid. 
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Cheng523 also suggests that enforced compliance increases where the 
detection risks are higher. 524 In terms of the punishment parameter, 
fines and other types of penalties also generally improve compliance. 
Some studies indicate, however, that when it comes to real life 
behaviour, small changes in penalties are easily overlooked and are 
unlikely to affect compliance.525 
However, Becker526 argues that despite the increased deterrent effect 
achieved through detection and punishment, the desire to keep tax 
administration costs low may lead policy makers to favour raising 
penalties over increasing costly detection in order to improve 
compliance.527 Also in the effort to maximize deterrence and raise the 
most revenue at minimal cost consideration may be given to extreme, 
but rare punishments. 
Braithwaite528 arrives at the inevitable conclusion that given the 
conflicting scenarios above, enforcement efforts which rely exclusively 
on punitive measures and the severity and probability of punishment 
are likely to be short sighted at best and counterproductive at worst. 
They are authoritarian attempts at shaping behaviour and they often 
lead to a never ending process as each piece of new legislation or 
amendment brings new opportunities for evasion. 529 
It seems, therefore, that there is a real case for recognIZIng the 
complimentality that must exist between cooperative strategies and 
enforcement strategies. The question as to which of these strategies 
best drives tax compliance largely remains moot. 
523Ibid. 
524E K Cheng 'Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating Behaviour' (2006) 100 
Northwestern University Law Review 655, at 659. 
525Ibid. 
526Ibid. 
527G S Becker 'Crime and Punishment: An Econometric Approach' (1968) 76 
Journal of Political Economy 169. 
528V Braithwaite 'Dancing with tax authorities: Motivational postures and non-
compliant actions', in V Braithwaite (ed) Taxing Democracy: Understanding Tax 
Avoidance and Evasion. Ashgate, Aldershot. 15-39. 
529Ibid. 
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In discussing governance and the legitimacy of government, it was 
observed that an important attribute of good governance is the ability 
of government to formulate policies, to deliver services and generally 
put in place a sound framework for economIC and social 
participation. This chapter examines the role of taxation policy and 
seeks to make the point that when the government is able to 
formulate sound tax policies, it is possible for the public to identify 
with the tax system and accept the various taxes levied by the 
government leading to higher tax compliance levels. 
6.2 Tax Policy 
It is easier to speak of what tax policy entails rather than to provide a 
definition of it. Tanzi and Zee530 state that tax policy involves both 
macroeconomic (the level and composition of tax revenue) and 
microeconomic (the design of specific taxes) considerations. It deals 
with determining the level of tax revenue appropriate to the spending 
requirements of the country. It also addresses the composition of 
revenue (taxation of income vs taxation of consumption). 
Tax policy formulation and the design of the tax structure seek to 
achieve the following main objectives: 
(i) to raise revenues to finance government operations and 
development activities; 
530 V Tanzi and H Zee Tax Policy for Developing Countries (March 2001) 
International Monetary Fund. 
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(ii) to stimulate economIC growth and employment 
generation; 
(iii) to encourage investment (and discourage consumption); 
(iv) to promote investments; 
(v) to protect domestic industries; 
(vi) to promote exports; 
(vii) to redistribute wealth; and 
(viii) to stabilise the economy and combat inflation 
It has been stressed in this study that taxation is the key source of 
government revenue. As a result the tax policies of many developing 
countries show that tax generation is central to the tax policy 
pursued. Tax administrations pride themselves in meeting and 
exceeding tax revenue collection targets. Tax administrations are 
also keen to increase the performance of taxation in funding the 
government budget, as well as increasing the ratio of taxation to GDP. 
At a Taxpayers' Day event in November 2007 (an annual event to 
commend and reward compliant taxpayers), the then Tanzania 
Minister for Finance, Zakhia Meghji spoke glowingly of the ability of 
the TRA to surpass repeatedly its revenue collection targets.531 
Tables 3a and 3a at page 135 above show that tax revenue collection 
statistics for the past six years from 2002 to 2009 have exceeded the 
tax revenue collection targets set by the Ministry of Finance (except 
for 2010 largely due to the global economic crisis). 
Figures for the period 2001 to 2007 published by the Bank of 
Tanzania confirm that tax collections have remained consistent with 
the government budget and have often surpassed projections. Table 
7 below shows total government revenue in relation to tax revenue 
and provides a breakdown of the performance of specific taxes. 
531Minister's speech at the Taxpayers' Day 20th November 2007 as reported in the 
'Daily News' and the 'Guardian' of 21 st November 2007. 
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Table 7: Tax Revenue Collection Performance for the Years 
2001/02 to 2006/07* 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2006/07 
to April 
Total 
Revenue 1,042 2,217 1,459 1,773 2,124 2,460 2,218 
Tax 
Revenue 939 1,105 1,342 1,615 1,946 2,269 2,046 
Customs 402 458 575 679 819 979 845 
VAT/ 
Excise 216 259 325 402 478 566 505 
Refunds 33 36 -48 -64 -69 -133 -88 
Income 
Taxes 220 276 366 465 581 657 604 
Other 
Taxes 100 111 123 132 136 198 179 
Non-tax 
Revenue 103 111 158 158 178 191 172 
*Source: Bank of Tanzama, Monetary Policy Statement, June 2007532 
** Values are in billion Tanzania shillings 
Another trend which is notable in the tax collection statistics of 
Tanzania (which is also the case for Kenya, Uganda, Zambia and 
Rwanda) is the dependence on indirect and consumption taxes. 
Custom duties and value added tax are bigger contributors than 
income tax. This is evidence of either a lack of productive activities to 
a sufficient degree, or a failure to efficiently enforce income tax 
collection in respect of income generating activities. A tax study 
carried out in Kenya concluded that the poor performance of direct 
taxes, which is mainly the income tax, results from the narrow tax 
base upon which income tax collections re1y.533 In the previous 
532Bank of Tanzania, Monetary Policy Statement, June 2007, 4l. 
533 H Waruhiu 'Taxing the People; An Economic and Public Policy Agenda for Kenya, 
AGENDA Publication Series, May 2001, at 6-7, internet source 
http://www.iea.or.ke/ourproblems.asp? This publication holds the view that 
reliance on indirect taxation has a sound philosophical basis because income adds 
to the national wealth and should not be overtaxed, whereas consumption reduces 
national income. Greater taxation on consumption will lead to greater retention of 
incomes and greater national savings and investment. This view is not shared by 
many, especially in developed economies where more reliance is placed on revenue 
from income tax because of the wide tax base created by favourable economic 
policies. 
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chapter it was shown how income generating activities in the 
agricultural and informal sectors are not captured for income tax 
purposes. This is true for Kenya as well. The failure to effectively 
capture the informal sector in the tax base undermines the 
performance of direct taxes. Governments desperate for revenue are 
forced to rely on indirect taxes. Table 8 below shows the extent to 
which import taxes and value added tax are major contributors to 
domestic tax revenue in Tanzania. The Table also shows that 
generally taxation in Tanzania is unable to fund government 
expenditure and that a significant budget deficit persists despite the 
good performance in tax collections. It is notable that the tax 
collection figures in Tables 7 and 8 taken from different sources 
within the government are not identical. However, the discrepancy is 
not significant and may be from failure by one source to capture all 
types of taxes, especially the fringe taxes. 
Table 8: Trends in Government Finance* 
2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006j07 
Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual Actual 
DOMESTIC REVENUE 1042945 1217517 1459303 1773710 1929625 2066752 
Tax Revenue 938478 1105746 1342798 1615248 1738209 1895967 
Import Duty and 
Excise Duty 266322 293695 352320 350532 180587 419260 
Value Added Tax (VAT) 351894 424338 548572 731597 834767 837912 
Imports 208675 249854 315958 439796 430891 496361 
Domestic 143219 174484 232614 291801 403876 341551 
Income Tax 219852 276050 366651 465455 657763 549074 
Other Taxes 100410 111663 123500 132040 198576 157555 
Refunds Accounts -48245 -64376 -133484 -67834 
Non-Tax Revenue 104467 111771 116505 158462 191416 170785 
TOTAL EXPENDITURE 1462767 1989538 2516943 3248352 4788497 4035114 
Recurrent Expenditure 1118156 148864 1780115 2017490 3054030 2649931 
Development 
Expenditure 344611 500897 736828 1230862 1734467 1385183 
Local Funds 50236 95662 133041 239651 641766 370038 
Foreign Funds 294375 405235 603787 991211 1092701 1015145 
DEFICIT/SURPLUS -419822 -772021 -1057640 -1474642 -888650 -1968362 
* Source: Ministry of Planmng, Economy and Empowerment, Annual Economic 
Survey 2007534 
** Values are in billion Tanzania shillings 
534Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, The Economic Survey 
2007,73. 
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Taxation is also used to stimulate economic growth and redistribute 
wealth. Despite the clear dominance of revenue generation as the 
driving objective for taxation in developing countries, promotion of 
economic growth and redistribution of wealth continue to form part of 
the fiscal policies of these countries. 
All Eastern Mrica countries have adopted tax policies aimed at 
promoting economic growth by encouraging foreign investment. 
There is recognition in these countries that the lack of domestic 
capital must be supplemented by foreign capital which will only flow 
in if there is a favourable investment climate. 
Tanzania has set the pace in creating what IS billed as a well-
balanced and competitive package of fiscal incentives535 In 
comparison with other African countries. In the mid-eighties, 
Tanzania abandoned twenty years of socialist economic policies and 
embraced open market reforms. After fifteen years of major political 
and economic reforms starting in 1986, bY,2000j2001 Tanzania was 
ranked the number one investment destination in benchmarking 
macro economic and investment climate success factors. 536 
Tanzania's fiscal policy incorporates fiscal measures for promotion of 
foreign investments, protection of local industries, encouragement of 
export trade and protection of the domestic market from dumping. 
These economic measures find the most expression in taxation in the 
form of tax incentives, although non-tax measures, such as the 
streamlining of compliance requirements for doing business, have an 
important effect too. 
535Bank of Tanzania Publication, Creating Optimal Conditions for Foreign 
Investment, Occasional Publication, December 2005, 14. Tanzania also 
secured top spot in Mrica's Improvement Index 2000, a ranking carried out by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. 
536The Mrica Competitiveness Report 2000/2001, Centre for International 
Development, Harvard University. The Report ranked Tanzania first followed 
by Morocco, Mozambique, Nigeria and Uganda. 
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The Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC)537 was formed as a one stop 
centre for promoting investments. It performs the following main 
functions: to create and maintain a positive private sector investment 
climate; to stimulate investments in the private sector; to attract 
foreign investments; and to provide assistance to all investors. TIC 
issues investment certificates to all approved investments. When 
issued with a Certificate of Incentives and Protection, the approved 
enterprise is entitled to enjoy tax and non-tax benefits provided 
under Part III of the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997. 
Taxation benefits given to holders of TIC certificates relate to income 
tax, customs and value added tax. For income tax, TIC certificate 
holders enjoy the following tax relief: a 100% capital allowance for 
expenditure on capital assets for the approved enterprise allowed at 
50% in the first year the machinery is put to use and 37.5% per 
annum for subsequent years; 5 year tax holiday on profits from the 
day the approved enterprise commences operations; and an indefinite 
carry forward of losses until they are exhausted. In respect of VAT 
approved enterprises enjoy deferment of VAT on start-up supplies 
until commencement of production and they also enjoy zero rating of 
VAT on manufactured exports. Regarding customs, certificate 
holders are entitled to: reduced import tariffs at 5% on project capital 
items for use i  priority underdeveloped areas538; zero rating for 
capital items for use in lead sectors (these are agriculture, road 
infrastructure, mining and investment in export processing zones); 
and import duty drawback for duty paid on imported raw materials 
used in the manufacture of goods. 
Apart from taxation relief, the TIC also offers several non-tax 
investment incentives. A company issued with a certificate of 
incentives is entitled to the following investment guarantees: 
537The Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) was established under the Tanzania 
Investment Act of 1997 [Tanzania Laws, Chapter 38] which replaced the 
National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act (NIPPA) of 1990. 
538The normal customs duty rate is 25%. 
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an unrestricted right to repatriate profits and dividends 
attributable to the investment; 
the right to make payments in respect of foreign loan servicing; 
the right to transfer funds for payment of royalties' fees and 
charges; 
the right to remit proceeds in the event of sale or liquidation of 
the investment; 
the right to remit payments of emoluments or other benefits to 
foreign personnel; 
protection against nationalisation or expropriation by the 
Government; and 
protection against being compelled by law to cede any interest 
in the capital to some other person. 
The TIC believes that Tanzania's fiscal policy offers a well-balanced 
and competitive package in comparison with other African countries 
and these fiscal measures are responsible for the recent significant 
growth of the Tanzania economy. The view' of the TIC is vindicated by 
the recent trend in Tanzania's GDP growth as shown in Chart 2. 
;; 
I 
Chart 1: Tanzania's GDP growth 1996 to 2006* 
Real GOP .Growth - At 1992 Constant Prices 
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* Source: The Economic Survey 2006, Ministry of Planning, Economy and 
Empowerment, June 2007 
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Tanzania's GDP growth figures for 2000 to 2007 are better than many 
countries in the SADC539 region, exceeded only by Angola, Botswana 
and Mozambique. Table 9 below shows the GDP growth figures for 
the SADC countries. 
Table 9: Percentage Growth of Real GDP for SADC Countries from 
2000 - 2007* 
Country 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Angola 3.6 5.2 15.5 3.4 11.7 20.6 19.5 19.8 
Botswana 7.3 9.1 1.6 9.5 3.4 9.2 -0.6 6.2 
DRC -6.9 -2.1 3.5 5.8 6.6 6.5 5.6 6.3 
Lesotho 1.3 3.2 3.5 3.3 3.2 4 7.2 5.1 
Madagascar NIA 6.0 -12.7 9.0 5.3 4.6 5.0 6.3 
Malawi 0.8 -4.1 2.1 3.9 5.1 2.3 8.2 7.9 
Mauritius 9.5 5.4 2.1 4.4 4.7 2.3 5.4 8.7 
'-;; 
Mozambique 1.9 13.1 8.2 7.9 7.5 6.2 8.5 7.3 
Namibia 3.5 2.4 2.5 3.7 4.4 4.8 4.1 4.8 
Seychelles 4.2 -2.2 1.3 -6.3 -2.0 1.2 4.5 5.0 
South Africa 4.2 2.7 3.7 3.0 4.5 4.9 5.4 5.1 
Swaziland 2.0 1.8 2.8 2.4 2.1 2.3 2.8 2.8 
Tanzania 4.9 5.7 6.2 5.7 6.7 6.8 6.7 7.1 
Zambia 4.0 5.0 3.3 4.0 5.0 5.1 6.2 5.7 
Zimbabwe -7.9 -2.8 -5.7 -8.3 -2.5 -4.0 -4.8 -5.7 
SADC 2.3 2.9 2.5 3.4 4.3 4.9 5.4 6.2 
Average 
*Source: Bank of Tanzania540 
539SADC (Southern African Development Community) is a trading block south of 
the equator and consists of 15 member countries. 
540Bank of Tanzania, Annual Report 2007/08, at 62 
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The GDP growth figures for Tanzania are supported by the data on 
growth of investment flows into Tanzania for the years 1996 to 2006 
as Chart 3 shows. 
Chart 3: Record of Investment inflows 1996 to 2006 
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TIC is also able to point to the significant growth of the mining sector 
as evidence that fiscal and non-fiscal incentives to investors are 
working in Tanzania. Tanzania is now said to be among the 
countries which host the most vibrant exploration and mining scene 
in Africa.541 Investments made in mineral development and 
exploration exceeded US$ 2.5 billion by 2006. Mining is the fastest 
growing sector in Tanzania542 in terms of its contribution to GDP and 
its share of export earnings. The value of mineral exports has 
increased from US$ 54.10 million in 1996 to over US$650 million in 
2004. In 2006 total mineral exports were US$ 823.9 million which 
was about 42.4% of Tanzania's total export earnings. 543 Tanzania is 
now Africa's third largest producer of gold behind South Africa and 
541Jnvestment Opportunities in Tanzania, TIC Publication, 2006, 6. 
542In 2006 the mining sector grew by 16.4% compared to 15.7% in 2005. The 
Economic Survey 2006, Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, June 
2007, 149. 
543In 2005 mineral exports were valued at US$ 711.3 million, The Economic Survey 
2006, op. cit., 149. 
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Ghana, with a production capacity of 50 metric tons of gold per 
annum from six mines. Geita gold mine, (owned by South Africa's 
Anglo Gold Ashanti) is the largest project with annual output of 
650,000 ounces. Other gold mines include Bulyanhulu Gold Mine 
owned by Canadian company Barrick Gold with annual output of 
400,000 ounces, Golden Pride mine owned by Resolute of Australia 
producing 240,000 ounces per annum. The remaining three gold 
mines (North Mara acquired by Barrick from Placerdome, Tulawaka 
also of Barrick and Meremeta mine being mined by a joint venture 
company involving the Chinese and a local company) are much 
smaller in size with a life span of around 10 years only. TIC believes 
that these mining developments have proceeded and appear to be 
succeeding largely because of Tanzania's favourable fiscal incentives. 
Even with these economic initiatives, balance of trade figures for 
Tanzania are still negative. To redress this, fiscal policies aimed at 
promoting exports have been put in place. The economy is 
responding to these measures as evident from improving balance of 
trade figures shown in Table 10 below. 
Table 10: Balance of Trade between Tanzania and Regional Economic Groupings* 
Region/Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
EU -254.0 -177.4 -31.3 -52.8 -52.8 -210.5 -176.7 -3.9 -77.8 
SADC -164.7 -182.5 -176.0 -200.6 -143.6 -233.7 -213.4 -64.0 -56.7 
EAC -75.5 -75.4 -58.3 -63.9 -57.1 -35.6 -42.3 64.0 -56.7 
* Source: Mlmstry of Planmng, Economy and Empowerment544 
** Values in million US $ 
544Ministry of Planning, Economy and Empowerment, The Economic Survey 2006, 
June 2007, 49. 
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6.3 The Dichotomy between Tax Policy and Tax 
Practice in Tanzania 
From the above analysis it is fair to state that all three objectives of 
taxation, namely; generation of revenue for government expenditure, 
stimulation of economic growth and redistribution of wealth, are 
incorporated into the tax policies of Tanzania. However, it is also fair 
to state that taxation measures which seek to stimulate economic 
growth and to redistribute wealth, have not been the driving force 
behind taxation policy. Research has shown that, both promoting 
economic growth and redistributing wealth, as objectives of taxation, 
tend to be overshadowed by the pursuit of revenue to fund 
government expenditure. As a result even where these two objectives 
are incorporated into fiscal policy, or written into the tax statutes (as 
is the case for tax reliefs and tax incentives), tax administrators tend 
to find ways not to give full effect to these q1?jectives. 
Glossy as the picture on tax incentives in Tanzania may appear on 
paper, the reality on the ground is different. The TRA pursuit for tax 
collections seems to sit uneasily with government effort to offer tax 
incentives for promoting economic growth in key sectors. Tax officers 
are reluctant to give full effect to the whole range of taxation 
incentives provided for in the tax statutes. The following examples 
demonstrate the extent of this uneasiness. 
Example 1: 
The TRA has been reluctant to let enterprises approved by the 
Tanzania Investment Centre (the TIC) enjoy the full benefit of the 5 
year tax holiday given to new enterprises in the initial years. When 
the Tanzania Cigarette Company (the TCq, formerly a public 
enterprise, was sold to R J Reynolds, the investor applied in respect 
of its capital investment in The TCC for the company to be accorded 
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the status of an approved enterprise. A certificate of incentives (No 
041575) was issued to the TCC on 17th May 1996 stating the project 
implementation period to be March 1996 to September 1997. The 
approved 5 year tax holiday period was to commence from October 
1997 to September 2002. 
Owing to some delay in the rehabilitation and expansion works at the 
TCC, an application was made to extend the implementation period 
and to put forward the commencement date for the tax holiday 
period. This was approved by the TIC which had succeeded the 
Investment Promotion Centre (the IPC). An amended certificate (No 
040050) was issued on 5th November 1997 showing the 
implementation period to be March 1996 to December 1997, with the 
tax holiday period running from January 1998. This certificate was 
promptly withdrawn because it failed to capture the implementation 
period and the tax holiday periods correctly. A fresh amended 
certificate (No 041575) was issued on 25th June 1998 stating the 
implementation period to be March 1996 to July 1998. The operative 
date stated on that certificate was August 1998, which meant that 
the tax holiday period also started from August 1998 to August 2003, 
but was stated as ending 10th September 2002. 
The TRA issued a corporation tax assessment for the years 2002 and 
2003 on the basis that the amendment to the TCC certificate was 
invalid and that the period of holiday ended September 2002. 
The TCC had to fight the assessment made and deal with the two 
issues raised by the TRA, namely, whether the amendment to the 
TCC certificate(s) embodying the new dates were validly made and 
whether, given that the tax holiday period provided under section 21 
of the National Investment (Promotion and Protection) Act of 1990 
(NIPPA) is five years, the TRA could be right in stating that the tax 
holiday period was from August 1998 to 10th September 2002. 
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Regarding the validity of the amended certificate, the TRA's position 
was that the amendment was made when the TIC had no statutory 
power to make the amendment. The TRA's stand was incorrect when 
one examines the sequence and effect of the changes that were made 
to the investments law. NIPPA was repealed and replaced by the 
Tanzania Investment Act of 1997. According to Government Notice 
No 691 of 1997, the new Act came into force on 10th September 1997 
and when it did, NIPPA lost its force of law. However, if one examines 
the objectives of the new investment Act, one notes that it aimed 
simply to-
"re-write afresh the legislation on investment in Tanzania in 
order to restructure the organization of the center for the 
purpose of ensuring efficient discharge of the functions of the 
center". 
The functions of the new Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) remained 
very much the same as the (IPC). 
While NIPPA itself ceased to be law, the validity of all certificates of 
approval issued under NIPPA was preserved by a transitional 
provision contained in section 31 of the Tanzania Investment Act. It 
reads: 
"31(1) Notwithstanding the repeal of the National Investment 
(Promotion and Protection) Act, 1990, on the coming into 
operation of this Act, a certificate of approval issued by the 
Investment Promotion Centre and which immediately before 
the commencement of this Act is still in force, shall on the 
commencement of this Act, continue to be valid on the terms 
and conditions on which it was issued, as if it were a 
certificate of incentives issued under this Act and shall be so 
valid -
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(a) until the expiration of the term under which its 
holder was entitled to enjoy any benefit, 
incentives or protection; or 
(b) up to five years from the date of commencement 
of this Act, if on the coming into operation of 
this Act, the holder has not utilized any benefit, 
incentive or protection. 
And on expiration of the period specified in paragraphs (a) and 
(b), the provisions of this Act shall commence to apply to the 
business of the enterprise." 
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Like all saving clauses, the objective of section 31(1) was to ensure 
that the change in the law of investments does not prejudice benefits 
given to existing holders of certificates of approval in order that the 
confidence of investors as to the stability of Tanzania's investment 
laws is maintained. Ordinarily, repealing Acts do not apply 
retrospectively unless expressly stated. Saving clauses, such as is 
contained in section 31 (1), seek not to undo what has been validly 
done under the repealed law. 
The TCC argued that one needs to examme the saving clause 
carefully to understand what is preserved. The pertinent words 
under section 31 (1) are the following "a certificate of approval issued 
by the Investment Promotion Centre ... and which is still in force ... (I) 
shall continue to be valid (2) on the terms and conditions on which it 
was issued (3) as if it were a certificate of incentives issued under 
this Act" (emphasis added). 
The TCC maintained that from the wording of the saving clause two 
distinct things are saved as far as existing certificates are concerned. 
Firstly, the validity of the existing certificates is saved and secondly, 
the terms and conditions on which the certificates were issued, are 
also saved. The other thing that the saving clause did is to carry the 
existing certificates from the repealed NIPPA into the new Act, thereby 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
221 
locking-in the prevIOUS regIme until the period of the certificate 
expIres. 
The other point for the Tee was that, under NIPPA there existed a 
power vested in the IPe to amend the certificates it issued. This was 
contained in section 16 and the circumstances under which an 
amendment would be required and allowed to be made, included the 
case where an approved business is transferred to another person, or 
where the name of the enterprise is changed, or where the investment 
period is extended, or such other appropriate reason. Therefore, 
where a need for amendment arose, the holder of a certificate under 
NIPPA was entitled to apply for and obtain the sort of amendment 
that was necessary in the new circumstances of the holder and so 
that the amendment enabled the holder of the certificate to enjoy the 
incentives granted. For the Tee, these were "the terms and 
conditions on which those existing certificates were issued" and if the 
validity of those certificates was preserved on the "same terms and 
conditions" it must have included "the right to seek and obtain 
amendment" to a certificate held (emphasis added). With this Tee 
view, the amendment of the Tee certificate, coming as it did after the 
repeal of NIPPA, was still valid because of the saving clause under 
section 31 (1). 
The TRA perspective on the repeal of NIPPA was untenable because if 
an enterprise holding a certificate issued under NIPPA were to change 
name or were to be transferred to another entity through a merger or 
an acquisition and taking the view that the power to effect a name 
change on the certificate was already lost as alleged by the TRA, the 
certificate would become valueless to the enterprise even though it 
has not expired and the holder would not be able to utilize the 
incentives given. This view completely defeats the whole purpose of 
the saving clause and is untenable. 
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As to the question of the proper dates for the Tee tax holiday period, 
the Tee contended that the certificate documents spoke for 
themselves. In terms of certificate No 041575 issued on 25th June 
1998, the implementation period is March 1996 to July 1998. The 
operative date is August 1998, but the tax holiday period is stated to 
be August 1998 to 10th September 2002. One would think that, as a 
matter of arithmetic, a five year period counting from August 1998 
runs to August 2003. To allege that it terminates in September 2002, 
makes the tax holiday less than the five-year period stipulated under 
NIPPA. 
The Tee argued that there can only be one reason why this date was 
inserted in the certificate. There must have been some reliance on 
section 31 ( 1 ) (b) of the new Act which restricted the tax holiday period 
to five years "from the date of commencement of this Act, if on the 
coming into operation of this Act, the holder has not utilized any 
benefit, incentives or protection" (emphasis added). As the new law 
came into force on 10th September 1997, five years from that date 
ended on 10th September 2002. That would explain why September 
2002 was used as the cut-off date when the Tee certificate was re-
issued. 
However, for one to invoke paragraph (b) and take the Tee out of the 
arithmetical five years, there is a critical statutory test to pass. If, at 
the time the new law came into force the Tee had not utilized any of 
the incentives granted under its certificate, the new cut off date 
would apply. The Tee produced proof that this was not the case. 
The Tee had already utilized the customs duty remissions and the 
sales tax exemptions in connection with the capital works 
undertaken at the Tee during the implementation period. 
It is possible for one to think that if the holder of a certificate had not 
utilized the tax holiday period when the new Act came into force, then 
paragraph (b) applies. This view would be wrong at law because 
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paragraph (b) is collective. It covers not only the tax holiday, but all 
"incentives, benefits or protection". In addition to customs and sales 
tax incentives utilized, the TCC would have utilized other benefits 
such as the foreign staff quota. Section 31(1) paragraph (b) cannot 
apply to the TCC. 
If paragraph (b) does not apply to the TCC, then the only other 
paragraph relevant to determining the TCC's tax holiday period is 
paragraph (a), which states that, the issued certificate shall be valid 
"until the expiration of the term under which its holder was entitled 
to enjoy any benefit, incentives or protection." Such term for the TCC 
is the full five years as from the operative date. 
Clearly, the attempt by the TRA to make a corporation tax claim 
within the TCC's tax holiday period was contrary to law and was 
driven only by a desire to collect tax. No regard was given to the 
fiscal policy that aims at assisting new and/ or expanded enterprises 
a period to recoup some of their capital investment before they are 
obliged to pay tax. 
Example 2: 
This second example shows how the TRA is too willing to curtail tax 
relief or advantages and to jump to new provisions if they are less 
favourable to taxpayers. 
When 60% of the shares of Tanzania Breweries Limited (the TBL) 
were sold to South African Breweries Corporation (SABC), the 
investor applied in respect of its capital investment in the TBL for an 
'approved enterprise' certificate. Certificate number 041195 was 
issued to the TBL by the IPC (predecessor to TIC), on the 17th 
September 2001. This certificate was in addition to certificate 
number 041196 which was issued on the same date as a joint 
certificate with the view of consolidating all the TBL branches in Dar 
es Salaam, Arusha, Moshi and Mwanza. The certificate was issued 
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under section 21 of NIPPA giving the TBL a five-year tax holiday from 
1996 to 2001. 
A tax dispute with the TRA emerged when the TRA attempted to apply 
section 16 (2) (w) of the Income Tax Act 1973 (enacted as an 
amendment in 1998) to deny the TBL the wear and tear deductions 
the TBL had claimed under the Second Schedule to the Act. The 
TBL's position was that, although NIPPA was repealed in 1997 the 
incentives to which the TBL was entitled as holder of a Certificate of 
Incentives issued under NIPPA survived in a way that a change in law 
cannot water them down or remove them. The TRA on the other 
hand took the view that NIPPA was no longer law and in any case 
section 16 (2) (w) being a more generous provision cannot be 
overridden by the saving clause which affects only provisions which 
are detrimental to the holder of a NIPPA Certificate. 
The TRA's position was that the introduction of section 16 (2) (w) by 
the Finance !.bct of 1999 brought something new whereby capital 
expenditure incurred is allowed in full in the year it is incurred 
inclusive of work in progress and that there is no provision of law 
which allows either the deferment of the expenditure or the granting 
of wear and tear on work in progress. However the TCC argued that 
the TRA was wrong in insisting it must apply section 16(2)(w) with 
respect to the capital deductions claimed by TBL. Section 16(2)(w) 
has a less favourable tax result in comparison to the tax result under 
the Second Schedule. Because of that, the provisions of section (20(2) 
of NIPPA come into play to prevent the watering down of benefits 
given to TBL under the certificate of incentives it held. 
Sections 20(2) of NIPPA provided: 
"(2) The benefits conferred upon an approved enterprise shall 
apply in relation to that enterprise notwithstanding the 
provisions of any other law save that where there is any 
change in any law, such that the benefits conferred under this 
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Act would be less favourable, the Minister shall adjust such 
benefits accordingly." 
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TBL was certainly right in saying section 16(2)(w) as introduced was 
less favourable than Schedule Two. Subsection 16(2)(w) provides that: 
"(w) where a person holding a certificate of incentives granted 
by Tanzania Investment Centre under the Tanzania 
Investment Act 1997, carries on business and has incurred 
expenditure in any year of income, there shall be made, in 
computing his gains or profits for that year of income, a 
deduction equal to the amount of that expenditure." 
The intention of this amendment to the Income Tax Act was to enable 
approved companies holding TIC certificates to make an outright 
deduction of all expenditure in that year of income. The effect is to 
prevent the carry-forward of losses from the initial years (when the 
enterprises is unlikely to be in a profit situation capable of fully 
absorbing the capital expenditure incurred). For this reason, section 
16(2) (w) was less favourable than Schedule Two. 
Subsequently the government thought it was desirable to expand the 
outright deduction provision to all companies instead of restricting 
the application of the subsection to holders of TIC certificates. 
Subsection 16(2) (w) was amended by the Finance Act 1999 to read 
as follows: 
"(w) without prejudice to the provisions of the Second 
Schedule where any corporation carries on business and has 
incurred expenditure in any year of income, there shall be 
made in computing his gains or profits for that year of income 
deduction equal to the amount of that expenditure. 
Provided that: 
(i) the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to 
capital expenditure on buildings. 
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(ii) For the purposes of ascertaining the total income of any 
corporation for any year of income no deduction shall 
be allowed in respect of any interest on any money 
borrowed and employed on the capital expenditure 
expensed in full under this subsection. 
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While the 1999 amendment expanded the application of section 16(2) 
(w) beyond holders of certificates of incentives, provIsos were 
introduced to limit and exclude its application to buildings and 
interest on capital loans. These further restrictions made section 
16(2) (w) more unfavourable. 
In addition, Finance Act 2002 removed sub-clause (ii) of section 16(2) 
(w) and replaced it with the following provision: 
"(ii) The provisions of this subsection shall apply to a 
corporation holding a certificate of incentives granted by the 
TIC not later than 30th June 2002." 
This small amendIl).ent may have been an afterthought. On the one 
hand, it stems from the saving clause in section 31(1) of the Tanzania 
Investment Act 1997. As noted above section 31 of TIA saved the 
validity of incentive certificates issued under NIPPA in terms of 
subsection (1) (a). But section 31 also enacted a sunset clause m 
subsection (1) (b) so that surviving incentive certificates in all cases 
would cease to apply by September 2002. The amendment in 2002 of 
section 16(2) (w) sought to bring the Income Tax Act in line with the 
sunset clause in the Tanzania Investment Act. So an attempt was 
being made through the amendment in 2002 to make section 16(2) 
(w) apply to holders of certificates of incentives. 
The fact that the TRA seized on these new provisions to deny 
expenditure deduction claims for TBL on industrial buildings and 
machinery in clear violation of the protections given to investment 
certificate holders, demonstrates how overbearing the drive for tax 
revenue has become. 
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One needs to look at the provisions of section 19(2) of the Tanzania 
Investment Act, 1997 which provided that for the purposes of 
creating a predictable investment climate, the benefits referred to 
under section 19(1) of the Tanzania Investment Act 1997 shall not be 
modified or amended to the detriment of such an investor. In essence 
therefore section 19 of TIA does the same thing that section 20 of 
NIPPA did. Their combined effect is to protect certificate holders 
against legislative changes which would otherwise water down the 
benefits given at the time of investing. In applying section 16(2)(w) 
against TBL instead of Schedule Two, the TRA was not acting in 
accordance with law. The tax assessment made in respect of 2001 
based on the erroneous view of the TRA was subsequently 
withdrawn. 545 
Example 3: 
A third example of the TRA's ambivalence with tax relief is 
demonstrated in TRA's tax dispute with QTP Terrassement, a French 
mining contracting company operating at the Geita gold mine. 
DTP Terrassement, recently won an appeal to the Tax Appeals 
Board546 against the TRA for the imposition of income tax of Tzs 
8,595,720,396 on the amount paid for the roll-over of assets back to 
Geita Gold Mine Ltd (GGM) upon the premature termination of its 
contract with GGM. The assessment was based on the contention 
that the sale value to be used in computing liability to corporation tax 
is the written down value calculated under section 144(1) (a) which 
assumes that wear and tear was available to the taxpayer. 
The taxpayer disputed this assessment on the ground that 
depreciation and wear and tear were not available to DTP by reason 
545Information supplied by law firm FK Law Chambers which was retained by the 
TBL for this case. 
546DTP v Commissioner General TRA, Appeal No.5 of 2006 decided in favour of DTP 
Terrassement by the Tax Revenue Appeals Board on 14th September 2007. The 
TRA has appealed this case. A decision by the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal is 
still pending. 
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of section 17(2) U) which when read together with section 33(3B) of 
ITA 1973 prevented DTP as a provider of technical services to a 
person carrying on mining operations from claiming the wear and 
tear deduction. DTP argued that the cost of DTP assets for which no 
depreciation was available must be the market value in terms of 
section 144(1) (b). DTP objected to the computation of asset value 
based on section 144(1) (a) as the TRA was intent on doing. DTP 
maintained that it was wrong to impute wear and tear values which 
had not been given to the assets being disposed of. The correct value 
to use was the economic cost/ market value, especially because the 
parties were un-related and were dealing at arms length [section 144 
(1) (b), (c) and (d)].547 
The second ground on which DTP protested the assessment was that 
the TRA had used the wrong tax rate of 30% as the DTP project at 
Geita was a single purpose project and the activities undertaken by 
the taxpayer were on.ly as provider of technical services to a person 
carrying on mining operations. The 30% tax rate applies to a 
taxpayer engaged in activity other than mining operations. The tax 
rate applicable to DTP as provider of technical services to a person 
carrying on mining operations is 3% and this had been the tax rate 
used by the TRA throughout the contract period. 
The TRA initially had wanted to apply the 5% rate brought in by the 
Income Tax Act 2004. But DTP argued that the fiscal stability clause 
in the Development Agreement with the Government (article 10) 
provides that the tax rate of 3% must continue to apply 
notwithstanding the change in the law. 
DTP also successfully argued that under the terms of the Agreement 
between Geita Gold Mine and DTP Terrassement, the roll over of 
547Ibid (submissions of legal counsel on pages 12, 13, 16 and 18 of the 
proceedings) . 
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assets to GGM was not a commercial transaction at profit. It was a 
simple transfer of mining equipment at residual book value. GGM 
needed to take-over the equipment so that it could move to an owner-
operated mine consistent with Schedule 5 paragraph 2.2 of the 
Agreement with DTP Terrassement. 
In this case DTP was able to prevent an attempt at enforcing the tax 
claim ofTzs 8,595,720,396 based on a view of the law which is driven 
more by the need to collect tax, rather than being driven by the 
justice of the case. 
Example 4: 
A fourth example relates to fuel levy exemption. The remission Order 
for road toll and fuel levy was promulgated on 1 st July 1999 under 
Government Notice No 99. It applied to holders of mining licenses 
who have signed a Mining Development Agreement (MDA) with the 
:. ; 
government of Tanzania and was intended to exempt mining 
companies which consume significant fuel in areas not serviced by 
power from the national grid. Fuel consumption in excess USD 
200,000 was exempted from fuel levy. There was a similar remission 
arrangement for excise duty on fuel under Government Notice 480 
effective from 1st July 2002. In both cases the tax relief would be lost 
if the relieved fuel was sold or transferred to a person not entitled to 
enjoy similar privileges. 
Fully aware that industry practice in the mining sector is to use 
contractors and subcontractors to carry out mining activities for the 
mine owner, the TRA rejected remission claims where the fuel was 
used by a contractor notwithstanding that the contractor carried out 
mining activities exclusively for the mining license holder and had no 
other activities to which the contractor could have diverted the 
exempt fuel. 
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TRA also imposed compliance and stationery requirements which are 
impossible to comply with, well outside the compliance requirements 
prescribed by the Government Notices referred above. TRA also 
claimed the existence of a time-bar of 12 months not present in the 
statutory instruments which govern the tax reliefs. As a result, by 
June 2010 mining companies have accumulated substantial unpaid 
fuel levy refunds amounting in the case of Geita Gold Mine Ltd to 
48.4 million USD, Mrica Barrick Gold - 65.2 million USD and 
Resolute Tanzania - 12.9 million USD. 
Faced with continuing TRA reluctance/refusal to pay, Resolute has 
issued notice of international arbitration against the government of 
Tanzania protesting the breach of law and breach of the MDA. 
Barrick and Geita Gold are contemplating similar action. 
6.4 The Caus~ of Conflict between Policy and 
Practice 
The reluctance of the tax administration to apply tax prOVlSIOns 
which result in foregoing tax revenue is, at least on face of it, 
reflective of a desire to collect more tax and meet or exceed revenue 
targets. The TRA sees tax reliefs as a loss of revenue and does not 
see the wider economic benefits which are the reason for the tax 
incentives. On this TRA seems quite short sighted as some loss of 
revenue today will lead to more tax revenue tomorrow, and the 
economic growth arising from tax incentives brings other benefits 
such as increased employment. 
However, TRA's apprehension against tax exemptions is not entirely 
without reason. In Tanzania, it is currently estimated that tax 
exemptions add up to 22.8% of the total tax revenue. This translates 
to about Tzs 560 billion of tax revenue which was foregone for the 
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year 2006/2007.548 Figures from the TRA show that in relation to 
customs the cost of exemptions has gone down in recent years 
compared to 1997/98 when exemptions were 82% of the total 
customs duties collected during that year. Although the scale of 
exemptions appears to have fallen to around 23% for 2002/2003, 
even at this level the TRA believes the cost to revenue is still too high. 
The TRA's ambivalence with tax exemptions stems from a belief that 
tax exemptions are mostly abused, despite the good intentions in 
having them. 549 For instance the TRA says the customs duty relief on 
imports given to mining companies are used by these companies to 
import large quantities of goods which have very little to do with 
mining activities. Mining companies are also accused of passing on 
to third parties (contractors) their VAT relief on supplies of goods. 
As a result, one of the objectives which the TRA has given pnme 
importance to in the Third Corporate Plan launched in 2008, is the 
need to streamline and reduce the extent of tax reliefs. 
In the last three years, public opinion in Tanzania has shown signs of 
clear opposition to government policy on tax exemptions, especially 
for the mining sector. In August 2007, a Member of Parliament for 
Kigoma North, Mr. Zitto Kabwe, was suspended from Parliament for 
three months for what was alleged by the Speaker to be unfounded 
criticism of the minister responsible for mining. His suspension was 
roundly criticized by the media and the public held rallies and 
marches on the street to support Zitto. His suspension was seen by 
the public and the media as an attempt by the government to muzzle 
comment on the 'plundering of our mining resources being carried on 
by foreign mining companies'. Zitto Kabwe became an overnight 
548Editorial, The Citizen Newspaper, Thursday, March 22,2007, page 8. 
549Ibid. 
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celebrity550 applauded by many and invited to be lead speaker at 
various forums and radio and television talk shows. 
Such has been the persistence of public criticism that the President 
had to form a Special Mining Committee to review all the Mining 
Development Agreements, the mmmg laws and the taxation 
provisions which erode the ability of the country to realize a fair 
return from its mineral resources. The Bomani Report from this 
inquiry made wide ranging recommendation aimed to improve the 
government's benefits from mines. 
6.5 Tax Policy and Fairness of Taxation 
Responsible tax policy formulation requires that tax policies be 
rational and have wider benefits in mind. Any suggestion of 
arbitrariness or favouritism in the tax policy and in the taxation 
system undermines~ public confidence in government and generates 
resistance to the taxes imposed by government. On the contrary, 
where there is public confidence in the fairness of taxation, the 
cooperation between the tax administration and the taxpayers is 
enhanced and with heightened confidence, the level of voluntary tax 
compliance also rises. 
The point has been made throughout this study that taxes must be 
fairly imposed and the public must see that fairness exhibited both in 
the content of the tax laws and in the administration of the tax laws. 
The two taxpayer surveys discussed in Chapter two indicate that 
there is now a widely held feeling among taxpayers in Tanzania that 
the tax exemptions which are contained in the tax system are ad hoc, 
550Zitto Kabwe's suspension was announced on 14th August 2007 on the floor of 
Parliament, Hansard of 14/8/2007; and reported on the front pages of the 
Guardian of 15/8/2007, Majira and Nipashe of 15/8/2007 (both Swahili dailies). 
The media criticism, street marches and protests, lasted for a month following the 
suspension. 
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too numerous and widely abused. Public opmIOn equates tax 
exemptions with tax injustice. The argument made is that many 
exemptions are provided without justification and those which are 
justified are not effectively monitored. In consequence, there is 
believed to be wide abuse of tax exemptions. 
The tax-paying public in Tanzania also has issues with the 
distribution of the tax burden. The burden of taxation is not cast 
wide enough, such that those paying tax feel unfairly singled out. 
This widespread public dissatisfaction with taxation belies the official 
accolades coming from government officials (TIC and Treasury) which, 
it has been shown, describe the fiscal policies of Tanzania and its 
taxation system, as well-balanced and effective. 
These contradictory perspectives of the government and the public 
underline a basic problem of understanding and perception. The 
point was made in chapter one (pages 14-15) that the assumption 
that tax laws (and policies) are understood) is not borne out given the 
-~ "; 
survey findings examined. The public is largely excluded from 
participation in the formulation of tax policy. There is also no wider 
involvement in discussing taxation Bills before they are passed into 
law. A lot of secrecy characterises the tax legislative process. 
On the other hand, there are insufficient guarantees against unfair 
taxation of the public. There is no provision in the Constitution of 
the United Republic of Tanzania sufficiently constraining the powers 
of taxation. The only provision existing is Article 138 (1). But, Article 
138 (1) declares simply that "no tax of any kind shall be imposed save 
in accordance with a law enacted by Parliament or pursuant to a 
procedure lawfully prescribed and having a force of law by virtue of a 
law enacted by a Parliament". This provision addresses itself only to 
the manner of bringing a tax into existence, it does not deal with the 
content of the tax, or the involvement of the public in its introduction. 
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The taxing power granted to the Parliament without any real restraint 
has enabled Parliament to cede to the Finance Minister wide 
discretionary powers for either giving tax exemptions, or withdrawing 
them. 551 The only condition imposed on the exercise of this discretion 
is a procedural one. The Minister must gazette any exemption, 
amendment, variation, or replacement of exemption made.552 
It has been suggested by Holmes553 that the most reliable restraint 
against possible abuse of the power to tax is the inclusion of 
restraining provisions in a constitutional clause which stipulates the 
nature of taxes to be imposed and the procedure of taxation.554 It is 
argued that this mechanism has the ability to restrain not only the 
taxing authority but even the legislature of the day, as no amendment 
can be easily made to such a clause.555 As a result some scholars 
propose that the best policy option is to make the powers of taxation 
a constitutional issue so that it gets the mandate of the majority in 
the state, thus building consensus.556 
Where taxation is a constitutional issue, the taxpayers participate 
directly in determining how they want to be taxed. The degree of 
discretion, both for the framers of tax policy and for the tax authority, 
is diminished. Taxpayer-participation in the formulation of tax policy, 
in the making of tax laws and in the administration of the tax system, 
makes them part and parcel of the taxation process. It destroys the 
justification for resisting taxation, because it creates understanding 
and acceptance of taxation. 
Looking at Tanzania, the extent of public participation in tax 
formulation is severely limited. The only forum for public input into 
tax policy and tax administration issues is the Stakeholders Tax 
551See for example section 10 ITA 2004 and section 9 and Schedule I of VAT Act 
1997. 
552Section 10 (1) (a). 
553J Holmes 'The Taxing Power' (1986) 134 Arizona Law Review 32. 
5541bid.37. 
5551bid. 
556B G Peters The Politics of Taxation: A Comparative Study, Blackwell, 1991, at 67. 
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Forum. The Tax Forum was conceived by the TRA principally to 
collect views from stakeholders and then use those views In 
formulating the TRA's advice to the Minister for Finance on matters of 
tax policy and tax administration. The Tax Forum is made up of wide 
representation drawing together professional bodies such as the 
association for accountants and auditors, the bar association, the 
medical association, the engineers and contractors association, the 
chamber of commerce, the chamber of mines, the chamber of 
industries, the oil dealers association and the shipping association. 
The Forum is chaired by the Commissioner General of the TRA and 
its secretariat is headed by the Director for Taxpayer Education of the 
TRA. All the revenue commissioners for VAT, Customs and Domestic 
Revenue attend in their official capacity. 
The Forum largely serves the purpose of deliberating on taxation 
proposals from various sectors, thus insulating the TRA from 
succumbing to individual lobbies and pre~sure groups. It meets once 
,~ ; 
every three months. 
The Forum is fairly limited in its ability to influence tax changes in 
Tanzania. It cannot engage the Minister directly as all its proposals 
are screened by and must rely on the support of the TRA. 
A more powerful body in terms of influencing taxation policy is the 
Task Force on Tax Reform. This has no public participation. It is 
made up exclusively of representatives from government departments 
(the Treasury, the TRA, the Bank of Tanzania and the Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Empowerment). Anyone wishing to make a 
representation before this group must file an application. The 
application is evaluated on merit before a hearing is allowed. At every 
session, verbal and visual representations are limited to a maximum 
of an hour, followed by a question and answer session. No decision is 
made on the spot. Deliberations are carried out in camera following 
the presentations. Applicants are informed only of the rejection or 
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acceptance of their submission. There is no requirement to give 
reasons for acceptance or rejection of a taxation proposal. 
Apart from these two forums, the only other way for the public to 
participate in tax policy formulation is through the suggestion boxes 
used by the TRA. These are largely ignored by both the public and 
the TRA and in any case the bulk of items that find their way to 
suggestion boxes are nuisance complaints against tax officers. 
Contributions from the public through media publications or radio 
talk shows are also largely ineffective. 
This scenario underlines the lack of inclusiveness in tax policy 
formulation. The public is largely left out such that it is difficult to 
speak of taxpayers owning the tax system and identifying with its 
objectives. 
It has been argued by Rakner and Gloppen557 that while taxation 
issues rank high on the agenda of political parties, parliaments and 
-t,.:; 
governments of developed countries, taxation issues are far less 
prominent public issues in developing countries. It is said that 
taxpayers in developing countries rarely mobilise politically. Two 
reasons are put forward for this political state. The first is that in 
developing countries only a small number of people form the tax 
base, especially for direct taxes. The second reason is that there is 
not enough direct taxation, as governments in developing countries 
tend to rely mostly on indirect taxes. 558 This view could be 
overstated. The revolt which occurred in Uganda against the 
introduction of the value added tax in 1996 is one example that 
shows taxation is an equally emotive issue in Africa. A more recent 
example in Tanzania is the way the opposition parties were able to 
mobilize the public to hold rallies and public marches between 
October and November 2007 which forced the Tanzania government 
557L Rakner and S Gloppen (2002) ''Tax Reform and Democratic Accountability in 
Sub-Saharan Africa' internet source http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr/cfs/activities/rakner-
gloppen. pdf 
558 Ibid. at 7 
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to form a Commission to reVIew tax conceSSIOns gIven to mInmg 
companies. 
The substantive and procedural aspects of tax equity, tax fairness, 
and justice of taxation have been examined. Both chapters 1 and 3 
made the point that the governmentsl power to tax is legitimised by 
both the rationality of the objectives of taxation and the equitable 
imposition and collection of taxes. Where the government has played 
its role as an investor and has provided the public services in the 
form of security, education, health and welfare, its claim to taxation 
is legitimised. In the absence of these benefits the government will 
find itself, at least in public perception, in a position similar to a 
street robber whose claim over stolen property is based only on 
might. 
The justice of taxation in this regard refers to the way the government 
legitimises its claim to taxation. Trust is an important factor; when 
taxpayers have trust in their government t~ compliance is bolstered. 
A government which does not command the trust of the public will 
need to rely on tax enforcement, as many taxpayers will rightly 
question the legitimacy of the government to tax them. 
Institutional accountability is also a factor, for both the government 
and its institutions (e.g. the TRA). They must show that they are 
accountable to the people. Accountability to the public plays a key 
role in influencing taxpayers to be tax compliant. A government 
which is not accountable to its people is alienated from them and has 
no right to expect cooperation. Taxpayers want the assurance that 
their taxes will serve the purposes they are intended to serve and 
those purposes must resonate with public expectation over the use of 
taxpayer money. 
Fairness, trust and accountability form the core part of substantive 
justice. They are indicators of the government's attempt to justify its 
right over taxes in society. They give the government of the day the 
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legitimacy to demand tax payment from society. A government which 
fails to meet these conditions loses the justification to levy taxes. In 
the absence of public acceptance, such government will resort to 
enforcement to realize taxation. It has no right to expect voluntary tax 
payment. 
The other factor promoting equity in taxation is procedural justice. 
This is embodied in the principle of fair play between the taxpayers 
and the tax authority. It requires that the tax administration 
observes the due process of law. An adherence to the due process of 
law enables the tax administration to gain acceptance with taxpayers. 
Procedural justice requires that the tax authority should not be 
allowed an unfair advantage in its dealings with taxpayers. SS9 This is 
reflected in a number of administrative requirements. One of these is 
the requirement that the tax authority must notify the taxpayer of 
any action the authority proposes to take against the taxpayer in 
connection with taxes. The other is that during the dispute 
resolution process, the taxpayer and the tax authority must be 
afforded equal treatment. The third requirement is consistency in 
decision making. The tax authority must be bound to the positions 
it has taken in respect of the taxpayer unless those positions are 
adjudged incorrect by a judicial body.s6o The tax authority must also 
make the same decision in respect of taxpayers who are in the same 
tax position. This creates desirable predictability in taxation. In all 
its decisions, the tax administration must observe the principles of 
justice. S61 
It is appropriate to refer to an incident where the courts in Tanzania 
found fault with the manner of exercise of power rendering a taxpayer 
taxable in disregard of a lawful exemption given to them. This relates 
559V Thuronyi (ed) Tax Law Design and Drafting, Kluwer Law International, 
Netherlands, Vol 1, 2000, at 7. 
56°Ibid. 
561Such as the presumption of innocence, the right to be heard, the right of appeal, 
the duty to give reasons for a decision, and others. 
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to the case of Karibu Textile Mills Limited v The Minister for Finance 
and the Honorouble Attorney General,562 where the taxpayer had to 
seek orders of certiorari to quash the decision of the Minister for 
Finance purporting to revoke the tax concession which the Minister 
had granted to the taxpayers by Government Notice No. 162 of 2005. 
The taxpayer challenged the decision of the Minister as unreasonable, 
unfair, illegally made with improper motives and in disregard of the 
principles of natural justice. 
The Finance Minister revoked the concession which he had granted 
pursuant to the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding with 
the taxpayers, followed by the publication of the Government Notice. 
The Minister revoked the said concession by a mere letter without 
giving any prior notice to the taxpayers, after the taxpayer had 
incurred substantial costs amounting to more that Tzs 15 billion, in 
reliance on the Memorandum of Understanding. 
The High Court agreed with the taxpayeI;s that the decision of the 
Minister was wrong in principle. The High Court reiterated the need 
for the state agencies to act judicially in these words: 
«An administrative body exercising functions that Impmge 
directly on any legally recognised interest has the duty to act 
judicially in accordance with the rules of natural justice ... the 
party adversely affected ... has the right to be given a 
reasonable and fair deal"563 
The Court also agreed with the taxpayers that the decision of the 
Minister having been reached without due regard for the fundamental 
procedure was a nullity and could not stand.564 The Court further 
observed that the decision was unfair because it was reached without 
considering that the Applicant had incurred substantial costs to 
implement the conditions of the Memorandum of Understanding 
562Misc. Commercial Case No. 43 of 2005. 
563 Ibid. at 17. 
564Ibid. at 19. 
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which led to the grant of the tax concessions. It held that the decision 
was made in error of law, because the decision to revoke the 
concession was made by a mere letter; it ought to have been gazetted 
in the same way as the granting was made by way of a Government 
Notice. On these grounds, the High Court quashed the decision of the 
Minister. 
The idea that there is a relationship between the perceived injustice 
of certain laws and a diminished general compliance with those laws 
is aptly documented. The possibility that law breaking can flow from 
perceived injustice is assumed on the ground that individuals have 
different reasons and motives for both compliance and non 
compliance with the laws. This applies to taxation laws as well. 
The diminished respect for the legal system that follows can cause 
resistance where previously there was law abiding behaviour.565 
Others have noted that the power of law can backfire when a law 
inadvertently generates disrespect. 566 Kahan567 has observed that a 
well publicized government crackdown on tax cheating can implicitly 
send the message that everyone cheats, thereby generating more 
cheating than would occur without the crackdown. 
In a scathing article against brutalism in law, Arthur568 argues that 
when a law is perceived as failing to accurately reflect popular 
notions of justice, then citizens will be less likely to view the law as a 
moral standard that should guide their behaviour. Consequently the 
public will view that law as not commanding their deference. 
Robinson and Darley argue that when the criminal law gains a 
reputation for assigning liability and punishment in ways that 
565J Nadler 'Flouting the Law' (2005) 83 Texas Law Review, 1399, at 140l. 
566H R McAdams 'The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms' (1997) 96 
Michigan Law Review 338 at 355 
567D M Kahan 'Trust, Collective Action and Law' (2001) 81 Boston University Law 
Review, 333 at 342. 
568R Arthur 'The Place of Norms in Tax Compliance' (1997) 56 Tax Review 216, at 
218. 
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correspond to the intuition of the community as a whole, it is more 
likely to be viewed as morally authoritative. 569 As a result people are 
more likely to defer to the commands arising from such law. 
Robinson and Darley add that most people obey the law, not so much 
because they are deterred by the possibility of being caught and 
punished, but because they either fear disapproval from their peer 
group, or they want to do the morally correct thing or both of them.57o 
Criminal law theorists who support the notion that liability and 
punishment track commonsense justice, are joined by others who are 
concerned with the fairness of specific laws. They cite a report of the 
commission of police officers, academics and politicians appointed to 
study Britain's drug problem which concludes that Britain's tough 
marijuana laws produce more harm than they prevent. 571 
A renowned jurist said that perceived injustice and the ill-feeling it 
causes have serious repercussions on compliance with law. He wrote: 
"If a person sees unfairness or illegitim~cy or unworthiness of 
trust in one instance, how far does his disillusionment 
extend? How much of his attitude spills over into his actual 
behaviour? The hypocrisy and unfairness of Prohibition, it is 
said, brought the whole legal system into disrepute. Legal 
scholars claim that marijuana laws "hasten the erosion of 
respect for the law." But how much "erosion of respect"? And 
where? And what are the consequences?"572 
The experimental evidence presented by Nadler did suggest that a 
perceived injustice can result in less respect for the law.573 
Compliance with the law decreases when many members of the 
569p Robinson and J Darley 'The Utility of Desert' (1997) 91North Western 
University Law Review, 457. 
57oIbid, at 468. 
571The Police Foundation 'Drugs and the Law: Report of the Independent Inquiry 
into the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971' (2000) at 115 internet source, 
http: ((www.policefoundation.org.uk., accessed 17/10/2007. 
572L Friedman The Legal System: A Social Science Perspective, Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1975, at 118-19. 
573J Nadler, 'Flouting the Law' (2005) 83 Texas Law Review 1399, at 1426. 
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society perceive that a particular law is unjust in accordance with 
their perception of what is just and fair. In the experiments 
conducted, Experiment One tested the influence of perceived unjust 
legal rules regarding civil forfeiture, distribution of the income tax 
burden and the righ t to privacy. In this experimen t Nadler 
demonstrated that perceived unjust legal rules cause people more 
likely to engage in law breaking in their daily lives. 
From Nadler's research, it is shown that perceptions of the justice of 
taxation (policy, laws and administration) can either increase or 
decrease compliance with taxation. It can increase compliance when 
taxpayers perceive the system to be fair, but will decrease compliance 
if the system is perceived unfair. Fairness of taxation flies through 
the window when, as is the case in Tanzania, a night nurse and the 
hard working school teacher are taxed fully on their small pay, but 
the same does not apply to Ministers and Parliamentarians who, in 
addition to higher'pay, tax free allowances and tax exempt gratuities, 
are taxed lightly on earnings. This can have a serious impact on 
taxpayer attitudes. 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has attempted to show that voluntary taxpayer 
compliance is affected, not only by tax administrators in the 
application of tax laws, but also by the soundness of the policies 
forming the basis for the laws administered by the tax authority. 
Therefore there is the need for the government to demonstrate to its 
people that the taxes they pay are fair and the revenue is utilized for 
worthy causes. The government must show visibly that the taxes it 
receives from taxpayers are well conceived and are also applied to the 
best interests of the taxpayers themselves. 
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The point has been made that an important attribute of good 
governance is the ability of government to formulate sound policies 
for the people it governs. It can also be said that at the centre of 
sound taxation policy is the fair treatment of taxpayers, including a 
fair distribution of the tax burden and a fair manner of collecting 
taxes. The fairer the tax burden is allocated and realised, the easier it 
is to win the hearts of taxpayers to voluntarily support the 
government in its tax objectives. 
Taxation policies and administrative procedures can be geared 
towards creating a conducive environment for a friendlier interaction 
between the tax administration and the taxpayers. The slogans 
adopted by the TRA on the occasion of the TRA's tenth anniversary 
are indeed instructive, "From Tax Collector to Partner in Developmenf' 
and "Together we Build the Nation'. Similar sentiments are echoed 
in Uganda where the URA uses the slogan "Building Uganda 
Together'. This reflects the change of mindset spoken about 
previously and has the potential to foster cboperation between the tax 
administration and the taxpayers. 
The service standards and the commitment to serve the taxpayers as 
are contained in the TRA and the URA Taxpayer Charters are a good 
starting point. However, for these service standards and expectations 
to achieve the intended results they must be enforceable at law. It is 
the force of law which can make service commitments an effective 
instrument, as that gives the taxpayers the ability to realize them in 
court, instead of being mere pronouncements in taxpayer charters 
which exist by the grace of the tax administration. 
Good tax administration adheres to a high performance standard and 
public expectation. The fundamental performance expectations which 
define a just system in a democratic society are well known in the 
perceptions of taxpayers. Any action by a government agency which 
is contrary to those performance expectations will undermine 
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confidence in that agency. These expectations come in addition to 
legal rights such as the presumption of innocence, the right of appeal 
without any let or hindrance and the right to property. 
Speaking on the for the government and its agencies to adhere to the 
due process of law, Mr. Justice Brandeis wrote that, 
"If the Government becomes a law breaker, it breeds contempt 
for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it 
invites anarchy"574. 
The overriding need to collect as much tax as is possible should not 
detract the policy framer, the legislator and the administrator, from 
the needs of those governed. Ultimately the government exists for the 
people and taxes must be paid only for the peoples' good. The justice 
of taxation must be maintained. 
57401mstead v United States, 277 U.S.438,485 (1928). 
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Chapter Seven: Enforcement of Tax Compliance 
7.1 Introduction 
Throughout this study the point has been made that non-compliance 
with taxation is a significant cost to the government.575 In Tanzania 
the TRA estimates that taxpayers who have been reached are less 
than half of the potential taxpayers.576 Reports abound that the 
government is losing much revenue through non-payment of tax and 
that this is difficult to combat because the vice is widespread. For 
this reason, combating non-compliance must be a key function in the 
administration of taxes. Typologies of deviant taxpayer behaviour 
which the tax administration has to combat include: 
failure to report taxable activities; 
omission of taxable items from tax returns (whether deliberate 
or accidental); 
tax evasion or fraud (illegal activities,which if discovered would 
result in criminal prosecution); and 
tax avoidance (involving schemes which enable a person to 
escape tax)577 
These forms of non-compliance are multi-faceted and the causes for 
their prevalence are also varied. Financial reward is just one of the 
many reasons for dodging tax. Other factors exist, including for 
instance the thrill of winning against the system. For such people 
self enrichment is not the objective, rather, it is the satisfaction which 
comes with beating the tax system. When faced with such a 
multifaceted problem, there can be no single response for dealing 
with it. 
575The TRA, From Tax Collector to Partner in Development - A Decade of TRA 
Transfonnation 1996-2006 at 3. 
576The Citizen Newspaper of 11th March, 2005 at 5, as no sufficient data was given 
by the report, this statement, while bearing some truth, may be exaggerated. 
577G Cooper 'Analysing Corporate Tax Evasion' (1994) 50 Tax Law Review 33, at 35. 
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This study has argued that tax compliance requires a combination of 
strategies. A tax administration must adopt both voluntary tax 
payment measures, as well as effective measures to compel non-
compliant persons to pay their taxes. The challenge for governments 
and tax administrations alike, is how to determine the right mIX 
between these two compliance strategies. For many tax 
administrations there appears to be an irresistible attraction to 
enforcement as the most efficient way to combat tax non-
compliance. 578 The justification could well be that a slight relaxation 
in enforcement can lead to many compliant taxpayers to joining the 
non-compliant. In this regard the effectiveness of enforcement need 
not always be measured by the ability to increase the number of 
taxpayers, but rather, the ability to sustain the number of compliant 
taxpayers. Therefore funding enforcement may in reality be funding 
to sustain compliance. This view should not detract from the need 
for expanding the tax base and the need for inclusive taxation. 
-oj 
The preference for enforcement measures is visible in Tanzania where 
a big portion of tax compliance resources are put into enforcement 
measures. Voluntary compliance measures are not as well funded as 
those which seek to enforce tax compliance. In pursuing tax 
enforcement, there is great emphasis on improving tax investigation 
ability to lead to effective prosecution and punishment of tax 
offenders. 
578In reaching this conclusion reliance is placed mostly on tax collections resulting 
from audits and investigations. No data is offered for results from voluntary 
compliance measures which would enable an objective comparison to be made. 
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7.2 Why Enforcement is Preferred 
Tax administrators' attraction to enforcement measures IS 
understandable. The revenue effectiveness of enforcement is readily 
measurable. Enforcement measures are also said to have a direct 
deterrent effect which increases tax compliance.579 Relying on this 
thinking, some people have suggested that the most efficient way to 
combat non-compliance is to enact very significant penalties for tax 
evasion,580 so that the 'would be' evaders are discouraged from 
contemplating such conduct. This view seems to have its foundation 
in the philosophical propositions of Jeremy Bentham who wrote that 
since "the profit of the crime is the force which urges man to 
delinquency, then the pain of the punishment is the force which must 
be employed to restrain him from it"; and "if the first of these forces 
be the greater, then crime will be committed; but if the second, then 
crime will not be committed" 581 
The other response to non-compliance ,1S a legislative response. 
However, the limitation in fighting tax evasion and avoidance using 
legislation is now widely recognized. The House of Lords' successive 
decisions in IRe v Bunnah Oil,582 Ramsay v IRCS83 and Furniss v 
Dawson584 decided between 1980 and 1984, recognized that drafters 
of legislation cannot foresee the mUltiplicity of schemes by which 
taxes can be avoided so as to come up with water-tight legislation 
capable of preventing such non-compliance.585 A Legislative 
response to tax evasion and avoidance also results in too much detail 
and complexity in tax legislation which is undesirable. Modern day 
tax thinking is that tax laws ought to be simple and understandable 
579C a Rossotti 'Modernizing Americas' Tax Agency', (1999) 83 Tax Notes 1191 at 
1195. 
580J Andreoni, BErard and J Feinstein 'Tax Compliance' (1998) 36 Journal of 
Economic Literature 818 at 824. 
581J Bentham, Principles of Penal Law, Edinburg, 1843. 
582IRC v Burmah Oil (1980) STC 73l. 
583Ramsay v IRA (1982) AC 300. 
584Furniss v Dawson (1984) AC 474 
585G S Cooper 'Analysing Corporate Tax Evasion' in G S Cooper Avoidance and the 
Rule of Law, IBFD Amsterdam 1997, at 35. 
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to taxpayers. Complex tax legislation is difficult to comply with and 
detracts from making tax legislation understandable. 
The effectiveness of tax investigations and audits in combating non-
compliance is relative.586 It is dependent on the resources available to 
the tax administration to enable it to undertake sufficient audits to 
uncover a significant number of non-compliant persons, as well as 
deter others because of the knowledge that they will be caught. No 
tax authority has resources at such levels as to be able to rely 
entirely on audits and investigations. 
Tax investigations tend to go hand In hand with prosecution and 
punishment. One compliments the other. It is one thing to uncover 
tax fraud, but if the discovered fraud is not effectively prosecuted and 
sufficiently punished, it leaves the offender feeling immune to 
sanction. The failure to prosecute and punish criminal behaviour 
also frustrates the enthusiasm of the investigators. 
Investigation, pro;ecution and punishment of tax offences are, 
however, not an easy task. Prosecution of tax cases, especially, is a 
complex process. Canada, which has a common law legal system 
similar to Tanzania, provides instructive lessons on how prosecuting 
tax delinquency is problematic. In dealing with tax evasion cases, the 
courts in Canada insist that the criminality test applicable to other 
areas of crime must apply as well to tax evasion cases. Prosecutors 
must establish mens rea and prove the willful intention to dodge tax 
on the part of the accused. In Regina v Branch,587 the accused 
admitted the failure to file tax returns for four years. The question at 
the trial was whether this failure was coupled with an intention to 
evade tax so that it could be said he had 'willfully evaded payment of 
taxes'. In his defense, it was argued that the failure to file tax returns 
was not intentional or wilful because he was emotionally disturbed 
and could not attend efficiently to many of his affairs. 
586Ibid. 
587Regina v Branch (1976) eTC 193. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
249 
The court found that the necessary mens rea to convict for tax 
evasion was lacking and acquitted him. The judge said: 
"... In my opinion the word evasion implies something of an 
underhand or deceitful nature ... a deliberate attempt to 
escape the requirement of paying tax on income that had been 
earned. This intention can be inferred from acts of omission or 
commission. Mere failure to file tax returns and to pay tax for 
four successive years cannot suggest an attempt to evade the 
payment of taxes."588 
Another example of the application of stringent criminal law tests to 
cases of tax evasion is the case of Regina v Hummel589 Here, the 
accused was charged with willful evasion of payment of taxes and 
making false and deceptive statements in tax returns. The court 
acquitted the accused on a finding that there was no mens rea. These 
two cases demonstrate that successful prosecution of tax evasion or 
other tax offences, especially where proof of intent is required, is not 
always an easy affair. 
7.3 The Tax Enforcement Strategies of the TRA 
In its tax compliance strategies, the TRA puts great emphasis on tax 
enforcement. It relies heavily on investigation and punishment of tax 
offenders. There is wide use of the audit and investigation powers as 
discussed earlier. Investigations are coupled with criminal 
prosecutions leading to various forms of punishment. 
Much effort by the TRA was put into strengthening the Tax 
Investigation Department (TID). The TID which had about 25 
investigation officers (19 male and 6 female) in 2005,590 had grown to 
588Ibid. at 195 
589Regina v Hummel (1971) eTe 803. 
590The TRA, Annual Report 2004/05, at 22. The staff position has tended to 
fluctuate over the years affected by Departmental transfers, dismissals and deaths. 
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80 investigators by 2010 with an additional 27 supporting staff. 
According to a TRA report591 
"the role of the Tax Investigation Department is to minimize 
the occurrence of tax fraud through identification and 
investigation of fraudulent cases, collecting evaded taxes and 
recommending prosecution of offenders with a view to improve 
compliance with tax laws."592 
The organizational changes, which occurred within the TRA have 
affected the Tax Investigation Department as well. On the 
recommendation of DANIDA, USAID, the Swedish International 
Development Agency (SIDA) and the German International 
Cooperation Agency (GTZ), together with the World Bank,593 who are 
the major development partners for the TRA, the TRA has adopted an 
integrated approach to tax administration. It has moved away from a 
tax-type to a tax-function approach. As a result, the singular 
departments for 'income tax, VAT and stamp duty which existed 
previously as separate administrative units, were merged in 2005 in 
what is now called the Department of Domestic Revenue. Even before 
this merger occurred, all large taxpayers were transferred in October 
2001 to the Large Taxpayers Department (LTD), in an effort to provide 
them a one-stop service centre for all their tax affairs (except for 
customs matters). 594 
In like manner, the TID also adopted an integrated approach to tax 
investigations and audits, such that audit visits are now carried out 
for all taxes at the same time, by the same officer(s), in respect of 
each investigation. 595 
591Tax Investigation Department, Annual Performance Report for 2002/2003. 
592Ibid. 1. 
593Annual Review Reports on the Tax Administration Project (TAP) funded under the 
basket funding administered by the W orId Bank, 
594The TRA, A Decade of TRA Transformation 1996-2006, Tanzania Revenue 
Authority, Dar es Salaam, 2006, 54. 
595Tax Investigation Department Report to the TRA Management, December 2002, 
at 2. 
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In order to enable the TID to carry out its functions, the TRA 
transferred officers from other departments to the TID. As these were 
drawn from tax collecting departments, they are able to utilize their 
experience in tax affairs to carry out investigation work. In addition, 
these officers were given professional training in investigation 
techniques relating to documentary evidence and in computer 
forensic audit. 596 
The TID put together a Business Intelligence Unit which is 
responsible for developing a data bank containing business 
intelligence which the TID is able to share with other departments at 
the TRA Head Office and its Zonal Offices to improve the quality· of 
investigations and audits. The Business Intelligence Unit became 
operational in July 2005. The TID also installed three hotline phones 
in the Northern Zone (Arusha, Moshi, Manyara area) Southern 
Highland (Iringa, Mbeya and Ruvuma area) and Lake Zones (Mwanza, 
Buko ba, Shinyaga and Kigoma area), as well as one hotline for the 
Dar es Salaam Zone, which are used bY"members of the public to 
report tax irregularities.597 
In line with these initiatives, the TID computers were linked to the 
Customs ASYCUDA ++ system and in August 2006 a radio 
communication system was installed in all the TID Zonal Offices.598 
An Internet facility that enables the distribution of orders and 
instructions was established to link the TID at Head Office in Dar es 
Salaam to the TID Dar es Salaam Zones I and II. Further radio 
connections were installed for Mbeya, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, 
Arusha and Mwanza.599 
The TID set up an investigation office for Zanzibar in December 2003 
which is headed by a Principal Tax Investigation Officer. The total 
workforce for this office is 4 investigation officers equipped with one 
596Ibid.3 
597 Ibid. 4-5 
598Ibid.4 
599Ibid.6 
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motor vehicle, several computers and a communication system. 
Surveillance equipment was also procured and deployed to the 
Zanzibar office. All these investigation initiatives of the TRA are 
captured in the National Investigation Policy which the TRA started 
implementing in July 2007.600 
7.4 Effectiveness of Investigations and Tax Audits 
Having been set up in 2001 the TID carried out operations for the 
first time as a full fledged investigation department during the year 
2002/03. It investigated a total of 466 taxpayers for suspected tax 
fraud and other tax irregularities. 601 The cases investigated had a 
total revenue potential of Tzs 8,807,000,000. An amount of Tzs 
4,525,100,000 was recovered representing a 51% recovery rate.602 
It is notable that in the first year of performance following the 
restructure, the TID performed below the mark it had set before 
reorganization. 603 The recovery rate for 2001/02 was 58%.604 
However, the recovery rate achieved for both years was well above the 
benchmark recovery rate set for the TID by the TRA which was 26% 
for 2002/03 and 25% for 2001/2002. A tabulation of tax 
investigation results for 2002/03 is shown in Table 10 below: 
600Ibid.6 
601The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2002/03. 
602 Ibid. 1- 2 
603Ibid. 2 
604Audit and Investigation Department Report 2001/02, 1. 
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Table 10: TID Investigation Cases for 2002/03 
TID Investigat Potential Arrears and Recoverable Tax Tax Recovery 
ions Revenue doubtful Arrears Recovered Outstanding 
claims Rate 
VAT 79 4,928.0 12.1 4,915.9 1,942.2 2,973.7 39.4% 
Income 103 2,265.6 - 2,265.6 1,328.5 937.1 58.6% 
Tax 
Customs 284 1,613.4 - 1,613.4 1,254.4 359.0 77.7% 
Total 466 8,807.0 12.1 8,794.9 4,529.1 4,269.8 51.4% 
* Source: The TRA Tax Investigation Departinent Annual Report for 2002/03 
** Values are in Billion Tanzania Shillings 
Among the taxpayers investigated for 2002/03, the TID recommended 
72 cases for prosecution. However, only 29 were taken up for 
prosecution. The TID relies on the Legal Services Department (LSD) 
of the TRA for advice on which cases can b  successfully prosecuted 
and also for undertaking the prosecutions in the courts. The LSD 
returned the rest of the cases to the < TID either for additional 
investigation, or rejected them as unfit for prosecution. 605 Table 11 
below shows the investigations breakdown for 2002/03. 
605The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2002/03,2. 
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Table 11: Cases Investigated and Action Taken 
1 Cases investigated 466 
2 Cases recommended to the LSD for 72 
prosecution 
3 Cases settled under compounding 288 
offence procedure 
4 Cases referred back to the TID for 22 
further investigation 
5 Criminal cases prosecuted 29 
6 Criminal cases completed 11 
7 Criminal cases decided In favour of 8 
the TRA 
.. ;
8 Criminal cases decided In favour of 3 
the taxpayer 
* Source: The TRA Tax InvestigatIOn Department Annual Report 
for 2002/03 
In its first year following reorganization, the TID continued to develop 
the investigation skills of its staff. Officers attended a two-month 
course on basic criminal investigation techniques conducted between 
February and April 2002. 
The tax investigation work undertaken by the TID involves 
surveillances, travel and communication. The TID annual report for 
2002/03 says that the TID was handicapped by a lack of working 
tools and enumerated the following factors which constrained 
performance:606 
606Ibid. at 13. 
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desk phones, cellular phones and motor vehicles; 
failure by taxpayers or their authorized accountants and 
auditors to comply with various TID notices to supply 
information or attend inquiries as permitted under the 
tax laws; 
inadequate professional skills for the TID staff when 
dealing with complex investigations; 
shortage of staff at Headquarters which is more serious 
at Zone, Regional and District level; and 
poor record keeping by taxpayers which makes it difficult 
to track taxable activities. 
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Annual Reports for the years 2003/04 and 2004/05 show no 
improvement in the performance of the TID. The reports also show 
that the constraints on performance noted by the TID in the first year 
of operations still persisted. Table 12 belo~~ shows a summary of the 
cases investigated by the TID for year 2003/04. 
Table 12: TID Investigation Cases for 2003/04 
TID Investigations Potential Arrears Recoverable Tax Tax Recovery 
Revenue and Arrears Recoverd Outstanding Rate 
doubtful 
claims 
VAT 51 3,136.6 - 3,136.6 1,716.0 1,420.6 55% 
Income 85 6,489.6 - 6,489.6 3,223.8 3,265.8 50% 
Tax 
Customs 111 6,286.8 100.7 6,186.1 4,816.8 1,369.0 77% 
Total 247 15,913.0 100.7 15,812.3 4,659.6 16,912.3 62% 
* Source: Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2003/04 
** Values are in Billion Tanzania Shillings 
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One of the highlights of investigation work undertaken In 
2003/2004607 was the interception of two mInmg company 
expatriates by officers of the TID at Mwanza Airport; one was a South 
African and the other, an Australian, both suspected of attempting to 
leave the country without paying their taxes. A search carried out on 
their personal effects, including information on the taxpayer's laptop 
computer, revealed that the required level of employment taxes for 
the year ending December 2004, had not been paid. Some of the 
employment tax deducted by the taxpayers' employers had not been 
remitted to the TRA under the PAYE scheme. A total of Tzs 463 
million as principal tax and penalties was recovered. 
For the year 2003/2004, the TID identified the following areas as 
causing tax revenue leakage:608 
failure to register taxpayers; 
the keeping of false books of accounts for purposes of evading 
taxes; 
the use of the Zanzibar port and airport to land goods for 
trans-shipment to mainland Tanzania without payment of 
proper duties (because of poor customs control in Zanzibar); 
the use of false documents to clear goods through customs (eg, 
false invoices, mis-declaration of goods and mis-classification 
of goods); 
smuggling through Tanzania's long and porous borders; 
overstatement of expenses to reduce income tax; 
failure to declare dividends and persistent reporting of losses 
by private companies; 
misuse of tax exemptions gIVen by Tanzania Investment 
Centre to approved enterprises; 
607The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2003/04, at 2-3. 
608Ibid. 5 
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splitting of remuneration paid to expatriate employees by 
private companies so that only a small portion of what they 
were paid was declared to the TRA for PAYE purposes, but the 
bigger part was paid off-shore into the employee's bank 
account; 
the laundering of money through real estate transactions; 
failure to withholding tax on payments to non-residents (e.g. 
fees for technical or management services); and 
failure to record and report payments to foreign or local 
directors of companies. 
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The above areas of concern are cited repeatedly in subsequent TID 
reports609 indicating that these problems have not been resolved. It is 
noted that for 2003/04, the TID did not meet the target of having at 
least 30% of its completed investigations cases sent for criminal 
prosecution. According to the 2003/04 annual report, the failure to 
achieve the targeted level of prosecutable ~ses resulted from inability 
to obtain the level of evidence required to ensure successful 
prosecutions. 610 
For the year 2004/05 the TID directed its efforts to identifying new 
areas of tax delinquency and following-up outstanding taxes. These 
efforts resulted in the recovery of Tzs 7,702,800,000 for both current 
taxes and tax arrears. During that year, the TID concluded 259 
investigation cases with a revenue potential of Tzs 22,083,100,000. 
The average revenue contribution per case was Tzs 85,300,000. The 
tax recovery rate for 2004/05 was only 22%, much lower than the 
recovery rate achieved in 2003/2004 which was 62%. Table 13 below 
shows the TID investigation performance for 2004/05. 
609'fhe TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Reports for 2003/04 to 2006-07. 
610The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2003/04. 
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VAT 
Income 
Tax 
Customs 
Total 
Table 13: TID Investigation Cases for 2004/05 
Investigations Potential Arrears Recoverable Tax Tax 
Revenue and Tax Recovered Outstanding 
Doubtful 
Claims 
63 9,145.8 402.5 8,743.3 1,522.3 7,221.0 
84 9,936.9 108.7 9,828.2 1,692.4 8,135.8 
112 3,000.4 - 3,000.4 1,444.9 1,555.5 
259 22,083.1 511.2 21,571.9 4,659.6 16,912.3 
* Source: Tax InvestigatIOn Department Annual Report for 2004/05 
** Values are in Billion Tanzania Shillings 
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Recovery 
Rate 
17% 
17% 
48% 
22% 
There has been no noticeable improvement In investigation 
performance for succeeding years. The constraints on good 
performance noted in the initial years have only been partially 
resolved. 
The shortage of tax investigation officers which is noted in all 
previous annual reports of the TID persisted in the year 2005/06.611 
The annual plan for the TID which was drawn up in March 2005 in 
time for the start of the TRA financial year on 1 st July 2005 envisaged 
a staffing increase by July 2006 upon completing the merger of the 
VAT Department and Income Tax Department. Excess staff from 
merged departments would be deployed to the TID. However, the 
expanded operations of the new Domestic Revenue Department 
absorbed nearly all the staff. Only a few officers were transferred to 
the TID, well below the staffing requirement for the TID. All the 
transferred officers were assigned to the Business Intelligence Unit, 
so that this Unit could start operations. 
The integration of the VAT and Income Tax Departments also 
disrupted the operations of the TID because the office space 
requirements of the new Domestic Revenue Department necessitated 
611The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2005/06,3. 
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the re-location of the Dar es Salaam Tax Investigation Zone offices 
twice during July and August 2006. The physical movement of files, 
electronic equipment and furniture, impaired the TID operations 
substantially.612 
The year 2005 was also an election year for Tanzania. The TRA was 
required to join other officers from the Police Force and State Security 
to undertake patrols during the 2005 general elections. Twenty-four 
hour patrols were conducted daily along the coastal stretch from 
Kisiju in Mkuranga District of Dar es Salaam to Saadan in Bagamoyo 
District. This operation lasted for 28 days. Various smuggled goods 
were intercepted and several other illegal activities affecting the 
security of the country and/ or its economic interests were 
prevented.613 
As many of the officers for this operation were drawn from the 
Customs Department and the TID, the use of the TID for this 
operation further deprived the TID of ca~~city to undertake normal 
tax investigations. 
In 2005/06, the TID also attempted to focus on tax irregularities in 
the transit trade. Tanzania is surrounded by a number of countries 
which are land -locked and the port of Dar es Salaam is used as a 
shipping route for goods destined for the land-locked countries of 
Uganda, Burundi, Rwanda, Zambia, Malawi and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. The TRA must ensure that transit goods which 
are allowed passage through Tanzania duty free must not be diverted 
into Tanzania for domestic consumption. Apart from the revenue loss 
which results from diverting transit goods, the sale of untaxed transit 
goods in Tanzania causes serious price distortions. However, 
monitoring and reconciling shipping and clearance documents for 
transit goods is a time consuming task as most records are stored 
manually. Some TID staff have been assigned to this task reducing 
612Ibid. 5 
613Ibid. 6 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
260 
further the number of investigation officers available for normal tax 
investigations which are revenue yielding.614 
The gathering of information through the Business Intelligence Unit 
proceeded in earnest during 2005/06. The intention was to gather 
data which would show the patterns of trading activities in terms of 
quantities, pricing, packaging and shipping. The typical patterns 
emerging would be used to test the veracity of the records of the 
taxpayer being investigated. During 2005/06 the TID gathered 
business information from 80 taxpayers relating to 5 business 
sectors, namely, hardware, textile, mlnmg, construction and 
petroleum.61s 
In 2005/06, the TID also tackled the problem of undervaluation of 
imported motor vehicles which results in payment of lower customs 
duties. The TID found that out of 114 motor vehicles cleared through 
the Holili border station, 95 vehicles were undervalued. The declared 
purchase prices were much lower than the comparable market prices 
stored in the TID database. A total of 310 motor vehicles in Dar es 
Salaam, were also examined during this period. It was established 
that appropriate taxes had not been fully paid in respect of 117 motor 
vehicles. Tax amounting to Tzs 123,000,000 millions was 
recovered.616 
A major constraint noted by the TID in 2005/06 is that, courts take 
too long to complete the tax cases filed and in most events convicted 
offenders get fines only, not jail terms. During 2005/06, 36 
taxpayers were recommended for criminal prosecution and only 22 
cases were completed. Convictions were obtained against 15 (worth 
Tzs 32,100,000 in tax revenue). Two taxpayers were acquitted (the 
tax claim against them was Tzs 42,200,000). Charges against five 
taxpayers were withdrawn. Although the success rate in criminal 
614Ibid. at 6-7 
61SIbid. 2 
616Ibid. 3 
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prosecutions arising from TID work is poor, the TID still believes that 
"the prosecution of tax evaders of itself has a deterrent psychological 
effect and to a large extent contributes m enhancing tax 
administration integrity". 617 However, the TID believes that in a 
society where tax evasion is not viewed by the public as a serious 
criminal breach, jail terms would serve as a more effective deterrent. 
Fines alone, however substantial, are not seen as an effective 
deterrent against tax evasion. 
The desire to use criminal prosecutions as a psychological tool for 
enhancing compliance persisted.618 In 2006/07, the TID had 47 
criminal cases in the courts. 27 of these were brought forward from 
2005/06 and 20 were newly instituted cases. Of the 17cases decided 
during 2006/07, there were 15 convictions with tax revenue 
amounting to Tzs 348,600,000; two taxpayers were acquitted (the tax 
claim against them was Tzs 99,500,000); six cases were withdrawn. 
For the first time too, two tax offenders were sentenced to three-
month jail terms for smuggling offences.619""; 
During 2006/07, the TID made further efforts to improve the 
competence of staff.620 It provided various training courses aimed at 
improving the investigator's skills in -
evidence gathering 
computer access and reconstruction of deleted data 
transfer pricing 
income splitting 
tax fraud investigation, detection, prevention and prosecution 
general intelligence. 
Training in reconstruction of computer data has become necessary 
because taxpayers who store data in computers often delete 
617The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2005/06, at 1, 
Paragraph 2.l. 
618The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2006/07. 
619Ibid. 1 
620Ibid.3 
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information in the wake of a tax investigation. In a bid to equip tax 
investigators with skills to reconstruct deleted data, 15 officers were 
sent for a three-month computer forensic networking course in 
Germany. 
In its annual report for 2006/07 the TID still decried the long delays 
attending criminal prosecution of tax offenders due to lengthy court 
procedures.621 The TID also decried the fact that most of the criminal 
cases end up in payment of a fine. In part, the TID report 
recommended that 
"[i]n order to improve compliance a fme alone is not enough. 
Where laws permit, offenders should be sentenced to jail 
sentences, this would be a lesson to the general public which 
views tax evasion as a minor offence. There is a need for tax 
evasion to be included in serious criminal offences. However, 
getting a conviction is in itself a positive step."622 
A comparison of taxpayer investigations undertaken in 2005/06 and 
2006/07 is shown in Table 14 below. 
Table 14: TID Investigation Cases for 2005/06 and 2006/07 
Cases Potential Tax Tax Recovery 
Investigated Revenue Recovered Rate 
YEAR 2005 
Domestic 
Revenue 
Customs 
Duties 
TOTAL 
Domestic 
Revenue 
Customs 
Duties 
TOTAL 
133 (49%) 9,208.0 1,718.7 18.7% 
139 (51%) 3,181.5 2,981.8 93.7% 
272 (100%) 12,389.5 4,700.5 37.9% 
YEAR 2006 
135 (43%) 14,589.1 8,073.8 55.3% 
176 (57%) 3,401.4 1,100.2 32.3% 
311 (100%) 17,990.5 9,174.0 51% 
* Source: Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2006/07 
** Values are in Billion Tanzania Shillings 
621The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2006/07,3. 
622Ibid. 3, Paragraph 3.2. 
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For the first quarter of the year 2007/08,623 a total of 64 investigation 
cases were completed with a revenue potential of Tzs 5,928,100,000 
compared to 57 cases during a similar period for 2006/07. Out of the 
64 cases, 60 were settled using compounding offence provisions, 
making a recovery ofTzs 4,918,600,000.624 
During the quarter, the TID had 22 cases in the courts brought 
forward from 2006/07, while four new cases were freshly instituted. 
Of the 26 cases in court, only two were completed and decided in 
favour of the TRA. There was no case dismissed or withdrawn during 
the period. The other 24 were still at various stages of prosecution.625 
A summary of tax cases investigated in the First Quarter of 
2007/2008 is shown in Table 15 below. 
Table 15: TID Investigation Cases for the First Quarter 2007/08 
Violations Cases Potential Tax Recovered Tax 
completed Revenue 'c Outstanding 
Direct taxes 29 4,391.6 3,316.5 1,075.1 
Indirect Taxes 11 305.7 26.6 279.1 
Domestic 40 4697.3 3343.1 1354.2 
Customs 24 1230.8 189.0 1041.8 
Total 64 5,928.1 3,532.1 2,396 
* Source: Tax InvestIgatlOn Department FIrst Quarter Report for 2007/08 
** Values are in Billion Tanzania Shillings 
The report for the first quarter of 2007/08 also notes that the 
gathering of business intelligence from various sectors of trade 
continued.626 The sectors covered included hardware, petroleum, 
hotels, textiles, manufacturing and general merchandise. The 
business intelligence gathered was tested in tax investigations carried 
623The TRA, Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2007/08, 1. 
624Ibid.2 
625Ibid.2 
626Ibid.3 
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out on traders based in the Dar es salaam, Mbeya, Iringa, Morogoro 
and Dodoma regions. The tax findings were still being analysed for 
trends and discrepancies at the time of this inquiry. 
The TID expected to surpass the mark of 311 cases investigated in 
2006/07 and the tax yield of Tzs 17,990,500,000 achieved in 
2006/2007.627 
In addition, the TID wants to encourage taxpayers with substantial 
disputed taxes to negotiate acceptable amounts which will resolve 
long running disputes and realize some tax for the government. 
Taxpayers with substantial long standing disputed liabilities are in 
the mining, major constructions, manufacturing, petroleum and 
telecommunications sectors.628 By June 2010, eight substantial 
disputes had been settled with TRA signing memorandum of 
understanding with each of the taxpayer involved. 
The TID has also unveiled plans for closer cooperation with the tax 
investigation wings~ of neighbouring countries such as Uganda, 
Kenya, Zambia, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, 
Malawi and Mozambique which share common borders with 
Tanzania, so that cross border transactions can be effectively 
monitored. The monitoring will cover imports, exports and transit 
goods.629 
The TID has targeted the examination of fuel import data from 
Kisumu, Kenya, consignments of transit sugar through Tanzania to 
neighboring countries, as well as transit fuel, in order to curtail the 
revenue leakages known to exist. The TID is cooperating with the 
highway control authority, TANROADS, so that information extracted 
at road weighbridges can be matched with that given to customs, to 
prevent cheating.630 
627lbid.3 
628lbid. 3-4 
629lbid.5 
630lbid.5 
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While the TRA has removed all its tax investigation work from the 
Income Tax and VAT departments and brought it under the TID, 
there are still some aspects of tax investigations being carried out by 
the Customs Department in its traditional role of securing the 
country's borders. One such function is the patrol of land borders 
and the territorial sea strip. Three patrol boats were acquired in 
2001 by the Customs Department and deployed to monitor the Indian 
Ocean coast, Lake Victoria and Lake Tanganyika, which are known to 
be prone to customs irregularities. 631 An additional boat was 
acquired in 2005. The TRA also created the Flexible Anti-Smuggling 
Teams (FAST) responsible for surveillance and seizure of smuggled 
goods.632 Although the public visibility of FAST has remained low key 
when measured against the rampant smuggling believed to exist, it 
nonetheless, serves as a useful deterrent. The performance of FAST 
for the five years up to 2004/05 is shown in Table 16 below. 633 
Table 16: FAST Performance for the years 2000/01 to 2004/05 
Description 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Cases 128 286 281 
detected 
Cases 105 198 150 
Completed 
Pending 23 88 131 
cases 
Revenue 156.9 444.2 201.7 
Collected 
* Source: The TRA Annual Report for 2004/05 
** Values are Million Tanzania Shillings 
631The TRA Annual Report for 2004/05,21. 
632Ibid. 21, Paragraphs 3.3.3 and 3.3.4. 
633 Ibid. at 21. 
2003/04 2004/05 
131 134 
95 62 
36 72 
119.3 203.6 
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7.5 Limitations of TRA's Enforcement Strategies 
An important constraint on the TRA enforcement strategy, which the 
above research shows, is the inability of the TRA, (and therefore 
government), to provide adequate resources for tax enforcement 
activities. The TID, which has 25 officers only, believes that it needs 
an additional 24 officers to attain an effective staffing level. 634 The 
fact that this need for additional staff has not been satisfied despite 
being repeated in every TID annual report since 2002 is indicative of 
an institutional inability to achieve optimum success with the tax 
enforcement strategy. 
Other resource constraints, which compromise the effectiveness of 
the enforcement strategy of the TRA, include inadequate working 
tools for the TID such as vehicles, computers, two-way radios and 
cellular phones. There is also the problem with the overall 
, 
inefficiency of the court system which causes delays in the 
completion of cases taken to court for prosecution. 
Court delays in the disposal of tax cases result in significant tied-up 
tax revenue. The extent of the problem is better appreciated when 
one also considers that the many tax appeals pending with the Tax 
Revenue Appeals Board and the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal add to 
the tied-up revenue. The TID has no control over these disputes 
because all tax cases involving litigation are handled by the Legal 
Services Department (LSD). The LSD is a department of the TRA 
headed by the Chief Legal Counsel who is also the Secretary to the 
TRA Board of Directors. The LSD has 32 lawyers, 21 of whom are 
based at the TRA Headquarters, while 11 work with the TRA Zonal 
offices in the regions. 
634The TRA Tax Investigation Department Annual Report for 2006/07, at 5. 
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The LSD undertakes all criminal prosecutions ansmg from tax 
investigations (customs, income tax and value added tax). It also has 
responsibility for all tax appeals arising from objections to tax 
assessments and from other disputes arising from tax decisions made 
by the TRA officers. This is a significant responsibility on a 
department which has only skeleton staff. 
As explained previously, there are three levels at which tax appeals 
are adjudicated. The Tax Revenue Appeals Board has original 
jurisdiction over all tax disputes.635 Appeals go to the Tax Revenue 
Appeals Tribunal,636 from which a final appeal lies to the Court of 
Appeal of Tanzania. 637 
The point made by the TID regarding the delay in disposing of tax 
criminal cases, can also be made against the Tax Revenue Appeals 
Board and the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal but in a different 
context. Tax appeals before these two bodies are determined with 
relative speed (within 3 to 6 months of b~ing filed).638 Appeals from 
the Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal to the Court of Appeal continue to 
be a serious concern because it can take up to three or four year for 
an appeal to be heard by that court. Altogether however, the large 
number of appeals filed by taxpayers tie-up significant amounts of 
tax revenue. 
Tables 17, 18 and 19 below show the number of tax 
assessments/decisions which are taken on appeal to the Tax Revenue 
Appeals Board relating to income tax, value added tax and customs 
duties. 
635Sections 16 of the Tax Revenue Appeals Act No 15 of 2000. 
636Ibid. section 16. 
637Ibid. sections 25. 
638Criminal prosecutions in Tanzania take up to three or four years to conclude. 
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Table 17: Income Tax Appeals for 2001 - 2010* 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dismissed 1 8 2 2 8 7 10 4 7 0 
Upheld 0 6 3 8 7 3 6 3 10 3 
Part Upheld 0 6 9 10 3 0 0 1 4 0 
Settled 0 6 5 4 3 1 0 3 11 1 
Withdrawn 0 9 3 4 4 1 0 1 2 0 
Pending 0 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 20 25 
Total 1 40 23 28 25 14 24 12 54 29 
* Source: The Tax Revenue Appeals Board - Appeals RegIster 
Table 18: Value Added Tax Appeals for 2001 - 2010* 
2001 2002 "2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dismissed 2 4 6 6 10 2 5 4 2 0 
Upheld 0 0 3 2 7 1 7 4 4 1 
Part Upheld 0 1 3 0 2 0 2 1 4 0 
Settled 0 1 3 1 1 0 1 2 1 0 
Withdrawn 0 2 1 5 0 0 1 2 3 0 
Pending 0 1 0 0 4 4 0 0 14 5 
Total 2 9 16 14 25 7 16 13 28 6 
* Source: The Tax Revenue Appeals Board - Appeals RegIster 
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Table 19: Customs Appeals for 2002 - 2010* 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Dismissed 5 7 3 6 2 3 6 2 1 
Upheld 2 1 3 2 0 3 4 3 0 
Part Upheld 5 1 2 0 0 0 1 2 0 
Settled 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Withdrawn 1 0 5 1 1 1 0 0 0 
Pending 0 0 0 0 0 3 6 5 8 
Total 13 9 13 10 3 10 17 12 9 
* Source: The Tax Revenue Appeals Board - Appeals Register 
The above tables show that the number of tax appeals which go to 
the Tax Revenue Appeals Board is significant. A total of 480 tax 
appeals were brought by taxpayers against income tax, customs and 
VAT assessments between November 200f"i:md December 2010. Only 
cases which arose after the establishment of the unified tax appeal 
bodies under the Tax Revenue Appeals Act of 2000 are captured in 
the above Tables. Cases filed and determined under the previous 
non-unified tax tribunals are not included. 
The 480 tax appeals involved disputed taxes amounting to Tzs 
447,739,392,861, which at an exchange rate of about Tzs 1200 to the 
American dollar, is well over 373 million US dollars. Table 20 below 
shows how this amount is distributed among income tax, customs 
and value added tax. 
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Table 20 Values for Income Tax, Customs and VAT Appeals brought 
to the Tax Revenue Appeals Board 2002 to 2010* 
Year Total Income Tax Total Customs Total VAT 
2002 24,680,855,759 1,426,633,937 791,805,762 
2003 6,732,527,231 528,217,828 3,071,152,755 
2004 145,604,704,695 5,586,694,913 13,871,877,773 
2005 1,067,900,350 1,372,077,460 6,399,933,418 
2006 4,872,583,757 1,114,252,822 12,507,831,315 
2007 14,619,836,161 17,401,082,625 22,112,041,246 
2008 23,210,222,870 6,805,701,978 24,759,037,274 
2009 51,690,964,357 13,155,440,888 37,085,293,148 
2010 24,455,689,964 3,248,223,679 1,214,416,539 
TOTAL 276,637,950,208 48,706,456,763 122,394,985,890 
* Source: The Tax Revenue Appeals Board - Appeals RegIster 
It is notable that less than one third of the appeals filed with the Tax 
Revenue Appeals Board, are taken on a second appeal to the Tax 
Revenue Appeals Tribunal. Only 132 appeals were taken to the Tax 
Revenue Appeals Tribunal for the period 2002 to 2010. Much fewer 
make the final stage of appeal to the Court of Appeal of Tanzania. 
Only 33 appeals were taken to the Court of Appeal between 2002 and 
2010. 
An additional concern, however, is that, the Court of Appeal is so 
congested that many of the appeals filed with that court remain 
pending for hearing. Table 21 below tabulates these numbers. 
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Table 21: Appeals to the Tribunal and to the Court of Appeal 
2002 - 2007* 
Year Tribunal Court of Appeal 
2002 10 0 
2003 10 2 
2004 7 3 
2005 13 5 
2006 38 12 
2007 17 1 
2008 23 4 
2009 31 3 
2010 27 ::",' 3 
* Source: The Tax Revenue Appeals Tribunal - Appeals Register 
7.6 Conclusion 
Given the many concerns discussed above regarding tax enforcement 
by the TRA, the overall success of this strategy is called into question, 
especially when pursued in isolation. Some emphasis needs to be re-
directed to voluntary compliance efforts spearheaded by a more 
aggressive taxpayer education program. In addition, the service 
culture which for the TRA is more word than deed, needs to be visible 
in TRA actions and in the way TRA officers interact with taxpayers. 
Equally, the partnership the TRA has announced should not be a 
partnership with government alone, but also with the taxpayers as 
the major stakeholders and the backbone of the tax system. 
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Chapter 8: Summary of Findings and 
Recommendations 
8.1 Summary of Findings 
The findings of this research show that voluntary taxpayer 
compliance in Tanzania has not been achieved at a sufficiently high 
level. The modernization of the tax administration undertaken in the 
mid 1990's, of itself, has done little to change the negative taxpayer 
perception of the TRA and the tax system at large. It appears that tax 
administration reform has focused too much on the structure of the 
TRA and the performance of its functions without sufficient attention 
being given to the interaction of tax officers with taxpayers and the 
impact of taxpayer attitude to the performance of the TRA. The TRA 
reform is being undertaken without sufficiently taking into account 
\~ 
the other factors which influence taxpayer acceptance of the tax 
system. 
The study has pointed to following factors as undermining voluntary 
compliance with, and preventing public acceptance of, taxation: 
the process of tax legislation and tax policy formulation is not 
inclusive, many who have a stake in taxation are not given the 
opportunity to participate; 
there are too many taxes administered by the TRA which 
makes it difficulty for taxpayers to understand and comply with 
taxation; 
the tax rates used for the various taxes are high and are not 
aligned to ability to pay; 
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the tax burden is not fairly distributed because the tax base is 
too narrow as it does not include the significant informal sector 
or rural sector; 
taxes are administered in a high-handed manner; and 
there is a negative perception of the government and the tax 
system which impacts on taxpayer compliance attitudes. 
Tanzania's tax base is also very narrow. While a large part of this is 
attributed to avoidance and evasion activities, there is also a 
reluctance to seriously harness the informal and rural sectors. This 
is partly because of an unfounded belief that those operating in the 
informal and rural sectors live on the poverty line and no good would 
result from taxing them, and partly because of the political risk of 
antagonizing this important voting. Figures making up the GDP in 
Tanzania show significant losses from failure to harness the informal 
sector. The DANIDA report referred to earlier,639 showed that, in 
Tanzania, a significant 28% of GDP is generated from non-market 
production and a further 15% from the informal sector. Combined, 
these two untaxed sectors make up 43% of the GDP. 
Maliyamkono's64o research leads to the same conclusion. He shows 
that the untaxed informal sector has been growing steadily. It was 
28.1 % of GDP in 1986, 36.1% in 1996, and 48.1 % in 2006. 
In their examination of tax reforms in Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, 
Rakner and Gloppen641 observed that in all three countries the tax 
reforms have focused on increasing collection through improving the 
compliance of existing and known taxpayers. They agree with a 
recent evaluation by the British Department of International 
Development (BDID) that the failure to tax the informal sector and 
639DANIDA Project Document, Danish Support to Tanzania Revenue Authority 
Phase II 2003/04 - 2007/08, at 7 
640 Op cit. P 25 
641L Rakner and S Gloppen Tax Reform and Democratic Accountability in Sub-
Saharan Africa' at 10 of their joint paper, internet source 
http://www.ids.ac.uk/gdr / cfs/activities/Rakner-Gloppen.pdf. 
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agriculture and the continued tendency of granting tax exemptions to 
powerful businesses/individuals with close political connections, 
provide the main reason why collections appear to have stagnated at 
a relatively low level. As for the reforms in Tanzania, Uganda and 
Zambia, Rakner and Gloppen say: 
"A common trend in all three countries is an apparent lack of 
ability and/or political willingness to apply the tax law with 
full force to informal operators perceived to be electorally 
important. The way VAT has been introduced helps explain 
the failure to widen the population base of the tax system. A 
uniform VAT (with major exemptions) has replaced business 
turnover taxes and sales tax in the three countries. However, 
as food commodities are zero-rated and most agricultural 
inputs are exempted, VAT has not included many new groups 
into the tax net"642 
On the unrealized revenue potential of the VAT, Maliayamkono643 
notes that since inception the VAT has been the most successful and 
robust tax producing revenue equivalent to 6% of GDP (the combined 
total tax/GDP ratio is around 13%). Nonetheless there is a wide 
range of remissions through special relief and zero rating which 
means there a potential to reduce the number of tax remissions 
where they are no longer justified and further increase the 
contribution of VAT to total revenues. 
The undue reliance on tax enforcement has only enhanced the public 
perception that the tax administration is high-handed. This 
research, however, has shown that the 'fear factor' alone can not 
effectively influence tax compliance patterns because of the limited 
enforcement capacity of the TRA. The capability constraints which 
afflict the Tax Investigation Department of the TRA make it 
impossible for enforcement to have either the deterrent effect it has 
642Ibid. pI I. 
643 0 . 21 'P CIt P . 
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on tax delinquency in countries where detection and punishment is 
better resourced, or the positive compliance effect on would be 
evaders by closing the opportunity to cheat. In addition, the TRA is 
unable to rely on the severity of sanctions to send the right message 
because of its lack of capacity to undertake wide-scale investigations 
and obtain convictions, and because of the public perception (which 
has been shown to be the perception of the courts as well) that failure 
to pay tax is not a serious offence.644 TRA has undertaken over 200 
criminal prosecutions since 2002, however, only two tax offenders 
have been sentenced to jail. Even in those two cases the jail terms 
were two and three months only, not severe enough to send a 
message against tax delinquency. 
This study also shows that, the tax laws in Tanzania do not 
encourage taxpayers to comply voluntarily with taxes. Provisions 
relating to assessment and payment of tax are mostly premised on 
punishing non-compliance rather than encouraging compliance. This 
alienates taxpayers from the tax system ahd does not inspire them to 
take ownership of the tax system. 
The lack of adequate accountability for the government also impacts 
negatively on taxpay r compliance attitudes. The government is 
perceived to be corrupt. In 2008, a major corruption scandal 
unraveled forcing the Prime Minister to resign and the President to 
dismiss the entire cabinet on 7th February 2008.645 
Allegations of corruption have also been continually leveled against 
the TRA as shown in the taxpayer perception surveys undertaken by 
the National Bureau of Statistics m 2003 and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2006. 646 As a result, taxpayer confidence 
644This is evident from the fact 
645This event was front page news on the 8 th February 2008 for all major daily 
papers in Tanzania including the Daily News, The African and the Guardian, as 
well as other papers published in the Kiswahili language. 
646National Bureau of Statistics 'Assessment of the Effectiveness of Taxpayer 
Awareness Programs and Attitude of Taxpayers Towards the TRA' National Bureau 
of Statistics Report, September 2003, Dar es Salaam; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
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m the tax system, necessary to promote voluntary taxpayer 
compliance, is lacking. It is encouraging to note that the Third 
Corporate Plan (2008/09 to 2012/13) currently being implemented 
has four strategic goals which underscore a recognition by the TRA of 
the dissatisfaction taxpayers have with the present state of taxation. 
The four strategic goals are: (i) to broaden the tax base; (ii) to improve 
voluntary tax compliance; (iii) to improve customer service; and (iv) to 
enhance integrity. It remains to be seen if the lofty objectives of the 
TRA Third Corporate Plan will bring fundamental changes to the 
institutional culture of the TRA. 
8.2 Relevance of Findings 
In demonstrating the limited capacity of the enforcement strategy to 
drive taxpayer compliance, and in documenting the resource 
constraints of the TRA in mounting an effective detection and 
\~ 
punishment scheme against tax delinquency, this study has made a 
case for refocusing tax compliance efforts such that enforcement 
strategies are not pursued in isolation but along side voluntary 
compliance strategies. 
With the appreciation that voluntary compliance can be the key to 
better performance of the tax system, the government should more 
seriously address factors such as fairness, accountability, trust in 
government and soundness of tax policies, which impact not only on 
compliance with tax laws, but on general compliance with all laws. 
A taxpayer-centric thinking is now required for tax administrators. 
Fortunately this is already emerging in the service oriented culture 
being adopted by the TRA making the taxpayer an important partner 
in taxation. 
'Stakeholders Perception Survey Report 2006', Large Taxpayer Department, the 
TRA, Dar es Salaam. 
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8.3 Recommendations 
(i) There is a need to change the mind-set of tax administrators 
so that they accept the partnership which must exist between 
tax administrators and taxpayers. 647 For that to succeed 
there needs to be a real commitment to respect taxpayer 
rights that goes beyond rhetoric, (in the form of non-
enforceable taxpayer charters) to substantive recognition. As 
suggested by Professor Bentiey,648 taxpayer rights need to be 
recognized not only because they reinforce tax compliance, 
but also because they are a matter of substantive law. 
Therefore taxpayer rights must be sufficiently entrenched in 
the tax laws so that taxpayers may readily enforce them, 
which is not the case at present. 
(ii) Adequate resources need to be provided for those measures 
which promote voluntary taxpayer compliance such as the 
taxpayer education program of the; TRA, which, currently is 
not sufficiently resourced by the TRA. 
(iii) Finally, there is a need to improve good governance so that 
the legitimacy of government is enhanced. With enhanced 
legitimacy of government and sufficient integrity within the 
tax administration, the foundation for better voluntary 
compliance will exist. As stated at the outset, taxpayers can 
voluntarily pay their taxes if they perceive the tax laws to be 
just, the tax administration to be fair and the government to 
be responsible. 
647L P Feld and B S Frey 'Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated' (2002) 3 
Economics of Governance 87. 
648D Bentley Taxpayers' Rights: Theory, Origin and Implementation, Series on 
International Taxation, Kluwer Law International, 2007, at 5. 
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